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NEPA AND THE “BENEFICIAL IMPACT” EIS
SHAUN A. GOHO*
ABSTRACT
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires that
federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for
any major federal action “significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.” Some courts—in dicta—and some commentators have sug-
gested that agencies must prepare an EIS for actions that will have
significant beneficial impacts on the environment but no significant ad-
verse impacts. In a recent case, the Ninth Circuit declined to address this
question, but suggested that there was a circuit split on the issue.
In this Article, I argue that agencies do not need to prepare such
a “Beneficial Impact” EIS. First, there is actually no circuit split on the
issue. All courts that have directly addressed the question have found that
there is no Beneficial Impact EIS requirement. Cases that have been cited
in support of such a requirement are either distinguishable or make such
statements only in dicta. Second, while the statute does not directly ad-
dress this question, some regulations and guidance indicate that an EIS
should not be required under these circumstances. Third, the policies un-
derlying NEPA are in tension with a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement.
Such a requirement would produce unnecessary cost and delay for envi-
ronmentally beneficial projects and create perverse incentives for federal
agencies without any compensating informational benefits.
INTRODUCTION
In its 2010 decision in Humane Society v. Locke,1 the Ninth Circuit
raised, but ultimately declined to address, what it described as “an issue
of first impression in this circuit: whether NEPA requires an agency to
prepare an EIS when an action has a significant beneficial impact but no
* Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School; Clinical Instructor and Staff Attorney in the
Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic. I thank Jared Knicley for his research
assistance and the editors of the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
for their editorial comments.
1 626 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2010).
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significant adverse impact on the environment.”2 Humane Society is not
alone. Several other courts have noted the issue but have not decided it.
For example, in 2006 the Fifth Circuit declined to rule on the issue.3
Similarly, a district court recently stated that “the Tenth Circuit has not
squarely addressed whether a project with a purely beneficial but signifi-
cant effect requires an EIS.”4
Some commentators have also asserted, or assumed, that an en-
vironmental impact statement (“EIS”) is required under the National
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) when an action will have signifi-
cant, beneficial environmental impacts.5 Charles Eccleston’s NEPA and
Environmental Planning, for example, says that “an action that would
result in a significant beneficial impact (with no significant adverse im-
pacts) may still be subject to an EIS.”6 Similarly, Daniel Mandelker’s
NEPA Law and Litigation treatise notes that while “[o]ne court held . . .
that an impact statement is necessary for a project that has beneficial
effects only if it also has significant adverse environmental effects . . . a
broad reading of the statute shows it also requires agencies to examine
the beneficial effects of their projects.”7
In this Article, I argue that NEPA should not be construed to
require that agencies prepare an EIS when a major federal action is
anticipated to have significant, beneficial environmental impacts, but no
significant, adverse environmental impacts. Neither the statute, nor the
Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) regulations, nor judicial prece-
dent require the preparation of such a “Beneficial Impact” EIS. Moreover,
the policies underlying NEPA are best served by an interpretation of the
statute that does not impose such a requirement. To the contrary, a
Beneficial Impact EIS requirement would undermine the goals of NEPA,
encourage gamesmanship by regulated industries, and create perverse
2 Id. at 1056.
3 See Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 239 (5th Cir. 2006).
4 Decker v. U.S. Forest Service, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1179 n.2 (D. Colo. 2011).
5 See, e.g., Neal McAliley, NEPA and Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 41 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10197, 10198 (2011) (“For proposed actions with significant
impacts (regardless of whether those impacts are negative or beneficial), an agency must
prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS).”); Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A Primer
on an “Old” Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10,060, 10,064 (1989) (“One frequently overlooked point is that the NEPA standard of
significance applies to both beneficial and adverse impacts.”).
6 CHARLES H. ECCLESTON, NEPA AND ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: TOOLS, TECHNIQUES,
AND APPROACHES FOR PRACTITIONERS 159 (2008).
7 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 8:37 (2d ed. Supp. 2010).
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incentives for federal agencies conducting NEPA analyses. As a result,
courts faced with this question should address it directly to make it clear
that agencies need not prepare Beneficial Impact EISs. The CEQ should
also consider promulgating guidance to clarify that the preparation of a
Beneficial Impact EIS is not required under NEPA.
My proposal is a narrow one. I am not suggesting, for example,
that any category of “environmentally beneficial” projects be exempted
from NEPA. Instead, my proposal addresses only the question of which
actions should require preparation of a full EIS; environmentally bene-
ficial actions would have to go through the environmental assessment
(“EA”)8 or categorical exclusion (“CE”)9 process to ensure that they do not
have significant adverse effects.
Nor do I propose that courts should accept, without question, an
agency’s characterization of its action as environmentally beneficial. To the
contrary, as is required under current case law, an “agency must prepare
an EIS if substantial questions are raised as to whether a project . . . may
cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor.”10 In
addition, I do not argue that actions with both significant beneficial and
adverse impacts should be exempted from the EIS requirement, even if
the beneficial impacts outweigh the detrimental ones. CEQ’s regulations
clearly require the preparation of an EIS under these circumstances.11
8 An environmental assessment is
a concise public document for which a Federal agency is responsible
that serves to:
(1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining
whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of
no significant impact[;]
(2) Aid an agency’s compliance with the Act when no environmental
impact statement is necessary[;]
(3) Facilitate preparation of a statement when one is necessary.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2010).
9 A categorical exclusion is
a category of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment and which have been found
to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in im-
plementation of [CEQ’s] regulations . . . and for which, therefore, neither
an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement
is required.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.
10 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1219
(9th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
11 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1).
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Nevertheless, the issue is still a significant one. A lot rides on an
agency’s decision whether to prepare a full EIS. For example, a 2003 report
by the federal NEPA Task Force found that the preparation of a typical EIS
costs between $250,000 and $2,000,000 and takes between one and six
years to complete.12 By contrast, “small” EAs typically cost $5000 to $20,000
and take between two weeks and two months to complete, and “large” EAs
for “controversial or high-profile projects” typically cost $50,000 to $200,000
and take between nine and eighteen months to complete.13 Because so
much depends on the choice between an EA and an EIS, “[t]he preparation
of an EA, rather than an EIS, is the most common source of conflict and
litigation under NEPA.”14
In particular, a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement could prove a
substantial impediment to the development of renewable energy projects.
Such projects are essential if the nation is to reduce its reliance on fossil
fuels and thereby reduce the impacts of global climate change.15 Across
the country, however—from the Cape Wind project off Cape Cod to solar
power projects in the Mojave Desert—some groups have been invoking the
environmental laws to oppose renewable energy proposals.16 If such pro-
jects will genuinely cause significant adverse environmental impacts, then
it is appropriate to require an EIS during the project planning process. But
it would be absurd to require the preparation of a full EIS, with the atten-
dant cost and delay, for such projects merely because of the significant
environmental benefits they will create.
In Part I, I explain that the statements in Humane Society v.
Locke and other cases notwithstanding, there is actually no circuit split
regarding whether an agency must prepare a Beneficial Impact EIS. The
only circuit court decision to address the question directly rejected this
proposition, and the other cases are distinguishable or made statements
12 NEPA TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NEPA TASK FORCE REPORT TO
THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION 66
(2003), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/report/finalreport.pdf.
13 Id. at 65.
14 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF
ITS EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS (1997), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov
/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf; accord Bear, supra note 5, at 10,064 (then–CEQ General Counsel
observing that “disagreement about whether a proposed action has ‘significant effects’
has been the most frequent reason for NEPA litigation over the past 19 years”).
15 See, e.g., CLARISSE FRÄSS-EHRFELD, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES: A CHANCE TO
COMBAT CLIMATE CHANGE 109–10 (2009).
16 See Matthew F. Pawa, The Very Definition of Folly: Saving the Earth from
Environmentalists, 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 77, 87–93 (2011).
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supporting a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement only in dicta. In Part II,
I discuss the statutory text, relevant regulations and guidance, and pol-
icy arguments. While the statutory text is ambiguous, the regulations,
guidance, and policy arguments support my argument. In Parts III and IV,
I consider and rebut some counterarguments, which suggest either that
a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement causes no harm that is not already
addressed by other doctrines or that such a requirement is desirable.
I. THERE IS NO CIRCUIT SPLIT
As one reason for refusing to decide the question, both Humane
Society and Decker suggested that there is a circuit split on the Beneficial
Impact EIS issue.17 A review of the decisions, however, demonstrates that
there is, in fact, no split regarding the need for a Beneficial Impact EIS.
The only decisions that have directly addressed the question have held
that there is no such requirement.18 The cases cited in Humane Society
and elsewhere as supporting such a requirement either made the state-
ment only in dicta, or addressed other questions, such as when an EIS
must be supplemented and when beneficial impacts must be analyzed in
an independently necessary EIS because of significant adverse impacts.19
A. The Only Cases Directly on Point Have Found that an EIS Is
Not Required
Courts routinely describe the test for a “significant” environmental
impact purely in terms of the magnitude of a proposed action’s adverse
impacts.20 For example, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[a]n EIS
17 Humane Soc’y v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1056 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010); Decker v. U.S. Forest
Service, 780 F. Supp.2d 1170, 1179 n.2 (D. Colo. 2011).
18 See infra Part I.A.
19 See, e.g., Humane Soc’y, 626 F.3d at 1056 n.9 (citing Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible
Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 F.3d 938, 956 (9th Cir. 2008), Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 816 F.2d 205, 211 n.3 (5th Cir. 1987), Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Herrington,
768 F.2d 1355, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1985), Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 783
(11th Cir. 1983), and Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir. 1981)).
20 See Dorothy W. Bisbee, NEPA Review of Offshore Wind Farms: Ensuring Emission
Reduction Benefits Outweigh Visual Impacts, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 349, 355 (2004)
(“The implementation of NEPA has focused on the harms, rather than the benefits, of
proposed projects and technologies.”).
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must be prepared if substantial questions are raised as to whether a
project . . . may cause significant degradation of some human environ-
mental factor.”21 Such cases properly recognize that the focus of NEPA
should be on understanding, reducing, and eliminating the adverse en-
vironmental effects of federal actions. Given that the Beneficial Impacts
EIS issue was not before the court in these decisions, however, such state-
ments are dicta and do not resolve the question.22
Only one circuit court decision has directly addressed whether an
agency must prepare a Beneficial Impact EIS, and it correctly concluded
that the agency need not. In Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home
Administration,23 the Sixth Circuit addressed a challenge to a decision
of the Farmers Home Administration (“FmHA”) not to prepare an EIS for
its decision to fund a small dam project.24 The dam, on Big Fiery Gizzard
Creek, near Tracy City, Tennessee, would create a fifty-seven-acre reser-
voir in a shallow valley.25 The reservoir and accompanying water treat-
ment plant would provide a source of drinking water for the town of
Tracy City.26 Because the FmHA was providing funding for the project,
it completed an EA, in which it concluded that “[t]here will be no signifi-
cant adverse impacts in connection with this project.”27 In fact, the FmHA
suggested that the project would “have a positive impact on the living envi-
ronment of the residents of the area” by providing them “with a dependable,
sanitary water supply.”28
21 Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also Hanly v.
Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830–31 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the significance determi-
nation depends on “at least two relevant factors: (1) the extent to which the action will cause
adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area affected
by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself,
including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse con-
ditions or uses in the affected area”) (emphasis added); Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 201 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that an
EIS “is required whenever the action arguably will have an adverse environmental impact”)
(three-judge court), rev’d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
22 See, e.g., Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project, 161 F.3d at 1216; Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 346 F. Supp. at 201.
23 61 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 1995).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 503.
26 Id.
27 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 Id.
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Several environmental groups, including the Friends of Fiery
Gizzard and the Sierra Club, challenged FmHA’s compliance with NEPA.29
Before the district court, the plaintiffs argued that the EA’s analysis of
adverse environmental impacts was inadequate in several respects.30 On
appeal, however, the plaintiffs primarily pressed their remaining claim,
which was that FmHA needed to prepare an EIS because the EA had dem-
onstrated that the project would have significant, beneficial environmen-
tal impacts.31 In particular, they argued that the plain language of NEPA
required an EIS for any “major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment,” and did not distinguish between
significant adverse and significant beneficial effects.32
The Sixth Circuit concluded that no EIS was required.33 The court
began by explaining that the statute had to “be read in the light of the
implementing regulations.”34 Both CEQ’s general regulations and FmHA’s
agency-specific regulations prescribe the use of EAs “as ‘a screening
device . . . [that] allows agencies with limited resources to focus on truly
important federal actions.’ ”35 The CEQ regulations establish criteria for
identifying “significant” environmental impacts.36 The court in Friends
of Fiery Gizzard emphasized that these regulations required an agency
to consider the “intensity” of an action, which the regulations defined as
“the severity of [the] impact.”37 In the court’s view “[t]his choice of adjec-
tives is significant . . . ; one speaks of the severity of adverse impacts, not
beneficial impacts.”38
29 See Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin., 864 F. Supp. 717 (M.D. Tenn.
1994), aff’d, 61 F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 1995).
30 See id. at 721–23 (discussing plaintiffs’ arguments that the EA “had not sufficiently
examined the potential effect of the impoundment on the quality of the water in the Big
Fiery Gizzard Creek,” that the EA had an “inadequate . . . alternatives analysis,” that
FmHA was biased, and “that there was inadequate documentation of several of the con-
clusions reached in the EA”).
31 Friends of Fiery Gizzard, 61 F.3d at 504.
32 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33 Id. at 505–06.
34 Id. at 504.
35 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851,
858 (9th Cir. 1982)).
36 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2010).
37 Friends of Fiery Gizzard, 61 F.3d at 504 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38 Id. The court also quoted portions of CEQ’s regulations that required agencies “ ‘to
make the NEPA process more useful to decisionmakers and the public,’ not less useful;
‘to reduce paperwork and the accumulation of extraneous background data,’ not expand
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The court also suggested that a Beneficial Impact EIS require-
ment would be inconsistent with the purposes of NEPA. In particular, it
questioned how “the delays and costs associated with the preparation of
an [EIS]” would “stimulate the health and welfare” of the residents of
Tracy City, given that the EIS “would not even arguably be required
were it not for the project’s positive impact on health and welfare.”39 “It
would be anomalous to conclude that an environmental impact state-
ment is necessitated by an assessment which identifies beneficial im-
pacts while forecasting no significant adverse impacts, when the same
assessment would not require the preparation of an impact statement if
the assessment predicted no significant beneficial effect.”40
Several district court decisions have reached the same result as
in Friends of Fiery Gizzard.41 There is therefore a clear body of case law
holding that Beneficial Impact EISs should not be required.42 As I will
discuss below, there are no cases that directly reach a contrary result.
B. Some Cases Are Distinguishable
Some of the other cases that are cited as supporting the proposition
that an agency must prepare an EIS when an action will have only signi-
ficant, beneficial environmental impacts actually involve different issues.
First, some cases involve the decision whether to prepare a supplemental
them; and ‘to emphasize real environmental issues and alternatives,’ not fanciful ones.”
Id. at 505 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(b)).
39 Id. at 505 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4321).
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Ind. Forest Alliance v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. NA99-0214-C-H/G, 2001 WL
912751, at *14 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2001); Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Gover, 104 F. Supp. 2d
1194, 1211 (D.S.D. 2000), vacated for lack of standing, 286 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2002);
Sierra Club v. Pena, 915 F. Supp. 1381, 1398–99 (N.D. Ohio 1996); cf. Buckeye Forest
Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 378 F. Supp. 2d 835, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (holding that an
action with “beneficial” effects did not require an EIS because the agency’s “conclusion,
on the basis of the EA, that the [action] would have no significant adverse environmental
consequences is entirely reasonable”).
42 The Ninth Circuit has also implicitly rejected the related argument that an EIS is
required when a proposal will have no significant environmental impacts, but an alter-
native would have significant beneficial impacts. In National Wildlife Federation v. Espy,
45 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 1995), the plaintiffs argued that the FmHA needed to prepare an
EIS when it transferred title for a wetland to the Farm Credit Bank without imposing
a wetlands conservation requirement, id. at 1343. The Ninth Circuit held that no EIS
was required because the transfer preserved the environmental status quo, which in-
cluded cattle grazing on the wetland. Id. This case presents a version of the baseline
problem, discussed in text accompanying notes 210–16, below.
2012] NEPA AND THE “BENEFICIAL IMPACT” EIS 375
EIS.43 Others involve an agency’s assertion that its actions are exempt
from NEPA compliance altogether.44 Finally, another set of cases hold
only that an EIS may be necessary even when an action may have net
beneficial effects.45 As explained below, these situations raise distinct
issues and do not compel a similar outcome when an agency is deciding
whether to prepare an initial EIS.
1. Supplemental EIS
A pair of cases frequently cited as supporting a Beneficial Impact
EIS requirement actually involved the distinct issue of when an agency
must prepare a supplemental EIS.46 In these cases, an initial EIS had been
required because the project was anticipated to have significant adverse
effects.47 When changes were made to the proposal to mitigate some of
those effects, the question arose whether the significant beneficial effects
of those mitigation measures required the preparation of a supplemental
EIS.48 Because of the significantly different posture in which these cases
arose, their conclusions that supplemental EISs were required to analyze
beneficial impacts do not compel a similar result when an EA discloses
that a project will have only significant beneficial impacts.
The first case is Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh.49 This
case involved the Army Corps of Engineers’ planning for the Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway (the “TTW”), a 253-mile artificial waterway across
parts of Mississippi and Alabama.50 The Corps first prepared an EIS for the
TTW in 1971.51 In the subsequent years, the Corps made various changes
to the proposed project, but did not complete a supplemental EIS.52 The
Environmental Defense Fund (“EDF”) sued the Corps in 1976 to compel
the supplementation of its environmental analysis.53
43 See infra Part I.B.1.
44 See infra Part I.B.2.
45 See infra Part I.B.3.
46 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981); Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1983).
47 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 987; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 721 F.2d at 771.
48 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 991; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 721 F.2d at 782.
49 651 F.2d 983.
50 Id. at 986.
51 Id. at 987. The adequacy of that EIS was upheld in Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974).
52 Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 988.
53 Id. at 990.
376 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:367
The Fifth Circuit concluded that several changes to the project were
sufficiently large to require the preparation of a supplemental EIS.54 Most
of these changes were likely to produce adverse environmental impacts.55
In addition, however, the court concluded that although there was evidence
that two of the changes—the acquisition of additional land to mitigate the
environmental impacts of the TTW and the chain-of-lakes design—could
have significant adverse impacts, a supplemental EIS would be necessary
even if the effects were beneficial: “[E]ven if the Corps was correct in decid-
ing that the new land use will be beneficial in impact, a beneficial impact
must nevertheless be discussed in an EIS, so long as it is significant.
NEPA is concerned with all significant environmental effects, not merely
adverse ones.”56
National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, decided by the Eleventh
Circuit two years later, involved the similar decision of whether to prepare
a supplemental EIS after the development of a mitigation plan for a pro-
posal to build an artificial lake.57 The court, citing Environmental Defense
Fund v. Marsh, held that a supplemental EIS was required because
“appellants have shown that the Mitigation Plan involves a number of
proposed project changes that are likely to have a significant, though ben-
eficial, impact on the environment in and around the proposed lake.”58
Based on these statements, some courts and commentators have
cited Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh and National Wildlife
Federation v. Marsh as standing for the proposition that an agency must
prepare an EIS when an action will have significant beneficial impacts.59
The cases are easily distinguishable, however. First, they dealt with the
need for a supplemental EIS rather than the need for an EIS in the first
place.60 As a result, it was uncontested in both cases that the action would
54 Id. at 992–96.
55 See id. (discussing the potential adverse impacts of changes in traffic levels and
direction, increased land use, a new chain-of-lakes design, and straightening of the
Tombigbee River).
56 Id. at 993; see id. at 994 (“Even if the Corps correctly decided that the design is
superior in terms of overall environmental impact, that decision does not dispose of the
material issue before the court: does the design have any significant new environmental
impacts, whether beneficial or harmful?”).
57 721 F.2d 767, 782 (11th Cir. 1983).
58 Id. at 783.
59 See, e.g., Humane Soc’y v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1056 n.9 (9th Cir. 2010); Bear, supra
note 5, at 10,064.
60 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 990; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 721 F.2d at 770.
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have at least some significant adverse impacts.61 The changes to the proj-
ects addressed by these opinions did not produce beneficial impacts in-
dependent of the adverse impacts they were intended to mitigate.62 The
courts’ holdings thus follow from the requirement that an agency prepare
an EIS for an action that will have both significant adverse impacts and
significant beneficial impacts.63
Second, the specific “benefits” alleged to flow from the amendments
to the projects were actually reductions in harm compared to the initial
proposal. The amendments were significant changes to the projects—thus
necessitating a supplemental EIS—but in the context of a project that
would still have significant adverse impacts.64 Third, in Environmental
Defense Fund v. Marsh, the court found that most of the amendments to
the project that triggered the need for a supplemental EIS would actually
produce adverse impacts.65
In sum, Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh and National
Wildlife Federation v. Marsh addressed situations in which an agency
proposed an action with significant adverse impacts and then made some
changes that might reduce some of those impacts. To require a supple-
mental EIS under these circumstances is consistent with NEPA’s purposes
because it both provides the public with important new information about
a project with significant adverse environmental impacts and forces the
agency to re-weigh the costs and benefits of the proposal and alternatives
to it in light of a significant change to the proposal. Requiring a supple-
mental EIS, however, says nothing about whether an agency must pre-
pare an initial EIS for a project that would have no significant adverse
impacts, but only significant beneficial ones. It is thus not surprising that,
in a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit characterized Environmental
Defense Fund v. Marsh as “determin[ing] only whether an EIS need discuss
positive benefits.”66
61 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 987; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 721 F.2d at 771.
62 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 992–95; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 721 F.2d at 784.
63 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1) (2010).
64 See Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 992–95; Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 721 F.2d at 784.
65 Envtl. Def. Fund, 651 F.2d at 992–97.
66 Coliseum Square Ass’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 239 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added) (citing Envtl. Def. Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981));
see Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin., 864 F. Supp. 717, 719–20 (M.D.
Tenn 1994) (“[N]either of the courts in [Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh and
National Wildlife Foundation v. Marsh] clearly stated that beneficial impacts merited an
EIS in their own right. These cases merely stand for the proposition that beneficial
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2. Claim of Absolute Exemption from NEPA
There are other cases that involve an agency’s assertion that the
proposed action is exempt from NEPA altogether. Such assertions go back
to the early days of the statute, when EPA took the position that all of its
actions were exempt from NEPA.67 Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) has argued that its decisions to list a species or designate critical
habitat under the Endangered Species Act are exempt from NEPA.68
The courts have agreed with FWS regarding species listings,69
but the cases are split regarding critical habitat designations. The Ninth
Circuit, in Douglas County v. Babbitt, held that the designation of crit-
ical habitat was exempt from NEPA.70 In Catron County Board of
Commissioners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,71 however, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the FWS’s argument that its decision to establish criti-
cal habitat for two threatened species (the loach minnow and spikedace)
was exempt from NEPA compliance. In its discussion of this question,
the court observed that whether “the Secretary believes the effects of a
particular designation to be beneficial is . . . immaterial to his responsi-
bility to comply with NEPA.”72
As a result of this statement, Catron County has been cited as
requiring a Beneficial Impact EIS.73 That was not the holding of the case,
however, and it is not clear that the Tenth Circuit said as much, even in
dicta. First, the court was addressing only the argument that no NEPA
compliance was required at all.74 Second, its explicit holding was that the
impacts should be discussed in an EIS, and that NEPA is concerned with all significant
impacts. That is not the same as holding that in a case where no significant adverse im-
pact exists at all, but a significant beneficial impact exists, an EIS must be performed.”).
67 See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson, Jr., The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 238, 256–67 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds., 1974)
(reviewing the debate about whether EPA had to comply with NEPA). While a blanket
exemption for EPA has been rejected by the courts, Congress has specifically exempted
many EPA actions from NEPA compliance, including most actions under the Clean Water
Act and all actions under the Clean Air Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (2006); 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(e) (2006).
68 See, e.g., Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 832 (6th Cir. 1981).
69 See id. at 841.
70 48 F.3d 1495, 1507–08 (9th Cir. 1995).
71 75 F.3d 1429, 1439 (10th Cir. 1996).
72 Id. at 1437.
73 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Pure Waters, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of
Natural Res., 519 U.S. 864 (1996) (No. 96-56), 1996 WL 3342213, at *13.
74 Catron Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 75 F.3d at 1439.
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FWS had to prepare an EA.75 Third, the plaintiff had alleged potentially
significant adverse impacts from the designation of critical habitat.76
An earlier case reaching the same result was Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant.77 This case involved a stream channeli-
zation project in the Chicod Creek Watershed in North Carolina that was
intended to reduce flooding.78 The Soil Conservation Service had not
completed an EIS under NEPA, but argued that environmental analyses
prepared pursuant to other laws eliminated the need for an EIS.79 The
court rejected this argument.80 In particular, it stated that “[a]ny action
that substantially affects, beneficially or detrimentally, the depth or course
of streams, plant life, wildlife habitats, fish and wildlife, and the soil and
air ‘significantly affects the quality of the human environment.’ ”81 It then
noted that the sixty-six miles of stream channelization was projected to
cause “a substantial reduction (ninety percent) in the standing crop of
[the] fish population” and “significant lossage in wetland habitat.”82 As
a result, the court concluded, the project “significantly affects the quality
of the human environment.”83
75 Id. (“When the environmental ramifications of such designations are unknown, we
believe Congress intends that the Secretary prepare an EA leading to either a FONSI or
an EIS.”) (emphasis added).
76 In particular, Catron County argued that the designation would “prevent continued gov-
ernmental flood control efforts, thereby significantly affecting nearby farms and ranches,
other privately owned land, local economies and public roadways and bridges.” Id. at
1437–38. In a subsequent decision, the Tenth Circuit required an EIS for the designation
of the Middle Rio Grande as critical habitat for the silvery minnow. Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy Dist. v. Norton, 294 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002). In particular, the
court concluded that the designation would result in a decrease of irrigated farmland and
a possible loss of flood protection (the latter because the Bureau of Reclamation might
have to use more expensive techniques to minimize harms to silvery minnow critical
habitat and therefore not have sufficient money for flood control). Id. at 1227–28. Even
though the court’s decision is suspect—both because it is not clear that reductions in ir-
rigated farmland should count as an environmental impact and because the causal chain
leading to the potential loss of flood control was too attenuated—the court clearly saw these
environmental impacts as detrimental. Therefore, Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District
did not endorse a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement.
77 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
78 Id. at 361.
79 Id. at 365–66.
80 Id. at 366.
81 Id. at 367.
82 Id. at 367.
83 See Natural Res. Def. Council, 341 F. Supp. at 367.
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Here too the agency had claimed that it was exempt from
NEPA.84 In addition, the available alternatives, at that time, were to
prepare an EIS or avoid NEPA altogether; the EA process had not yet
been developed.85 Finally, the court’s statement about beneficial impacts
was dicta, because it identified significant adverse environmental im-
pacts as the basis for concluding that the project would significantly
affect the human environment.86
These cases, at most, stand for the proposition that an agency’s
belief that a project will have only beneficial impacts does not exempt it
from NEPA altogether. Such a result is reasonable. Given the risk of agen-
cy short-sightedness or tunnel vision, a court should not accept an agency’s
assertion that an action will have only beneficial impacts unless there is
some environmental analysis to back it up.87 For categories of actions that
can be addressed together, a categorical exclusion might be appropriate.
For actions that can be addressed only on a case-by-case basis, an EA can
sort out the actions that will genuinely have only environmentally bene-
ficial effects. Public involvement in these processes will reduce the like-
lihood that an agency is overlooking harmful effects from what it believes
to be a beneficial action.
3. Cases Holding that an Agency Must Complete an EIS Even if
the Project Will Have Net Beneficial Impacts
An agency must consider the beneficial environmental impacts
of a project when completing an EA or EIS.88 The existence of these
benefits—and even the conclusion that they will outweigh the detrimen-
tal impacts—does not, however, relieve the agency of the duty of prepar-
ing an EIS if the project does have significant adverse impacts.
This rule follows from the requirement in the CEQ regulations
that “[a] significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency believes
84 See id. at 364.
85 CEQ provided for the preparation of EAs in final guidelines published on August 1, 1973.
Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (Aug. 1, 1973).
86 See Natural Res. Def. Council, 341 F. Supp. at 367.
87 See infra notes 217–21 and accompanying text.
88 See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE UNDER THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 8 (1997), available at http://www.epa.gov
/compliance/ej/resources/policy/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.pdf [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE].
2012] NEPA AND THE “BENEFICIAL IMPACT” EIS 381
that on balance the effect will be beneficial.”89 In other words, the existence
of both significant beneficial impacts and significant adverse impacts can-
not be used as an excuse not to perform an EIS. The rule makes sense,
given that environmental impacts are frequently incommensurable.90 If an
action, for example, will reduce air pollution but increase water pollution,
there is no easy way to conclude that the beneficial impacts “outweigh”
the negative impacts.
A number of cases have held that an agency must prepare an EIS
even when it believes that the significant beneficial environmental im-
pacts of its action will outweigh the significant negative environmental
impacts. For example, in Environmental Protection Information Center
v. Blackwell,91 the Forest Service issued an EA and a Finding of No
Significant Impact (“FONSI”) for a timber sale, concluding that an EIS
was unnecessary.92 One of the issues raised by the timber sale was its
potential impact on ecological connectivity—whether the timber har-
vesting would make it more difficult for animals, including endangered
northern spotted owls, to travel between a wilderness area and a late-
successional reserve.93 The Forest Service argued that, although the
timber sale would have some adverse effects on connectivity, those effects
would be outweighed by its positive impacts—namely that part of the
project area was infested with a fungus and that, if the infected trees
were not harvested, the disease would spread and ultimately render even
more habitat unsuitable for owl foraging and dispersal.94
The court rejected this argument, which it characterized as being,
“in essence, that the benefits of the DA Timber Sale will outweigh any
adverse effects.”95 In support of its conclusion, it cited both the CEQ reg-
ulations and dicta from Friends of Fiery Gizzard, in which the court had
observed that “[w]here [significant] adverse effects can be predicted, and
the agency is in the position of having to balance the adverse effects
89 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1) (2006).
90 See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer
World, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61, 85 (2007).
91 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
92 Id. at 1181.
93 Id. at 1195. Late-successional reserves are federal lands designated by the Northwest
Forest Plan of 1994 “to serve as habitat for late-successional and old-growth related
species including the northern spotted owl.” Id. at 1180 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
94 Id. at 1197.
95 Id.
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against the projected benefits, the matter must, under NEPA, be decided
in light of an environmental impact statement.”96
Similarly, another district court found that an agency could not
avoid preparing an EIS in a case involving the issuance of permits and
rights-of-way to allow two utilities to connect power plants in Mexico to
the power grid in California.97 Granting the permits would produce sig-
nificant detrimental impacts, including increases in the salinity of the
Salton Sea, even though it would also “improve the biological and chemi-
cal quality” of the water entering the Sea.98
These cases should not be misconstrued as requiring a Beneficial
Impact EIS.99 Instead, they require an EIS for an action that has both
significant detrimental impacts and significant beneficial impacts. This
requirement is consistent with my proposal and helps promote NEPA’s
key purposes.
C. In Other Cases, the Statements Are Only Dicta
In another set of cases, the court did directly endorse the Beneficial
Impact EIS requirement, but only in dicta. In some of these cases, the is-
sue was not even before the court.100 In others, the court did hold that an
EIS was required, but only when also faced with significant detrimental
impacts.101 Either way, however, the court’s statement that significant
beneficial impacts trigger the EIS requirement was dicta, and therefore
not binding on subsequent courts, even in the same circuit.
For example, in Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn,102 the
plaintiffs challenged a federally funded housing project. The Department
96 Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 389 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 (quoting Friends of Fiery Gizzard v.
Farmers Home Admin., 61 F.3d 501, 505 (6th Cir. 1995)) (alterations in original)
(emphasis removed).
97 Border Power Plant Working Grp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
98 Id. at 1023 n.22.
99 Cf. MANDELKER, supra note 7, at § 8.37 (citing Environmental Protection Information
Center, amongst others, for the proposition that “[m]ost courts have held or suggested,
however, that agencies must consider the beneficial impacts of their actions”).
100 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973), overruled, Sierra
Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983); Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle,
503 F. Supp. 314 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d, 639 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1980).
101 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cookeville, 381 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Jones v.
Redevelopment Land Agency, 3 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,607 (D.D.C. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
102 476 F.2d 421.
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of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) had determined that the
housing project would produce no significant environmental impacts and
that an EIS was therefore not required.103 The plaintiffs argued “that
NEPA requires that an agency file an environmental impact statement
if any significant environmental effects, whether adverse or beneficial,
are forecast.”104
The Fifth Circuit noted that “this contention raises serious ques-
tions” about HUD’s decision not to prepare an EIS.105 In particular, the
court suggested, “[a] close reading of Section 102(2)(C) in its entirety dis-
closes that Congress was not only concerned with just adverse effects but
with all potential environmental effects that affect the quality of the
human environment.”106 Nevertheless, the court did not reverse HUD’s
decision, because the district court had held “a full evidentiary hearing”
in which it had concluded that an EIS was not required.107
Because they did not affect the result—HUD’s decision was
upheld—the Fifth Circuit’s statements in Hiram Clarke are merely
dicta. It is also unclear whether the court’s statements should be read as
unequivocal support for the notion that an EIS is required based only on
substantial beneficial effects; after all, the court said only that the plain-
tiffs’ argument “raise[d] serious questions” and that in section 102(2)(C),
Congress was “concerned with” both adverse and beneficial effects.108 Thus,
in a later case, the Fifth Circuit characterized its Hiram Clarke decision
as one in which it “rhetorically considered the question, but ha[d] not ar-
rived at an answer.”109
Several other cases make brief references to a Beneficial Impact
EIS requirement but do not actually impose such a requirement on the
agency in the case before the court. In one case, the D.C. Circuit merely
mentioned in passing that “DOE is correct in pointing out that both ben-
eficial and adverse effects on the environment can be significant within
the meaning of NEPA, and thus require an EIS.”110 Similarly, a 1979
103 Id. at 426.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 427.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Hiram Clarke, 476 F.2d at 421.
109 Coliseum Square Ass’n v. Jackson, 465 F.3d 215, 239 (5th Cir. 2006).
110 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). DOE,
in its brief, devoted only one paragraph to this argument, citing Hiram Clarke Civic Club,
Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973) and National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 721
F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1983) in support of its assertion that “[i]f a proposal will have signi-
ficant environmental impacts either beneficial or adverse, an EIS is required.” Corrected
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district court decision characterized EPA’s then-current regulations as
requiring “that an EIS must be prepared when an EPA project will have
a significant effect—beneficial or adverse—upon population, land use,
fish and wildlife, floodplains, historic or archeological land sites, or en-
dangered species.”111 On the facts before it, however, the court concluded
that an EIS was not necessary for a proposed wastewater treatment
plant because “the ultimate streamflow was to increase and . . . any det-
rimental effect on the streamflow was speculative.”112 Other cases state
in dicta that significant beneficial impacts require preparation of an EIS
but either also identify significant adverse impacts or indicate that the
agency has already agreed to prepare an EIS.113
None of these cases actually held that an agency had to prepare
an EIS for an action that was expected to have only significant benefi-
cial impacts. Instead, because their statements were only dicta, they do
not create a split of authority with Friends of Fiery Gizzard. Therefore,
there is no reason in the case law to hold an agency to a Beneficial
Impact EIS requirement.
Moreover, even if some of the early cases discussed above, such as
Hiram Clarke and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, might be
read to create a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement, changed circum-
stances since the early 1970s undercut their precedential value. First,
those cases were decided before the CEQ issued its NEPA regulations in
Brief for Respondent Donald P. Hodel, Secretary, Dep’t of Energy at 101, NRDC v.
Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (No. 83-1195). Yet, as discussed above, the
statement in Hiram Clarke is itself dicta and National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh
addressed the distinct issue of when analysis of significant beneficial impacts is required
in a supplemental EIS when it is conceded that there are also significant adverse effects.
111 Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle, 503 F. Supp. 314, 321 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d,
639 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1980).
112 Id. at 324. In addition, the court appeared to mis-characterize the EPA regulation on
which it relied. That regulation provided that “[a]n action with both beneficial and det-
rimental effects should be classified as having significant effects on the environment,
even if EPA believes that the net effect will be beneficial. However, preference should be
given to preparing EIS’s on proposed actions which, on balance, have adverse effects.” 40
C.F.R. § 6.200(a)(1) (1979) (emphasis added). The regulation thus said nothing about the
situation in which an action would have only significant beneficial effects but no sig-
nificant detrimental impacts. In fact, by indicating that the emphasis should be placed
on preparing EISs for actions with “on balance . . . adverse effects,” the regulation is
consistent with my proposal here that the EIS process should not be applied to actions
with only significant beneficial impacts. Id.
113 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cookeville, 381 F. Supp. 100, 111 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Jones v.
Redev. Land Agency, 3 ENVIR. L. REP. 20,607, 20,608 (D.D.C. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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1978.114 As explained below, those regulations support the conclusion
that an EIS is required only when there are significant adverse environ-
mental impacts.115 Second, the time and effort required to prepare an EIS
had not yet become clear in the early 1970s. As the Sixth Circuit observed
in Friends of Fiery Gizzard, since that time, “there has been ‘a growing
awareness that routinely requiring such statements would use up re-
sources better spent in careful study of actions likely to harm the envi-
ronment substantially.’ ”116 Third, the development of the EA process has
meant that exempting a project from the EIS requirement does not mean
exempting it from NEPA altogether.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE
REQUIRED BASED ONLY ON SIGNIFICANT BENEFICIAL IMPACTS
The previous part of this Article explained that, despite statements
to the contrary, there is no circuit split regarding whether an agency must
prepare a Beneficial Impact EIS. In this section, I examine the statutory
text, regulations, guidance, and policy arguments. The statutory text does
not address this question and the regulations, while somewhat favor-
ing my argument, are also not entirely clear. Policy arguments, however,
strongly oppose a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement.
A. The Statutory Text
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, which creates the EIS requirement,
provides that an agency must prepare an EIS for “major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”117 The EIS
must contain a discussion of:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of
long-term productivity, and
114 Implementation of Procedural Provisions, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (Nov. 29, 1978).
115 See infra Part II.B.1.
116 Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin., 61 F.3d 501, 505 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995)
(quoting River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs, 764 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1985)).
117 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
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(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.118
If an action is one that is otherwise subject to NEPA, the trigger
for the EIS requirement is that the action will “significantly affect[ ] the
quality of the human environment.”119 The juxtaposition of the neutral
“significantly affect[ ]” with “adverse environmental effects” could lead
one to conclude that the EIS requirement is triggered by any significant
environmental effect, even if that effect is significantly beneficial for the
environment.120 Indeed, in a seminal law review article on NEPA, Thomas
McGarity observed that “[a] literal reading of the language of NEPA re-
quires the preparation of an EIS detailing the beneficial effects of federal
actions that have no significant detrimental effects.”121
Yet, the overall emphasis is still on avoiding or minimizing ad-
verse impacts.122 In section 101, Congress stated as a reason for enacting
NEPA, its “recogni[tion]” of “the profound impact of man’s activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly
the profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization,
industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding tech-
nological advances.”123 These “impact[s]” are all, or virtually all (“new and
expanding technological advances” may not be) adverse.124 A primary goal
of NEPA is thus to address these harmful impacts on the environment.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX.
L. REV. 801, 850 n.194 (1977).
122 A precedent for interpreting seemingly neutral language to require the most de-
tailed analysis only for adverse impacts is found in the regulations implementing the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). Under the ESA, an action agency must consult with the
FWS or National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) if the action “may affect” listed
species or critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (2010). The Departments of Commerce
and the Interior have explained that the consultation requirement is triggered by “[a]ny
possible effect, whether beneficial, benign, adverse, or of an undetermined character.”
Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 Fed Reg. 19,926, 19,949
(June 3, 1986). However, before engaging in full, formal consultation, action agencies may
engage in informal consultation. “If, as a result of informal consultation, the Federal
agency determines, and the Service concurs, that the action (or modified action) is ‘not
likely to adversely affect’ listed species or critical habitat, then formal consultation is not
required.” Id. (emphasis added).
123 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006).
124 Id.
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The statute also indicates that its goals include “restoring and
maintaining environmental quality,” working “to create and maintain con-
ditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony,”
and “enhanc[ing] the quality of renewable resources.”125 These purposes
seem to contemplate actions that will actively enhance environmental
quality rather than merely avoid or minimize harm. Yet even these goals
are not inconsistent with my argument. If one of NEPA’s goals is to pro-
mote environmentally beneficial actions, then a Beneficial Impact EIS
requirement would actually hinder this goal. Such a requirement would
largely serve to delay or otherwise impede environmentally beneficial
projects. Therefore, even NEPA’s goal of “enhancing” environmental qual-
ity does not require a Beneficial Impact EIS.
The statutory text, therefore, does not conclusively answer the
question of whether agencies must prepare a Beneficial Impact EIS,
although it is consistent with my argument. I therefore next turn to the
regulations and guidance promulgated by the CEQ and by other fed-
eral agencies.
B. Regulations and Guidance
1. CEQ Regulations
In 1978, the CEQ issued regulations interpreting NEPA “to guide
federal agencies in determining what actions are subject to [the EIS]
requirement.”126 The Supreme Court has held that these regulations are
“entitled to substantial deference.”127
In these regulations, CEQ amplifies on the statutory term “signifi-
cantly.”128 The regulations explain that whether an action “significantly”
affects the environment “requires considerations of both context and
intensity.”129 “Context” for this purpose means that the “action must be ana-
lyzed in several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the
affected region, the affected interests, and the locality.”130 “Intensity . . .
refers to the severity of impact.”131 The regulation then lists ten consider-
ations to be used in determining intensity.132
125 Id. § 4331(a)–(b).
126 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004).
127 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 355 (1989).
128 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2010).
129 Id.
130 Id. § 1508.27(a).
131 Id. § 1508.27(b).
132 Id.
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The first of these factors is: “Impacts that may be both beneficial
and adverse. A significant effect may exist even if the Federal agency
believes that on balance the effect will be beneficial.”133 This factor has
led some to conclude that an agency must prepare a Beneficial Impact
EIS. For example, the Tenth Circuit cited this sentence in its Catron
County decision.134 Even then–CEQ General Counsel Dinah Bear, in a
1989 article in the Environmental Law Reporter, cited this provision to
support her statement that “the NEPA standard of significance applies
to both beneficial and adverse impacts.”135
Yet the better reading of the regulations is that they do not re-
quire a Beneficial Impact EIS and even implicitly disfavor it. First, they
identify “intensity” as “refer[ring] to the severity of impact.”136 As the Sixth
Circuit observed in Friends of Fiery Gizzard, “[t]his choice of adjectives
is significant, we think; one speaks of the severity of adverse impacts, not
beneficial impacts.”137 Second, even the requirement to prepare an EIS
for actions that have “on balance” beneficial impacts can be understood
to assume that no EIS is required for actions with only significant bene-
ficial impacts.138 An action that on balance has beneficial impacts can
have both significant adverse impacts and significant beneficial impacts.
Moreover, it would not be necessary to indicate in the regulations that
such actions with both significant beneficial and adverse impacts can re-
quire an EIS if actions with only significant beneficial impacts required
an EIS. Yet the regulations say nothing about the latter situation.139
More generally, the emphasis of the CEQ regulations is on avoiding
or minimizing adverse impacts. Thus they instruct agencies “to the full-
est extent possible” to “[u]se the NEPA process to identify and assess the
reasonable alternatives to proposed actions that will avoid or minimize ad-
verse effects of these actions upon the quality of the human environment.”140
Agencies are also to “[u]se all practicable means . . . to . . . avoid or mini-
mize any possible adverse effects of their actions upon the quality of the
human environment.”141
133 Id. § 1508.27(b)(1).
134 Catron Cnty Bd. of Comm’rs v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th
Cir. 1996).
135 Bear, supra note 5, at 10,064; see also ECCLESTON, supra note 6, at 159.
136 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (emphasis added).
137 Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin., 61 F.3d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 1995)
(emphasis in original).
138 See id. at 505.
139 See id. at 505–06.
140 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(e) (emphasis added).
141 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(f) (emphasis added).
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In sum, the CEQ regulations do not compel the preparation of a
Beneficial Impact EIS. Yet they also do not unequivocally indicate that
one is not required.
2. CEQ Guidance and the Regulations and Guidance of
Other Agencies
Most federal agencies have also promulgated NEPA regulations
to guide their own implementation of the statute.142 These agencies, as
well as CEQ, have also issued various guidance documents addressing
NEPA issues.143 Some of these documents provide strong support for the
proposition that agencies should not be required to prepare Beneficial
Impact EISs.144
The clearest such statement comes from the Bureau of Land
Management’s NEPA Handbook.145 First, it makes it clear that an expec-
tation that an action will have beneficial impacts does not exempt it from
NEPA compliance altogether.146 Second, it provides that an EA or EIS
should analyze the effects “from actions that may have both beneficial
and detrimental effects, even if on balance the agency believes that the
effects will be beneficial.”147 Crucially, however, “[o]nly a significant adverse
effect triggers the need to prepare an EIS.”148 This series of statements
exactly mirrors my proposal here. Because they are contained only in an
internal handbook, however, they are not legally binding.
Similarly, the Fish and Wildlife Service’s FONSI Checklist, while
not specifically addressing beneficial impacts, asks: “Does the FONSI show
that the agency reasonably concluded that the project will have no sig-
nificant adverse environmental consequences? Does the FONSI show that
142 See Basic Information: National Environmental Policy Act, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/basics/nepa.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
143 See id.
144 Note, however, that agencies other than CEQ do not receive deference for their inter-
pretations of NEPA. See Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 341–42 (D.C. Cir.
2002); Park Cnty. Res. Council. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 620 (10th Cir. 1987),
overruled on other grounds, Vill. of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d 970,
973 (10th Cir. 1992).
145 See BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT HANDBOOK H-1790-1 (2008).
146 See id. at 13 (“As a federal agency, the BLM must meet NEPA requirements whenever
it is the BLM’s decision that would result in an effect on the human environment, even
when the effect would be beneficial.”).
147 Id. at 54.
148 Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
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the alternatives including the proposed action will not significantly degrade
some human environmental factor?”149 Implicit in these questions is that
an action with only significant beneficial impacts does not require an EIS.150
In addition, the concept of a mitigated FONSI, recognized by CEQ
in its guidance documents151 and by many agencies in their specific NEPA
regulations,152 is in tension with the idea that only significant beneficial
impacts can require the preparation of an EIS. If an agency can avoid pre-
paring an EIS by mitigating the adverse impacts of its action, it would be
bizarre if an agency had no way out of preparing an EIS for a project with
beneficial impacts of a similar magnitude.153
All of these sources are consistent with my argument, though none
of them creates a legally binding rule. I therefore turn in the next section
to the policy arguments related to Beneficial Impact EISs.
C. The Policy Aims of NEPA
NEPA declares that its purposes are:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment;
to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to
the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and
welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecologi-
cal systems and natural resources important to the Nation;
and to establish a Council on Environmental Quality.154
149 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT REFERENCE
HANDBOOK at Checklist for the Contents of a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI)
(1999), available at http://wsfrprograms.fws.gov/subpages/toolkitfiles/fwsnepa.pdf (emphasis
added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
150 See id. (“An EIS is required whenever a proposed action may cause significant degra-
dation of some human environmental factors. Does the FONSI show that the alternative
including the proposed action will not significantly degrade some human environmental
factor?”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
151 See Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,037–38 (Mar. 23, 1981).
152 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 6.206(c)(1) (2010) (EPA regulations) (stating that “[a]ny com-
mitments to mitigation that are essential to render the impacts of the proposed action
not significant” must be included in a FONSI); 10 C.F.R. § 1021.322(b)(1) (2011) (DOE
regulations) (same).
153 CEQ’s guidance on analyzing environmental justice impacts under NEPA also states
that if “a proposed agency action would not cause any . . . disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental impacts, specific demographic analysis may not
be warranted.” See ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 88, at 14.
154 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (emphasis added).
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The current understanding of NEPA focuses primarily on the
second of these purposes. Thus, the CEQ recently declared that “NEPA
was enacted to promote efforts that will prevent or eliminate damage to
the human environment.”155
NEPA achieves its environmental goals not through substantive
mandates, however, but through procedural requirements. The EA/EIS
process, which has come to be the main focus of NEPA implementation,
promotes environmental protection through two mechanisms.
First, [i]t ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision,
will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed in-
formation concerning significant environmental impacts.
Second, it guarantees that the relevant information will be
made available to the larger audience that may also play a
role in both the decisionmaking process and the implemen-
tation of that decision.156
The preparation of an EIS for an action that has only significant
beneficial impacts conceivably promotes the second, informational purpose
of NEPA.157 It does little to advance the first goal, however, of injecting
environmental considerations into agency decision-making. This ratio-
nale was based on the paradigm of a mission-focused agency that would
not consider the environmentally detrimental consequences of its actions
unless forced to weigh the environmental costs in an EIS.158 This para-
digm seems inapplicable to an agency that is taking an action that will
have predominantly beneficial effects on the environment—which is by
155 Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley, Chair, CEQ, to Heads of Federal Departments
and Agencies 2 (Jan. 14, 2011) (emphasis added), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa
/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_of_GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_02182010.pdf.
Similarly, “[i]n listing NEPA’s purposes in 1980, William Hedeman, then Director of EPA’s
Office of Environmental Review, did not mention recognition or maximization of environ-
mental benefits among them.” Joel A. Gallob, In Search of Beneficial Environmental Impacts:
Superconductive Magnetic Energy Storage, the National Environmental Policy Act, and
an Analysis of Environmental Benefits, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 411, 414 (1990).
156 Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (citations and internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
157 See McGarity, supra note 121, at 850 n.194 (noting that a Beneficial Impact EIS
requirement “serves the informational purpose of the Act [and] perhaps encourage[es]
Congress to devote more funds to beneficial projects”).
158 FREDERICK R. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 6 (1973) (stating that NEPA “placed an environmental
imperative upon those agencies which had earlier contended that they lacked authority
to consider the environmental effects of their actions”).
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definition the case if it has significant beneficial impacts but no signifi-
cant detrimental impacts.159
Moreover, in practice, the main function of an EIS is to help the
agency decide whether to cancel or modify the proposed action because
of its harmful environmental impacts.160 If the only significant impacts
that will be examined in an EIS are beneficial impacts, then those im-
pacts will only tend to confirm the agency’s decision to continue with the
action as proposed. The EIS would therefore not fulfill its main practical
purpose in this situation.
Furthermore, an analysis of beneficial impacts will frequently
require the agency only to examine the type of impacts that it already
considers under the substantive statute pursuant to which the action is
being taken. For example, under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(“EPCA”),161 the Department of Energy develops energy efficiency stan-
dards for appliances.162 The development of new, more stringent stan-
dards arguably has a significantly beneficial environmental impact. Yet
the benefit—a reduction in energy use—is precisely the consideration
that the agency already is instructed to take into account under EPCA.
Therefore, requiring an EIS to analyze these beneficial impacts would
serve no independent purpose.
In addition, requiring an EIS for such actions can actually hinder
NEPA’s underlying goal of protecting the environment.163 As discussed
above, the preparation of an EIS is expensive and time-consuming.164 The
additional time and money required to produce an EIS rather than an EA
for an environmentally beneficial project could be better spent on prepar-
ing EISs for environmentally harmful projects or in performing other
159 Cf. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767 (“[I]nherent in NEPA and its implementing regu-
lations is a rule of reason, which ensures that agencies determine whether and to what
extent to prepare an EIS based on the usefulness of any new potential information to the
decision-making process. Where the preparation of an EIS would serve no purpose in light
of NEPA’s regulatory scheme as a whole, no rule of reason worthy of that title would re-
quire an agency to prepare an EIS.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
160 See Madeline June Kass, A NEPA Climate Paradox: Taking Greenhouse Gases into
Account in Threshold Significance Determinations, 42 IND. L. REV. 47, 51 (2009) (“[T]he
ultimate goal of all this [EIS] process is essentially to nip in the bud the detrimental
effects of human activities on the environment.”) (emphasis added).
161 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201–6422 (2006).
162 Id. § 6295.
163 See McGarity, supra note 121, at 874 (stating that “when compliance with NEPA would
hinder an agency in taking environmentally beneficial action . . . strict enforcement of
section 102(2)(C) would defeat the environment-enhancing purpose of NEPA”).
164 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
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agency activities. More specifically, recognizing a Beneficial Impact EIS
requirement could delay or weaken environmentally beneficial actions.165
Opponents of environmental protection have already attempted to use
NEPA for this purpose.166
In other contexts, the courts have resisted efforts by regulated en-
tities or anti-environmental interests to misuse NEPA in this fashion.167
For example, when the D.C. Circuit created the “functional equivalence”
doctrine, under which EPA actions developed through a process that pro-
vided “the functional equivalent of [an] impact statement” were exempt
from NEPA, it remarked that “opponents of environmental protection
would use the issue of [NEPA] compliance . . . as a tactic of litigation and
delay.”168 Similarly, in refusing to require an EIS for species listings under
the ESA, the Sixth Circuit stated that “[t]his Court is reluctant to make
NEPA more of an obstructionist tactic to prevent environment-enhancing
action than it may already have become.”169 Here too, courts should not
allow opponents of environmental protection to hinder environmentally
beneficial actions by requiring a Beneficial Impact EIS.
Moreover, a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement would create per-
verse incentives for agencies. Under such a requirement, an agency would
need to prepare an EIS for an action with significant environmental ben-
efits, but not for an action with insignificant environmental benefits.170
To avoid having to prepare this type of EIS, agencies would have an
165 Katie Kendall, Note, The Long and Winding “Road”: How NEPA Noncompliance for
Preservation Actions Protects the Environment, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 663, 683 (2004) (“[T]he
time it may take to file an EIS [for an environmentally beneficial action] and later defend
its soundness in court subverts environmental preservation.”); see id. at 684 (arguing that
the preparation of an EIS for the Roadless Rule meant that “valuable time [was] lost in
the fight for environmental conservation”).
166 See McGarity, supra note 121, at 850 n.194 (explaining that “polluters have embraced
this view of NEPA as a shield to parry efforts to implement environmentally protective
federal action”); id. at 874 n.313 (“[S]ince the overall goal of NEPA . . . is to protect the
environment, the courts have wisely refrained from allowing plaintiffs with monetary
goals to defeat the overall purpose.”).
167 See JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
CASES, LEGISLATION, POLICY 63 (2d ed. 1992) (“Occasionally a polluter will invoke NEPA
in an attempt to forestall environmentally beneficial action. . . . The courts have uni-
formly rejected these efforts.”).
168 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973), superseded
by statute, 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1984), as recognized in Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
169 Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 838 (6th Cir. 1981); accord Douglas Cnty.
v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
170 See Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Admin., 61 F.3d 501, 505 (6th Cir. 1995).
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incentive to choose an alternative with smaller environmental benefits and
thereby avoid the delay and expense of preparing an EIS. Alternatively,
an agency might ignore the environmental benefits of a project altogether
so as to avoid triggering a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement.171 These
results would be inconsistent with NEPA’s goal of enhancing environ-
mental quality.172
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS, PART ONE: NO HARM, NO FOUL
There are several possible criticisms of my proposal. I respond to
them in the next two parts. First, I address here various arguments that
suggest there is no need to worry about a Beneficial Impact EIS require-
ment because other doctrines will ensure that such a requirement is not
abused to hinder environmental protection.
A. Standing Will Take Care of It
First, one might argue that any fear that polluters or industry will
use a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement to hinder environmentally bene-
ficial actions is overblown because such interests will not have prudential
standing to bring suit under NEPA.173 While prudential standing will im-
pede at least some cases attempting to enforce a Beneficial Impact EIS
requirement, it will not eliminate all of them. In addition, this argument
ignores that agencies will usually prepare such an EIS if legally required
to do so, regardless of the availability of standing to potential challengers.174
171 For example, the EAs of many wind power projects have ignored or given short shrift
to their greenhouse gas emission reduction benefits. See Bisbee, supra note 20, at 374–79.
172 Joel Gallob has criticized the NEPA process as being too focused on the dichotomy be-
tween environmental harms and economic benefits. Gallob, supra note 155, at 414–15.
He observes that “[w]hereas environmental groups and the EPA have traditionally de-
fended against potential harms, no group has displayed an institutional interest in un-
covering potential benefits.” Id. at 442. Unlike when Gallob wrote, in 1990, it is no longer
the case that environmental groups do not advocate for recognition of the environmental
benefits of some projects, like renewable energy generation. It is worth noting, however,
that a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement would reduce the incentive of such groups to
advocate for recognition of environmental benefits, lest such recognition delay the project
while an EIS is prepared.
173 See Jonathan M. Cosco, Note, NEPA for the Gander: NEPA’s Application to Critical
Habitat Designations and Other “Benevolent” Federal Action, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
F. 345, 384 (1998) (“[S]tanding requirements will help ensure that NEPA is not abused
by industry proponents.”).
174 See id. at 355 n.50.
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Standing has both constitutional and prudential components.
Constitutional standing is a limit on the subject-matter jurisdiction of a
federal court and is assessed using the familiar three-part test of injury-
in-fact, causation, and redressability.175 Prudential standing, by contrast,
is a set of “several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction.”176 Among these limits is the “zone of interests” test, which
determines “whether a particular plaintiff has been granted a right to
sue by the statute under which he or she brings suit.”177
Because “[t]he purpose of NEPA is to protect the environment,”
courts have generally held that “a plaintiff who asserts purely economic
injuries does not have standing to challenge an agency action under
NEPA.”178 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has held that a plaintiff asserting an
interest in traffic safety does not have prudential standing under NEPA.179
Accordingly, the argument would go, any polluter who attempts to
use NEPA to hinder an environmentally beneficial action in defense of
purely economic interests will lack standing to bring such a claim. As a
result, courts will not need to reach the issue of whether a Beneficial
Impact EIS is required in such cases.
While it is undoubtedly true that prudential standing will reduce
the number of claims brought to require a Beneficial Impact EIS, it will
not eliminate them entirely. First, even individuals and groups with pre-
dominantly economic interests will, in some cases, be able to identify en-
vironmental interests sufficient to satisfy the zone of interests test.180 As
the D.C. Circuit has explained, even a plaintiff motivated primarily by
175 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
176 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
177 City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004).
178 Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993); accord
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“[A]n allegation of injury to monetary interest alone may not, of course, bring a
party within the zone of environmental interests as contemplated by NEPA for purposes
of standing.”) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
Taubman Realty Grp. Ltd. P’ship v. Mineta, 320 F.3d 475, 481 (4th Cir. 2003); Churchill
Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 533 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1976).
179 Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); see also Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am.
v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying prudential standing to
a plaintiff claiming that its members will “be adversely affected by the increased risk of dis-
ease they face when Canadian beef enters the U.S. meat supply” because the plaintiff “has
failed to show any relationship between risks to human health and environmental harms”).
180 See MANDELKER, supra note 7, at § 4.23 (“Despite clear rulings that economic injury
does not qualify plaintiffs for standing, creative litigants have attempted to avoid this
barrier by alleging environmental as well as economic injury.”).
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economic concerns may still have other interests sufficient to establish
prudential standing: “[A] plaintiff ’s economic interests do not blight his
qualifying ones, such as aesthetic and environmental interests in the qual-
ity of public lands where he hikes, camps, fishes, etc. Under our circuit’s
law NEPA standing is not limited to the ‘pure of heart.’ ”181
For example, in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glicksman,
two property rights organizations, Montana and Idaho municipalities,
and a timber company challenged a proposal for timber harvesting in
the Kootenai National Forest, arguing that the Forest Service should
have allowed more trees to be cut.182 The plaintiffs brought suit under sev-
eral statutes, including NEPA. As for the NEPA claim, the D.C. Circuit
held that the plaintiffs had satisfied the zone of interests test because
some of their members hiked in the Forest, which they alleged was
subject to an increased risk of wildfires.183 Other courts have reached
similar conclusions.184
Second, a number of cases brought to date arguing in favor of a
Beneficial Impact EIS requirement have been filed by animal welfare
organizations. Thus, for example, the Ninth Circuit decision mentioned at
the beginning of this article, Humane Society v. Locke,185 was brought by
181 Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
182 Id. at 1231.
183 Id. at 1236. To the extent that such a suit is brought by an organization rather than
individual plaintiffs, organizational standing presents an additional burden for industry
interests suing under NEPA. If such a group asserts that injury to a member’s aesthetic
or recreational interests establishes prudential standing, a court will usually hold that
that member’s interests are not germane to the organization’s purposes, and hence that
the organization does not have standing to represent those interests. See, e.g., Cent. S.D.
Co-op Grazing Dist. v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 266 F.3d 889, 897 (8th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the protection of wildlife habitat was not germane to the purpose of a grazing
district). Similarly, when a business entity brings suit, it cannot base its prudential stand-
ing on the aesthetic or recreational interests of its employees. Rock Creek Pack Station,
Inc. v. Blackwell, 344 F. Supp. 2d 192, 205 (D.D.C. 2004).
184 See, e.g., Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, 415 F.3d at 1103 (“A plaintiff can,
however, have standing under NEPA even if his or her interest is primarily economic, as
long as he or she also alleges an environmental interest or economic injuries that are causally
related to an act within NEPA’s embrace.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
Robinson v. Knebel, 550 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that landowners adjacent to
proposed development had standing because they alleged not only economic harm but also
a loss of hunting opportunities); California Forestry Ass’n v. Bosworth, No. 2:05-cv-00905-
MCE-GGH, 2008 WL 4370074, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2008) (holding that timber industry
groups had standing to challenge the 2004 Sierra Nevada Forest Plan Amendment under
NEPA because “their interests in increased fuels treatment were ‘causally related’ to envi-
ronmental concerns like stand-replacing wildfires which clearly fall within NEPA’s rubric”).
185 626 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the Humane Society of the United States, amongst other plaintiffs. In this
case, the plaintiffs challenged a decision by the National Marine Fisheries
Service (“NMFS”) to authorize the annual killing of eighty-five sea lions
that were preying on threatened and endangered salmon and steelhead at
the Bonneville Dam on the Columbia River.186 The plaintiffs argued that
NMFS’s characterization of the benefits of killing the sea lions for listed
salmon and steelhead as “significant” required the preparation of an EIS.187
Similarly, in Fund for Animals v. Norton,188 the lead plaintiff was
an animal welfare organization. It challenged the issuance of a depre-
dation permit by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to the State
of Maryland that would allow the state to kill 525 mute swans, an invasive
species that was damaging underwater plant communities in Chesapeake
Bay and other watersheds along the eastern seaboard.189 Again, the plain-
tiffs argued, in part, that an EIS was required because “defendants them-
selves have stated that the proposed permit will have significant beneficial
impacts on the environment.”190
In these cases, the plaintiffs’ prudential standing under NEPA was
apparently uncontested. Their standing would not have been controversial,
given the many other cases brought by animal welfare or animal rights
groups in which the plaintiffs have been found to have standing to sue un-
der NEPA.191 Such groups typically base standing on their members’ aes-
thetic injury resulting from the deaths of animals that the individual
enjoys observing in the wild, which is clearly a cognizable injury for pur-
poses of constitutional standing.192 Courts have also found such interests
to be germane to the purposes of animal welfare groups.193
Animal welfare groups can therefore establish prudential stand-
ing based on their members’ interests in observing even animals that
produce detrimental environmental impacts, as allegedly was the case
with the sea lions in Humane Society v. Locke and the mute swans in
186 Id. at 1044.
187 Id. at 1055–56.
188 281 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2003).
189 Id. at 213–15.
190 Id. at 232.
191 See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1396–97 (9th Cir. 1992);
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Espy, 814 F. Supp. 142, 149 (D.D.C. 1993); cf. Humane Soc’y
v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that “the interests of Humane Society
members also fall within the zone of interests protected by the Endangered Species Act”).
192 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1992) (“Of course, the desire to
use or observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cog-
nizable interest for purpose of standing.”).
193 See, e.g., Humane Soc’y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d at 59–60.
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Fund for Animals v. Norton.194 As a result, such groups will be able to use
NEPA to hinder environmentally beneficial actions through the enforce-
ment of a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement.195
In sum, prudential standing doctrine will not eliminate litigation
to enforce a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement. Industry groups will, in
some cases, be able to establish standing based on subsidiary environmen-
tal interests. In other cases, animal welfare groups will be able to estab-
lish standing to challenge environmentally beneficial actions that harm
individual animals.
Moreover, leaving litigation to one side, this argument also ignores
the ex ante incentives created for federal agencies. Even if it is unlikely
that there will be a plaintiff with prudential standing who would chal-
lenge an agency’s failure to prepare a Beneficial Impact EIS for an envi-
ronmentally beneficial action, agencies will usually prepare a Beneficial
Impact EIS if the courts clearly require them.196 As a result, agencies will
still need to devote excessive resources to such EISs.
B. Courts Will Not Enjoin Environmentally Beneficial Projects
When Remanding for Preparation of a Beneficial Impact EIS
Another possible response to my proposal is to point to case law
suggesting that some courts will not enjoin an agency action even when
requiring a Beneficial Impact EIS. In particular, some cases hold that a
court should not impose an injunction “under NEPA when enjoining gov-
ernment action would result in more harm to the environment than deny-
ing injunctive relief.”197
For example, in American Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt,198 the plain-
tiffs challenged a land management plan for federal land in the California
194 If the impact of certain animals, such as invasive species, on the environment truly
is negative, it is not clear that an interest in observing such animals should count as
being within the zone of interests protected by NEPA.
195 Indeed, in the mute swan case itself, environmentalists supported the culling of the
mute swan population. See Lars Johnson, Note, Pushing NEPA’s Boundaries: Using NEPA
to Improve the Relationship Between Animal Law and Environmental Law, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1367, 1384–85 (2009); see also Paul J. Cucuzzella, The Mute Swan Case, The
Fund for Animals, et al. v. Norton, et al.: National, Regional and Local Environmental
Policy Rendered Irrelevant by Animal Rights Activists, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 101 (2004)
(identifying the harmful environmental consequences of the Fund for Animals decision).
Animal welfare activists and environmentalists also find themselves on opposite sides of
other disputes, such as over the siting of wind farms. Johnson, supra, at 1384.
196 See Cosco, supra note 173, at 355.
197 Consol. Salmonid Cases, 713 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1156 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
198 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983).
2012] NEPA AND THE “BENEFICIAL IMPACT” EIS 399
desert. They alleged that the development of the plan violated the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) as well as
NEPA.199 The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction.200 On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court
decision, holding that the issuance of an injunction would not be in the pub-
lic interest because “it is clear in this case that strong environmental con-
siderations militated against enjoining the Plan. The district court found
there was a danger of harm to the fragile desert resources of the [California
Desert Conservation Area] if the Plan’s restrictions were lifted and plain-
tiffs were allowed to pursue increased motor vehicle use.”201
In any case in which the proposed action will have significant en-
vironmentally beneficial impacts but no significant detrimental impacts,
the effect of enjoining the action will be a net harm to the environment.
Therefore, under this rule, such projects will not be delayed even if a court
requires that the agency perform a Beneficial Impact EIS. One might there-
fore argue that the agency will suffer no harm and that, given the informa-
tional benefits of requiring an EIS, the benefits of such a requirement
outweigh the costs.
There are several responses to this argument. First, it ignores the
cost, both in time and resources, that an agency must devote to an EIS.
Even if a court adopting a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement does not
impose an injunction, it will still require the agency to complete the EIS
on remand. The completion of this EIS will tie up money and personnel
better devoted to other work.
Second, the argument ignores the ex ante effects on agency behavior.
If an agency knows that a court will require the preparation of a Beneficial
Impact EIS, then the agency will likely prepare one, even if the agency also
knows that the court will not enjoin the underlying action in the absence
of such an EIS. As a result, environmentally beneficial agency actions will
still be delayed because of the additional time required to complete an EIS.
Third, the American Motorcyclist Association rule does not appear
to have been adopted outside the Ninth Circuit. A traditional balancing of
199 Id. at 964.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 966; see Kootenai Tribe v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1124–26 (9th Cir. 2002)
overruled by Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the district court improperly failed to consider the conservation benefits of the
Roadless Rule in deciding to impose an injunction under NEPA); Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc’y
v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975) (denying a NEPA injunction in a case
involving the harvesting of insect-infested timber because of the danger of the infestation
spreading to other trees if the harvesting was enjoined).
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the harms, however, should usually weigh against granting an injunction
when the environmental harm will be greater if the injunction is granted
than if it is denied. Nevertheless, the limited applicability of this rule also
suggests that its existence does not undermine my argument against re-
quiring Beneficial Impact EISs.
C. The Statutory and Common-Law Exemptions from NEPA Will
Take Care of It
Another response would be to argue that most, if not all, actions
that will have only significant environmentally beneficial effects are al-
ready exempted from the EIS process. These exemptions take two forms.
Some are statutory, such as the exemptions for all of EPA’s actions under
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)202 and most of them under the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”).203 Others have been created by the courts. The main such ex-
emption is the functional equivalence rule, which applies to actions that
are “subject to rules and regulations that essentially duplicate the NEPA
inquiry.”204 Some environmentally beneficial actions, such as the listing of
species under the Endangered Species Act,205 Superfund cleanup actions,206
and cancellations of pesticide registrations207 have been exempted from
NEPA under the functional equivalence exemption.208
While these exemptions do account for a large number of actions
that would otherwise be subject to a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement,
they by no means cover all of them. One need only look at the cases
202 Clean Air Act, 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (2006) (“No action taken under the Clean Air Act
shall be deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act.”) (internal
citation omitted).
203 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (2006) (exempting from the EIS process all ac-
tions under the Clean Water Act except those related to grants for the construction of pub-
licly owned treatment works and the issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (“NPDES”) permits to new sources). For a list of other statutory exemptions, see
MANDELKER, supra note 7, at § 5.6.
204 Catron Cnty Bd. of Comm’rs v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1435 (10th
Cir. 1996).
205 Pac. Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1981).
206 Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1098 (7th Cir. 1990).
207 Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding
that EPA did not need to prepare an EIS for a cancellation order affecting uses of DDT).
208 Another judicially created exemption, which is rarely invoked, exempts an agency from
preparing an EIS when there is “a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority,”
such as when an action must be completed too quickly for an EIS to be possible. Flint
Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n, 426 U.S. 776, 788 (1976).
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discussed above to see that the issue still arises despite these exemptions.
More generally, my proposal allows a specific action to avoid the EIS pro-
cess even though the broader category of actions to which it belongs may
in some cases require an EIS.
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS, PART TWO: WE NEED A BENEFICIAL
IMPACT EIS REQUIREMENT
Another set of counterarguments take on my proposal more directly,
arguing that for various reasons a Beneficial Impact EIS requirement is
desirable. I rebut several such arguments in this part.
A. You Can’t Know Whether the Impacts Are Beneficial or Adverse
Until You Complete an EIS
One argument is that it is impossible to know whether the envi-
ronmental impacts of an action are actually beneficial or adverse without
going through the process of completing an EIS. As one commentator who
favors NEPA compliance for environmentally “benevolent” actions has
put it, “[t]he problem with creating a broad exemption for benevolent fed-
eral action is that there is no way to determine, absent a thorough exam-
ination of a proposed action’s environmental impacts, to what extent that
action would in fact conserve the environment, and to what extent it might
harm the environment.”209
This argument would be more appropriate if I were suggesting
that certain actions be exempted from NEPA altogether. That is not my
proposal, however. I argue only that an action that will have significant
beneficial impacts but no significant detrimental impacts, as determined
through an EA or the categorical exclusion process, does not require the
preparation of a full EIS. My proposal, therefore, requires some analysis
of the environmental impacts of a proposed action or category of actions.
If an EA produces no evidence of significant detrimental impacts, the
agency should not be required to go to the time and expense of preparing
an EIS just because one can always learn more with additional analysis.
209 Cosco, supra note 173, at 380; see ECCLESTON, supra note 6, at 159 (“[I]t may be dif-
ficult if not impossible, to demonstrate that an action would actually result in a signif-
icant beneficial impact (with no significant adverse side effects) without first preparing
an analysis to review thoroughly the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts. An action
that is substantial enough to significantly improve the environment might also involve
hidden or unknown adverse impacts that can be adequately identified only through prep-
aration of a detailed analysis.”).
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A related observation is that whether an action’s impact is bene-
ficial or adverse depends on the baseline that you adopt. A representative
case is Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.210 In this case, the petitioner challenged the EA for the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (“NHTSA”) corporate av-
erage fuel economy (“CAFÉ”) standards for light trucks.211 The court found
that NHTSA’s analysis of the action’s cumulative impact on climate change
was inadequate.212 The proposed fuel economy standards would be more
stringent than the existing standards but, because the number of vehicle
miles driven was projected to increase, the total greenhouse gas emissions
from light trucks in the United States would increase under the proposal.213
The agency saw the appropriate baseline as continued regulation
under the prior CAFÉ standard; from this perspective, the agency’s action
had a beneficial environmental impact. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, but
its reasons for doing so were not entirely clear. At some points in the
opinion, the court appeared to rely on the absolute increase in green-
house gas emissions in concluding that the action would have a signifi-
cant environmental impact.214 At others, however, the court suggested
that an action could be significant even if it had a small, beneficial impact,
so long as there were alternatives available to the agency that would
have had a greater environmental benefit.215
This case shows that whether an action’s impacts count as bene-
ficial or adverse can depend on the baseline that one uses for comparison.
Note that in Center for Biological Diversity, however, the court did not
rely on the existence of asserted beneficial impacts to conclude that an EIS
was required; the court was explicit that it rejected the agency’s explana-
tion for its FONSI because “[p]etitioners have raised a substantial question
as to whether the CAFÉ standards for light trucks [model years] 2008–
2011 may cause significant degradation of some human environmental
210 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
211 Id. at 1181.
212 Id. at 1216.
213 Id. at 1184, 1216.
214 See id. at 1216 (“NHTSA does not dispute that the CAFÉ standard will have an effect
on global warming due to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions. The new rule will not
actually result in a decrease in carbon emissions, but potentially only a decrease in the
rate of growth of carbon emissions.”).
215 See id. at 1223 (“In light of the evidence in the record, it is hardly ‘self-evident’ that a 0.2
percent decrease in carbon emissions (as opposed to a greater decrease) is not significant.”);
see also Kass, supra note 160, at 69 (observing that in Center for Biological Diversity, “[e]ven
the fact that the NHTSA projected the rulemaking action would decrease carbon dioxide
emission rates—as compared to the existing rule—did not alter the court’s conclusion”).
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factor.”216 The court’s characterization in this case is the correct one: a fed-
eral authorization to perform an environmentally harmful action should
count as an adverse environmental impact, even if the current action
authorizes less of the harmful activity than in the past.
B. You Can’t Trust the Agency’s Characterization of the Effects
as Beneficial
One might also argue that agencies may mis-characterize the
nature of, or overemphasize certain aspects of, the effects of their actions.
One of the primary goals of NEPA, after all, was to overcome agency
“tunnel vision” and require agencies to consider other perspectives on
their proposed actions.217 Agencies might “disingenuously characterize
their actions as ‘benevolent’ in order to avoid the administrative burdens
of complying with NEPA.”218 Or, to take a more charitable view, they might
simply overlook that an action that will primarily have beneficial envi-
ronmental impacts, such as reducing air pollution, also has collateral ad-
verse impacts, such as water or solid waste pollution, or harms to migratory
birds.219 Similarly, a timber harvesting project intended to reduce wildfire
risk or disease transmission might also increase soil erosion or damage the
habitat of endangered species.220 In all of these cases, the NEPA process
can help ensure that the agency considers the full range of environmental
impacts associated with an action.
216 Center for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1221 (second emphasis added) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
217 See Anderson, supra note 67, at 263. As the D.C. Circuit put it in one of the first cases
addressing an asserted exemption from NEPA, “Who shall police the police?” Portland
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1973), superseded in statute,
15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1) (1984), as recognized in Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
218 Cosco, supra note 173, at 380; see Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1089 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (observing that “an agency like [the
Atomic Energy Commission], which has a statutory mandate to develop nuclear technol-
ogies, may minimize the possible adverse effects of its technology development programs”)
(internal citation omitted).
219 See Portland Cement Ass’n, 486 F.2d at 384 (“Concern was also voiced by petitioners
in this case that EPA might wear blinders when promulgating standards protecting one
resource as to effects on other resources, as is asserted in this case, that air standards
may increase water pollution.”); Cosco, supra note 173, at 381–82 (“[A]ctions intended to
benefit the environment may have undesirable secondary effects—effects that might go
unnoticed without the benefit of NEPA compliance.”); Anderson, supra note 67, at 263
(“That the ‘major actions’ taken by EPA are in large measure environmentally protective
ones is not a sufficiently distinguishing factor. Specialization and ‘tunnel vision’ within
the environmental field may be as harmful as they are in other areas.”).
220 See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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This argument is also better directed at proposals to exempt some
agency actions completely from NEPA. When an agency prepares an EA,
a court will have a document before it from which the court can deter-
mine whether the agency adequately explained its characterization of the
effects associated with the proposed action. Courts already remand EAs
when they find that an agency has mis-characterized the effects of an
action as beneficial. For example, in National Resources Defense Council
v. Hodel,221 the court rejected the defendants’ characterization of “the
potential environmental benefits” of Cooperative Management Agreements
with ranchers on Bureau of Land Management land because “[t]he EA is
devoid, however, of any mention of or justification for defendants’ relin-
quishment of their authority to cancel, suspend, or modify permits when
overgrazing occurs.”222 It is not clear that a Beneficial Impact EIS re-
quirement would do anything to enhance this form of judicial review.
CONCLUSION
A Beneficial Impact EIS requirement is not required under NEPA,
CEQ’s implementing regulations, or judicial precedent. Such a requirement
would produce environmentally pernicious effects and so is contrary to the
purpose and goals of the statute. Courts that are faced with these questions
should therefore make it clear that agencies need not prepare an EIS for
an action with only significant environmentally beneficial impacts. In
addition, the CEQ should issue guidance to clarify that agencies need not
prepare an EIS under these circumstances.
Finally, environmental organizations should be wary of raising this
argument in litigation. In some cases, environmental groups have sued
over actions that they perceive to be environmentally harmful but, when
rebuffed by the courts in their efforts to compel preparation of an EIS be-
cause of these adverse impacts, have made the fallback argument that
significant beneficial effects alone are enough.223 While this argument, if
successful, might bring them success in an individual case, it would in the
long run do more harm than good to their goal of environmental protection.
221 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
222 Id. at 872; see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1368–69 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(rejecting the Army Corps of Engineers’ conclusion that the “environmental benefits” of
a damming project included benefits to hunting, fishing, and “nature students”), rev’d on
other grounds by Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974); see also supra
notes 91–96 and accompanying text (discussing Environmental Protection Information
Center v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
223 See supra notes 23–40 and accompanying text.
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The international trade in hazardous wastes has been a subject
of controversy for decades. Notorious examples of hazardous wastes being
improperly disposed of in Africa have created concern about the legitimacy
of developed western countries “dumping” the hazardous byproducts of
their industrial development on less-developed countries.1 Alarms have 
1 In 2006, there was an international furor when the vessel Probo Koala unloaded toxic
wastes in the port city of Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Seven people died as a result of improper
disposal of the wastes, and the scandal led the president of the Ivory Coast to dismiss his
cabinet. See Tanya Karina A. Lat, Note, Testing the Limits of GATT Art. XX(b): Toxic Waste 
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been sounded about the adverse impacts on human health and the envi-
ronment from the practice of exporting electronic wastes for recycling.2
Most members of the international community, with the notable
exception of the United States, have addressed these concerns through the
Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes.3
The Basel Convention establishes a “notice and consent” regime that allows
the trade in hazardous waste, both for disposal and recycling, only if the
government of the importing country has been given advanced notice of
and consents to the shipment.4 This notice and consent regime attempts to
address concerns about the human health and environmental risks of the
trade in hazardous waste while at the same time both fostering the alleged
economic efficiencies that result from free trade in hazardous wastes5
Trade, Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreements, and the WTO, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
L. REV. 367, 369 (2009); see generally Cyril Uchenna Gwam, Adverse Effects of the Illicit
Movement and Dumping of Hazardous, Toxic, and Dangerous Wastes and Products on the
Enjoyment of Human Rights, 14 FLA. J. INT’L L. 427 (2002); Jeffery D. Williams, Trashing
Developing Nations: The Global Hazardous Waste Trade, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 275 (1991).
2 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1166T, ELECTRONIC WASTE: HARMFUL
U.S. EXPORTS FLOW VIRTUALLY UNRESTRICTED BECAUSE OF MINIMAL EPA ENFORCEMENT
AND NARROW REGULATION (2008) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 2008 GAO REPORT] (describing
problems resulting from export of electronic waste to Asian countries including China and
India); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1044, ELECTRONIC WASTE: EPA
NEEDS TO BETTER CONTROL HARMFUL U.S. EXPORTS THROUGH STRONGER ENFORCEMENT
AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION (2008) [hereinafter AUGUST 2008 GAO REPORT];
see also BASEL ACTION NETWORK & SILICON VALLEY TOXICS COAL., EXPORTING HARM:
THE HIGH-TECH TRASHING OF ASIA (2002), available at http://www.ban.org/E-waste
/technotrashfinalcomp.pdf.
3 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126, available at http://www.basel
.int/text/documents.html [hereinafter Basel]. There are currently 176 parties to the
Convention. See Basel Convention’s Ratifications, BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel
.int/ratif/convention.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). The United States proudly stands
with Haiti and Afghanistan as countries that have signed, but not ratified, Basel. Id.
4 See Basel, supra note 3, at arts. 6, 9.
5 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of 1991: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Envtl. Prot. of the Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 102d Cong. 639–40 (1991)
(testimony of William K. Reilly, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
Richard J. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Environment) [hereinafter Hearings
on Envtl. Prot., testimony of W. Reilly]. Another bedrock in the debate over the legitimacy
of the international trade in hazardous waste is the argument that the trade promotes eco-
nomic efficiency by allowing disposal or recycling at facilities that can manage the wastes
more cheaply. The Preamble to the Revision of the 2001 Decision of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”), for example, recognizes that “the envi-
ronmentally sound and economically efficient recovery of wastes may justify transboundary
408 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:405
and respecting the rights of states to establish their own environmen-
tal policy.6
Although an international scofflaw with respect to the Basel
Convention, the United States does regulate the export of hazardous
waste. The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has issued a
complex set of regulations that establish domestic “notice and consent”
requirements on the export of hazardous wastes.7 These regulations im-
plement section 3017 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”) which prohibits the export of hazardous waste unless the
exporter complies with either a set of Congressionally defined “notice and
consent” requirements or, if in existence, any international agreements
between the United States and the receiving country.8 The United States
is a party to three such international agreements: bilateral agreements
with Canada and Mexico and a Decision of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) governing the transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes.9
movements of wastes between member countries.” ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS OF RECOVERABLE WASTES 37 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd
/57/1/42262259.pdf. EPA has supported efforts to allow continued export of hazardous
waste based on efficiencies associated with the trade. Hearings on Envtl. Prot., testimony
of W. Reilly, at 638–39.
6 See Basel, supra note 3, at Preamble. The Preamble to the Basel Convention recognizes
“the sovereign right [of States] to ban the entry or disposal of foreign hazardous wastes.”
Id. The tension in international agreements between establishing environmental standards
and concerns, particularly among developing countries, about preserving state sovereignty
to establish environmental policy is a staple of debate in international environmental
law. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Exclusive Sovereignty Versus Sustainable Development of a
Shared Resource: The Dilemma of Latin American Rainforest Management, 32 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 37 (1997).
7 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, §§ 245(a), 3017,
98 Stat. 3221, 3262 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2006)).
8 Id.
9 See infra notes 46–231 and accompanying text for a discussion of these international
agreements and implementing regulations. The United States has also entered limited
treaties authorizing the importation of waste into the United States from other countries.
These include treaties with Malaysia, Costa Rica, and the Philippines. See U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, REGULATIONS GOVERNING HAZARDOUS WASTE GENERATORS III-49, avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/wastes/inforesources/pubs/orientat/rom33.pdf. There was also
apparently a “limited term, limited-purpose mercury import agreement with India.”
Robert Heiss, Director of Import/Export Program, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Statement at
the Joint U.S.-Canada Industry Workshop on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Waste and Border Security 16, (Mar. 5–6, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.epa 
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the legal bases for EPA’s
regulation of the export of hazardous waste and the manner in which
EPA’s regulations operate.10 The article contains a detailed examination
of EPA’s complex sets of export regulations and provides data on the actual
scope of exports reported to EPA. It then examines a series of questions re-
garding EPA’s authority to regulate the export of hazardous wastes: What
domestic authority does EPA derive from the international agreements?
What is the scope of EPA’s authority to exclude hazardous wastes from
export control? What authority does EPA have to ban the export of hazard-
ous wastes to countries with which the United States does not have an
international agreement and which may not manage the waste properly?
This Article also examines the extent to which EPA regulations address
the significant concerns associated with the largely unregulated export
of electronic wastes.
This Article reaches a number of perhaps surprising conclusions.
First, there are significant and unaddressed constitutional and statutory
questions regarding EPA’s authority to regulate the export of hazardous
wastes under RCRA. Among other things, the Article evaluates the impli-
cations of the provisions of section 3017 that purport to give domestic legal
effect to future international agreements. A particular problem arises with
conferring domestic legal effect on the Decision of the OECD (“the OECD
Decision”), and recent case law suggests that giving such domestic effect
to the OECD Decision would be an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority to an international body. If the OECD Decision does not have
binding domestic effect, then EPA’s regulations governing exports within
the OECD for recycling may, among other things, have been promulgated
in violation of the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
Second, although the United States has not ratified the Basel
Convention, the Senate did consent to ratification in 1992 and the only
step necessary to complete ratification may be submission of U.S.
.gov/compliance/resources/briefings/monitoring/importexport/hazardtranscript.pdf)
[hereinafter Statement of Robert Heiss, Joint U.S.-Canada Industry Workshop] (RCRA
and Implementing Regulations; TSCA and Implementing Regulations).
10 This Article does not address issues relating to the importation of hazardous waste into
the United States. Although there are potential concerns regarding the import of wastes,
in most cases those wastes, once they enter the United States, are subject to the same
requirements applicable to domestic hazardous waste. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.60 (2010); see
Statement of Robert Heiss, Joint U.S.-Canada Industry Workshop, supra note 9 (New
Developments in Statutory and Regulatory Framework: U.S. Side).
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documentation by the Executive.11 The obstacle to ratification has been
the widespread perception that statutory changes to RCRA would be nec-
essary to implement Basel. This Article suggests that RCRA currently con-
tains adequate authority to implement Basel and thus ratification could
be immediately undertaken. The Article argues, however, that control of
the international trade in U.S. hazardous waste may be better served by
the United States not ratifying Basel.
Third, there may be a substantial misperception, fostered by EPA,
about the regulation of electronic wastes under RCRA. EPA has sug-
gested that only waste “cathode ray tubes” are a hazardous waste under
RCRA, but EPA’s own data suggests that a substantial amount of other
e-wastes should be classified as hazardous wastes and thus subject to
export controls.12 Perhaps the most significant step EPA could take to
strengthen its existing export regulations would be to clarify the status
of such e-wastes.
Fourth, EPA does have the authority under RCRA to impose export
controls on hazardous wastes that it has excluded from domestic regulation.
Thus, EPA could regulate the export of e-wastes while not imposing re-
quirements on the domestic recycling of such wastes.
Finally, EPA’s management of the export of hazardous waste would
be improved by providing more transparency through online posting of ex-
port data. Concerns about releasing confidential business information do
not stand as a significant obstacle to providing this information.
I. REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTES WITHIN THE
UNITED STATES
Subtitle C of RCRA establishes the basic “cradle to grave” system
that governs regulation of the domestic disposal, treatment, and storage
of “hazardous waste.”13 Since it is difficult to evaluate EPA’s regulation of
the export of hazardous waste without understanding the domestic require-
ments to which they would otherwise be subject, a brief excursus on RCRA
(which RCRA mavens may ignore) is warranted.
RCRA does not regulate the broad mass of materials that might
be considered hazardous wastes. Rather, Subtitle C of RCRA imposes
11 See International Waste Activities: Basel Convention, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/international/basel.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
12 See infra notes 267–74 and accompanying text.
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–39 (2006).
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regulatory requirements only on those materials that meet both EPA’s
regulatory definition of “solid waste” and “hazardous waste.”14 EPA’s regu-
latory definition of “solid waste” is notorious for its complexity.15 At its
simplest, the definition of solid waste includes materials that are obviously
discarded by being abandoned.16 Materials sent to a landfill for disposal
would be considered solid wastes under RCRA. EPA, however, also defines
some, but not all, materials that are recycled as solid wastes.17 Whether
a recycled material is regulated as a solid waste depends both on the type
of material and the manner by which it is recycled. “Spent materials,”
“byproducts,” and some “commercial chemical products” that are sent to
be recycled by “reclamation” or by being used as a “fuel” are also solid
wastes.18 Under EPA’s definition, spent lead-acid batteries or cathode ray
tubes that are recycled by having their lead content recovered would be
solid wastes.
Solid wastes must also be “hazardous” to be regulated under
Subtitle C.19 A solid waste may be classified as hazardous in either of
two ways. First, a solid waste may be a “listed” waste; any solid waste on
specific hazard lists promulgated by EPA is classified as a hazardous
waste.20 Second, an unlisted waste can still be hazardous if it exhibits one
of four hazard “characteristics.”21 These characteristics include “ignitability”
(capacity to catch fire), “reactivity” (capacity to explode), “corrosivity” (low
and high pH materials), and “toxicity.”22 The toxicity characteristic in-
volves testing an extract of the material to see if it contains concentrations
of forty specific chemicals above a regulatory threshold.23 Thus, if an ex-
tract of a waste contained more than five milligrams per liter of lead it
would exhibit the toxicity characteristic.24 While EPA is responsible for
14 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(a)(1) (2010). There are broader statutory definitions of solid and
hazardous wastes that apply for other purposes under RCRA. See generally Conn. Coastal
Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1993); see also JEFFREY
M. GABA & DONALD W. STEVER, LAW OF SOLID WASTE, POLLUTION PREVENTION AND
RECYCLING § 2:3 (Thompson Reuters 2010) (1992).
15 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2. See generally Jeffrey M. Gaba, Rethinking Recycling, 38 ENVTL.
L. 1053 (2008).
16 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(b).
17 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i)(B).
18 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c) tbl.1.
19 40 C.F.R. § 261.3.
20 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.31–.33.
21 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20–.24.
22 Id.
23 40 C.F.R. § 261.24.
24 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 tbl.1.
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making the determination to “list” a hazardous waste,25 the determination
of whether a solid waste exhibits a hazard characteristic must be made on
a case-by-case basis by the generator.26
The class of Subtitle C hazardous wastes is far from comprehensive;
solid wastes may be hazardous, but if they are neither listed nor exhibit
a hazard characteristic they are simply not RCRA hazardous wastes.27
Additionally, EPA has promulgated a large number of exemptions and
exclusions that exempt materials from being classified as either solid or
hazardous wastes.28 EPA has, for example, excluded “household hazardous
waste” from classification as a Subtitle C waste and therefore most munic-
ipal solid waste is not regulated as hazardous waste.29 EPA does, however,
employ a device, known as a “conditional exclusion,” through which it im-
poses regulatory requirements as a condition for excluding the material
from being classified as a solid or hazardous waste.30
The Subtitle C program imposes certain requirements on the man-
agement of hazardous wastes. These include 1) an obligation on generators
to determine if their material is a regulated hazardous waste, 2) a require-
ment that a tracking document, known as a hazardous waste manifest,
accompany the transportation of hazardous waste, 3) certain limited re-
quirements on transporters of hazardous waste, and 4) a limitation, in
most cases, on the disposal or treatment of hazardous wastes at facilities
that have received a federal hazardous waste permit.31 EPA generally does
not regulate the recycling process or products produced from the recycling
25 40 C.F.R. § 261.30.
26 40 C.F.R. § 262.11.
27 For example, unlisted wastes that contain high concentrations of dioxin might not be
classified as a hazardous waste since dioxin is not one of the chemicals tested under the
“toxicity characteristic.” See 40 C.F.R. § 261.24 tbl.1.
28 These exemptions and exclusions litter various parts of EPA’s RCRA regulations, but
40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (labeled Exclusions) contains the most specific list of exempt materials.
40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a) contains exclusions from classification as a “solid waste.” Id. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.4(b) contains exclusions from classification as a “hazardous waste.” Id. The distinction
is in most respects moot; either exclusion exempts the material from being classified as a
Subtitle C hazardous waste.
29 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(1). Ash from the incineration of municipal waste may, however, be
classified as a hazardous waste. See generally City of Chi. v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S.
328 (1994).
30 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Regulation by Bootstrap: Contingent Management of Hazardous
Wastes Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 83, 102 &
n.86 (2001).
31 See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 263 (RCRA generator requirements).
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of hazardous waste, and Subtitle C requirements largely stop at the point
that a hazardous waste is inserted in the recycling process.32
Generators that produce 100 kilograms per month or less of haz-
ardous waste, known as “conditionally exempt small quantity generators”
or “CESQGs,” are largely exempt from RCRA requirements.33 Wastes
produced by CESQGs are not subject to a manifest requirement and may
be disposed of in municipal solid waste landfills.34
II. RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
FROM THE UNITED STATES UNDER STATUTE AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT
EPA’s regulatory treatment of the export of hazardous waste is
largely governed by the provisions of RCRA, but a series of international
agreements governing the export of wastes also address the export of
hazardous waste to Canada, Mexico, and other OECD countries.35
A. Statutory Requirements Under RCRA
Section 3017 of RCRA, adopted as an amendment to RCRA in
1984, establishes the basic statutory requirements governing the export
of hazardous waste.36 Section 3017 provides several legal bases for the
establishment and enforcement of export controls under RCRA. First, sec-
tion 3017(a) directly imposes a prohibition on the export of a Subtitle C haz-
ardous waste “unless” the exporter either 1) complies with congressionally
32 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(c)(1); Gaba, supra note 15, at 1074.
33 40 C.F.R. § 261.5.
34 Id.
35 In addition to the federal export requirements contained in RCRA and international
agreements, the export of hazardous waste is also subject to state control. Texas, for
example, has its own regulations governing the export of hazardous wastes. See, e.g., 30 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 335.10–.13 (shipping, record-keeping and reporting requirements applicable
to primary exporters of hazardous waste). RCRA generally allows states to adopt more
stringent regulation of hazardous waste than that established by EPA; this article does not
address issues that might arise from conflicts between state regulation and the require-
ments of an international agreement. Cf. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Granholm,
344 F. Supp. 2d 559 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (rejecting challenge to Michigan laws that limited
the importation of solid waste from Canada based on claims that the laws violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause and Foreign Affairs Power of the federal government).
36 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3017 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938
(2006)) [hereinafter RCRA].
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defined “notice and consent” requirements or 2) the export “conforms” with
any applicable international agreement governing the export of hazard-
ous wastes.37 Thus, section 3017(a) provides for two distinct sets of export
requirements: a congressionally defined “base” program (applicable in
the absence of any international agreement) and requirements estab-
lished by any subsequent international agreement.38 EPA is required to
adopt regulations implementing the requirements of section 3017, includ-
ing both the “base” program and any international agreements.39 Exports
in violation of these statutory prohibitions, as well as violation of EPA
37 Section 3017(a) provides:
Beginning twenty-four months after November 8, 1984, no person shall ex-
port any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter unless
(1)(A) such person has provided the notification required in subsection
(c) of this section,
(B) the government of the receiving country has consented to accept such
hazardous waste,
(C) a copy of the receiving country’s written consent is attached to the
manifest accompanying each waste shipment, and
(D) the shipment conforms with the terms of the consent of the govern-
ment of the receiving country required pursuant to subsection (e) of this
section, or
(2) the United States and the government of the receiving country have
entered into an agreement as provided for in subsection (f) of this section
and the shipment conforms with the terms of such agreement.
Id. § 3017(a). This subsection is curiously phrased to suggest that the “base” program or
international agreements are alternative methods to satisfy the export prohibition. In other
words, section 3017(a) reads as if exports are allowed if they satisfy either the requirements
of the base program or any applicable international agreement. Section 3017(f), however,
expressly provides that if an international agreement exists, then only the requirements
of section 3017(a)(2) and certain reporting requirements apply. Id. § 3017(f). The legislative
history of section 3017 clearly indicates that Congress intended that exporters must comply
with any international agreement, rather than the base program, after such an agreement
goes into effect. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1133, at 46–47, 115 (1984) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649 (stating that under the provisions adopted by the conference
committee, the requirements of the base program “do not apply if there exists an inter-
national agreement between the U.S. and the receiving country establishing hazardous
waste export procedures.”).
38 Sections 3017(c)–(f) contain additional details on the requirements for the “base”
program. RCRA §§ 3017(c)–(f) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6938(c)–(f) (2006)).
39 Section 3017(b) requires EPA to adopt regulations “necessary to implement this section.”
Id. at § 3017(b). Thus, on its face, section 3017(b) provides authority to implement the base
program specified in section 3017(a)(1) and the requirement relating to international agree-
ments in section 3017(a)(2). Additionally, section 2002(a)(1) grants the Administrator the
authority to adopt “such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions” under
RCRA. Id. at 2002(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6912(a)(1) (2006)).
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export regulations, would presumably be in violation of RCRA.40 Indeed,
RCRA makes it a criminal violation to knowingly export in a manner that
is not “in conformance” with an international agreement.41 Thus, it appears
that, under RCRA, a private party could be subject to civil and criminal
liability for violation of an applicable international agreement.42
Additionally, section 3017(h) expressly provides EPA with the
authority to implement export regulations that are broader in scope than
those required by the section 3017(a)(1) base program. Section 3017(h)
provides:
(h) Other standards
Nothing in this section shall preclude the Administrator
from establishing other standards for the export of hazard-
ous wastes under section 6922 of this title or section 6923
of this title.43
Thus, EPA is authorized under RCRA to establish more stringent regu-
lation of hazardous waste exports if justified under the basic authority
of Subtitle C applicable to regulation of generators and transporters.44
This authority is, however, limited to imposing restrictions on exports to
countries with which the United States does not have an applicable inter-
national agreement.45
40 Section 3008(g) provides for civil penalties for violation of “any requirement of this
subchapter [i.e., Subpart C of RCRA].” RCRA § 3008(g) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(g) (2006)). Section 7002(a)(1)(A) provides for citizen suits against persons who
violate “requirement” or “prohibition” of RCRA generally. Id. at § 3008(g) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (2006)).
41 § 3008(d)(6)(B) provides criminal penalties for “any person who . . . knowingly exports
a hazardous waste”:
where there exists an international agreement between the United States
and the government of the receiving country establishing notice, export,
and enforcement procedures for the transportation, treatment, storage,
and disposal of hazardous wastes, in a manner which is not in confor-
mance with such agreement.
Id. at § 3008(d)(6)(B) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(6)(B) (2006)).
42 The domestic legal status of international export agreements is discussed below. See
infra notes 275–335 and accompanying text.
43 RCRA § 3017(h) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(h) (2006)).
44 The significance of this authority is discussed below. See infra notes 370–75 and accom-
panying text.
45 RCRA § 3017(f) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (2006)).
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B. Bilateral Agreements with Canada and Mexico
In 1986, the United States entered into two bilateral agreements
governing the import and export of hazardous wastes.46 Not surprisingly
these agreements are with our neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and, as
discussed below, the vast bulk of reported exports of hazardous waste in-
volved movements to these countries.47 Neither the Canada nor the Mexico
Agreement is a treaty ratified by the Senate; rather both have the status
of international executive agreements.48
The agreement between Canada and the United States addresses
the import and export of hazardous waste and municipal solid waste be-
tween the countries.49 The Canada/U.S. Agreement establishes a basic
“notice and consent” system for transboundary shipments of “hazardous
waste” for “treatment, storage or disposal.”50 Indeed, the stated purpose
of the agreement is to encourage transboundary shipments of hazardous
waste to ensure economically efficient disposal.51 Notice must be provided
by the designated authority of the exporting country to the designated
authority of the importing country.52 The definition of hazardous wastes
46 International Waste Agreements, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/osw
/hazard/international/agree.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011); see also Statement of Robert
Heiss, Joint U.S.-Canada Industry Workshop, supra note 9. The Canada and Mexico agree-
ments address both the export and import of hazardous wastes. See id. The United States,
however, has also entered into limited treaties authorizing the importation of waste from
other countries. See id.
47 See infra notes 238–48 and accompanying text.
48 See infra notes 282–89 and accompanying text.
49 Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, U.S.-
Can., Oct. 28, 1986, T.I.A.S. No. 11,099, available at http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard
/international/canada86.pdf [hereinafter Canada/U.S. Agreement]. A word of caution, the
version of the U.S./Canada Agreement published on the EPA website is missing a page. The
Canada/U.S. Agreement was amended in 1992 to cover nonhazardous municipal solid
waste. Amendments to Canada/U.S. Agreement, Nov. 4, 1992, available at http://www
.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/international/canada86and92.pdf [hereinafter Amendment to
Canada/U.S. Bilateral Agreement]. This requirement has apparently not been implemented
because of concerns that EPA does not have authority under section 3017 to implement
export requirements on nonhazardous solid waste. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, IMPORTS OF
CANADIAN WASTE SUMMARY, CRS-2, CRS-7 (Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.cnie
.org/NLE/CRSreports/08Mar/RL33720.pdf.
50 See Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, arts. 2, 3(a).
51 See Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, Preamble.
52 Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, art. 3(a). For the United States, the designated
authority is the EPA; for Canada, the designated authority is the Department of the
Environment. Id. art. 1(a).
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under United States law for purposes of the agreement includes “hazardous
waste subject to a manifest requirement.”53 Notification requires submis-
sion of a limited set of information, and if no objection or conditions are
imposed within thirty days of receipt of notice, consent is presumed.54
In 1986, the United States and Mexico also entered into an agree-
ment governing the transboundary movement of hazardous waste.55 This
agreement, like the Canada/U.S. Agreement, is based on notice and con-
sent requirements. Notification must be provided to the designated gov-
ernment authority at least forty-five days prior to shipment, and consent
is not presumed from a failure to respond to the notice.56 “Hazardous
waste” is simply defined through reference to domestic regulation.57 The
Mexico/U.S. Agreement specifically defines the “activities” to which it
applies, to include recycling, reuse, and “other utilization” in addition to
disposal, treatment, and storage.58 In addition to hazardous wastes, other
portions of the Mexico/U.S. Agreement also address the transboundary
movement of hazardous substances, including pesticides.59
C. The OECD Decision on the Export of Hazardous Waste
for Recycling
The OECD has issued a number of Directives relating to the move-
ment of hazardous waste among member countries.60 In 1992, the OECD
53 Id. art. 1(b).
54 See id. art. 3(d).
55 Annex III to the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding the Transboundary
Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, Nov. 12, 1986, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,269, available at http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/international/mexico86.pdf
[hereinafter Mexico/U.S. Agreement]. The Mexico/U.S. Agreement was adopted as an Annex
to the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment
in the Border Area. U.S.-Mex., Aug. 14, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2916, available at http://www.epa
.gov/Border2012/docs/LaPazAgreement.pdf [hereinafter La Paz Agreement]. The La Paz
Agreement addressed a range of environmental issues between the United States and
Mexico, and it specifically provided for the subsequent adoption of annexes. Id. art. 3.
56 Mexico/U.S. Agreement, supra note 55, art. III.2.
57 Id. art. I.2.
58 Id. art. 1.4.
59 Id. arts. V–VII.
60 See Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes
Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1238–39 (Jan. 8, 2010) for a
discussion of the history of the OECD Decisions addressing the movement of hazardous
418 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:405
adopted a decision that first established a series of requirements on OECD
members regarding the movement of hazardous waste among members
for the purpose of recycling.61 In 2001, the OECD issued revisions to the
1992 Decision that were designed in part to “harmonize” OECD require-
ments with those of the Basel Convention.62 The OECD subsequently added
an addendum and appendices and issued the revised document as “Decision
of the Council Concerning the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations.”63 This 2001 OECD Decision,
as amended, currently applies to the movement of hazardous wastes for
recycling among OECD members.64
The OECD Decision establishes a two-tier system for “green” and
“amber” wastes.65 For the hazardous “amber” wastes, it establishes a
“notice and consent” regime that is similar, but more detailed, than that
specified in the Mexico and Canada Agreements.66 Among other things,
the OECD Decision requires contracts between the exporter and the re-
cycling facility and use of “movement documents” that accompany the
wastes,67 requires facilities recycling the waste to provide notice of receipt
of the wastes and issue a “certificate of recovery” upon completion of the
recycling,68 provides for “tacit” consent when the importing country does
not respond to a notice within thirty days,69 provides for designation of
“pre-consented” recycling facilities that have different notice and consent
wastes. The OECD was established in 1961 to improve economic cooperation among a
group of developed nations and currently includes thirty-four countries. History, OECD,
http://www.OECD.org/history (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). In addition to the United States,
these include thirty-three other European, Latin American and Asian countries. Members
and Partners, OECD, http://www.oecd.org (follow “About” hyperlink, then follow “Members
and Partners” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
61 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Decision of the Council
Concerning the Control of Transfrontier Movements of Wastes Destined for Recovery
Operations, OECD Doc. C (92) 39/FINAL (Mar. 30, 1992), available at http://www.oecd
.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=C(92)39/FINAL&docLanguage=En.
62 OECD, Decision of the Council Concerning the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Wastes Destined for Recovery Operations, OECD Doc. C(2001)107/FINAL (June 14,
2001) (amended 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008) http://webnet.oecd.org/oecdacts/ (follow “by Title”
hyperlink, then click on title of this decision) [hereinafter OECD Decision].
63 See id.
64 See id. at ch. II(A)(7)–(9).
65 Id. at ch. II(B)(2).
66 Compare OECD Decision, supra note 62, ch. II(D) with Mexico/U.S. Agreement, supra
note 55, art. III and Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, art. 3–4.
67 OECD Decision, supra note 62, ch. II(D)(2), at Case 1.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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requirements,70 and requires consent of any transit country as well as the
importing country.71 The OECD Decision specifically requires the exporting
country to readmit any amber wastes that cannot be recycled pursuant to
the original consent or at an alternate approved recycling facility.72
D. The Significance of the Basel Convention to U.S. Exports
The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal is the primary multinational
agreement that deals with the import and export of hazardous waste.73
The Convention establishes a “notice and consent” regime that requires
notification of and consent from the receiving and transit countries for
trade in the disposal and recycling of hazardous wastes and municipal
wastes.74 Among other things, Basel requires that trade in hazardous
70 Id. at Case 2.
71 Id. at Cases 1–2.
72 Id.
73 Basel, supra note 3.
74 Notification Concerning the Basel Convention’s Potential Implications for Hazardous
Waste Exports and Imports, 57 Fed. Reg. 20,602, 20,603 (May 13, 1992). EPA issued a
Federal Register notice shortly after the effective date of the Basel Convention in which
it described the terms of the Convention as follows:
The Basel Convention’s main goal is to protect human health and the
environment against the adverse effects that may result from misman-
agement or careless international movements of hazardous and other
wastes. The Convention seeks a reduction in waste generation, a reduction
in transboundary waste movements consistent with environmentally
sound and efficient waste management, and sets a standard of environ-
mentally sound management for those waste movements that do occur.
Wastes covered by the Convention include hazardous wastes, household
wastes, and residues arising from the incineration of household wastes.
The Convention controls the transboundary movement of these wastes
from one Party to another. Before a transboundary movement of haz-
ardous or other wastes may occur, the exporting country must notify
in writing the countries of import and transit and must obtain their
consent. The shipment cannot proceed until the exporting country has
received written consent from the importing country and any transit
countries as well as confirmation of the existence of a waste manage-
ment contract between the exporter and the importer. Both the exporting
and importing countries are obligated to prohibit a transboundary move-
ment if there is reason to believe that the waste will not be managed in
an environmentally sound manner in the importing country.
Id. at 20,603.
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wastes be allowed only if the waste will be managed in an “environmentally
sound manner.”75 Basel also prohibits the trade in waste between parties
and nonparties.76 Article 11, however, provides that trade between parties
and nonparties is authorized if pursuant to a separate bilateral, multi-
lateral, or regional agreement that is consistent with the aims and purposes
of the Convention (for a pre-existing agreement) or that contains provi-
sions that “do not derogate from the environmentally sound management”
required by the Convention (for newly negotiated agreements).77
The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Basel Conven-
tion,78 and it remains among the very few countries that are not parties.79
Thus, virtually every country on earth would be prohibited from consenting
to a shipment of hazardous wastes from the United States unless pursuant
to an international agreement that satisfies the requirements of Article 11
of Basel. EPA has taken the position that the OECD Decision and the
Canada and Mexico Agreements satisfy these requirements.80 EPA has spe-
cifically stated that the OECD Decision C(92)39 constitutes a “pre-existing”
agreement, and adoption of the EPA regulations pursuant to the OECD
Decision allows trade with OECD countries to continue in compliance with
the Basel Convention.81
III. EPA’S REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXPORT OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE
In 1986, EPA promulgated a relatively simple, single set of “notice
and consent” export requirements.82 At that time, the United States had
not entered into the bilateral agreements with Mexico and Canada and the
OECD had not issued a binding directive on the transboundary movement
of wastes. Thus, these regulations were exclusively governed by EPA’s
75 Basel, supra note 3, art. 4.8.
76 Id. art. 4.5.
77 Id. art. 11.
78 As discussed below, the Senate consented to ratification of the Basel Convention in 1992,
and the United States has not “ratified” the Convention because it has not submitted
documentation to the Basel Secretariat. See infra notes 338–40 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
80 See Implementation of OECD Council Decision C(92)39, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,290, 16,291
(April 12, 1996).
81 See id.
82 Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664,
28,665 (Aug. 8, 1986) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 262, subpt. E).
2012] EXPORTING WASTE 421
authority to establish a “base” program under section 3017(a)(1).83 The
original regulations have since morphed into a confusing array of differing
regulatory programs that vary depending on the destination, the type of
wastes, and their means of disposal or recycling. With apologies, the follow-
ing section contains a detailed description of eight different sets of export
regulations promulgated by EPA.
A. General Requirements: Subpart E
Part 262, Subpart E contains the regulations generally applicable
to the export of hazardous wastes under RCRA.84 Indeed, these general
Subpart E regulations are the “default” export regulations and apply
to all exports of hazardous waste unless other explicit export provisions
apply.85 The application of Subpart E to wastes exported to OECD coun-
tries is particularly complex (and confusing). Canada and Mexico, both
OECD countries, are subject to the Subpart E regulations whether the ex-
port is for disposal or recycling. The export of hazardous waste for disposal
to all other OECD countries is also subject to the Subpart E regulations.
Exports of hazardous wastes for recycling to OECD countries (other than
Canada and Mexico) are, however, subject to the Subpart H regulations
discussed below in lieu of the Subpart E regulations.86 EPA has described,
but not explained, this distinction.87
83 RCRA § 3017(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 6938(a) (2006)).
84 40 C.F.R. pt. 262, subpt. E (2010).
85 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50–.52.
86 40 C.F.R. § 262.58(a).
87 When EPA adopted the Subpart H regulations, EPA specifically excluded Canada and
Mexico from their coverage. The preamble to the 1996 regulation states:
Although Canada is subject to the Decision, movements of waste between
the U.S. and Canada that otherwise would be governed by the Decision
will continue to be controlled by the U.S./Canada bilateral agreement.
Implementation of OECD Council Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,290, 16,298 n.7 (Apr. 12, 1996).
The preamble also states:
Mexico joined the OECD in June 1994. Movements of waste between the
U.S. and Mexico will continue to be controlled by the U.S./Mexico bilateral
agreement and EPA’s current regulations, until such time as the U.S.
and Mexico agree to switch to procedures under the OECD Decision.
Id. at 16,298 n.8. EPA’s decision to apply the bilateral agreements, rather than the
OECD Decision, to exports to Canada and Mexico requires somewhat more justification.
Presumably, EPA has concluded that the country specific bilateral agreements “trump”
the OECD Decision, but it is not clear why. The OECD Decision was adopted after the
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Covered Wastes. The Subpart E regulations explicitly apply only to
the export of Subtitle C “hazardous waste.”88 The regulations also implicitly
apply only to hazardous wastes that are subject to the manifest require-
ment in Part 262, Subpart B. This limitation arises solely through the
definition of “primary exporter” which includes “any person who is re-
quired to originate the manifest for a shipment of hazardous waste.”89
Drafting notwithstanding, EPA has otherwise expressly stated that the
Subpart E regulations only apply to Subtitle C hazardous wastes that
are subject to a manifest requirement.90
Persons Subject to Requirements. Most requirements under
Subpart E apply to the “primary exporter” of hazardous waste; it is the
“primary exporter” who is subject to the requirement to provide notice of
intent to export, and who is subject to most record-keeping and reporting
requirements.91 The “primary exporter” is defined as the person who is
“required to originate the manifest for a shipment of hazardous waste in
accordance with 40 C.F.R. part 262, subpart B.”92 Under the cited regula-
tions, the person who is required to originate the manifest for a shipment
bilateral agreements, and although the OECD Decision is more detailed and, in some
respects, more stringent than the bilateral agreements, it is not directly contradictory.
In other words, an export could comply with both the requirements of the OECD Decision
and the bilateral agreement. There is nothing in the OECD Decision that states that OECD
members can comply with specific bilateral agreements in lieu of the Decision. Indeed,
the 2001 OECD Decision notes that OECD members may be obligated to comply with
other international agreements in addition to the OECD Decision, including the Basel
Convention and regulations of the European Community governing both the disposal and
recycling of wastes. OECD Decision, supra note 62, at “Instructions for Completing the
Notification and Movement Documents: Introduction.” If, as EPA has stated, the OECD
Decision is binding, it is worth some explanation as to why exports to Mexico and Canada
for recycling should not meet the same Subpart H requirements that apply to exports to
other OECD countries.
88 40 C.F.R. § 262.50. Although hazardous waste is not defined in the Subpart E
regulations, EPA’s Subtitle C regulatory definitions of solid and hazardous waste would
apply. See id. § 260.10.
89 40 C.F.R. § 262.51.
90 See Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed.
Reg. 28,664, 28,670–72 (Aug. 8, 1986); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, RO 13719, MONTHLY
HOTLINE REPORT: RCRA HOTLINE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Dec. 1994), available at http://
yosemite.epa.gov/osw/rcra.nsf/ea6e50dc6214725285256bf00063269d/69375E8D66EC6CF
78525670F006BCCDB/$file/13719.pdf (“Part 262, Subpart E applies only to wastes which
are subject to Part 262, Subpart B manifest requirements.”).
91 40 C.F.R. §262.53(a) (“primary exporter” required to provide notice of intent to export);
§ 262.55 (“primary exporter” required to file exception report); § 262.56(a) (“primary
exporter” required to file annual reports).
92 40 C.F.R. § 262.51.
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of hazardous waste is the “generator,”93 and the generator is defined as
the person whose action first creates the hazardous waste.94 Thus, the
original generator of the exported waste would appear to be the “primary
exporter” subject to regulation under Subpart E.
Notice Requirement. The primary exporter of hazardous waste
must provide notification of its intent to export at least sixty days prior
to export.95 The notification must be sent to EPA, and it must contain cer-
tain general information about the waste, its proposed means of disposal
or recycling, the countries through which the waste will transit, and the
country that will finally receive the waste.96 The single notification may
cover export activities for up to a year.97 EPA, in conjunction with the State
Department, is responsible for providing notification to the receiving
country and any countries through which the waste will transit.98
Consent Requirements. The waste may be exported only if the
receiving country consents to the shipment.99 Upon receipt of consent
from the receiving country, the United States Embassy of that country
will issue an “Acknowledgment of Consent.”100 This document must accom-
pany the shipment.101 If the receiving country objects to the shipment,
EPA will notify the primary exporter. Transit countries, although notified,
may not block the shipment of wastes under these provisions of RCRA; the
regulations merely provide that EPA will inform the primary exporter of
“any responses” by the transit countries.102
Manifest Requirement. The exported wastes are subject to the basic
RCRA manifest requirement, but some special requirements apply.103 The
RCRA manifest of wastes intended for export, for example, must include
the “consignee” of the waste and the point of exit from the United States.104
93 40 C.F.R. § 260.20.
94 40 C.F.R. § 262.10.
95 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(a).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(e).
99 40 C.F.R. § 262.52(b).
100 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.51, 262.52(c).
101 40 C.F.R. § 262.52(c).
102 40 C.F.R. § 262.53(f). Section 3017(a) does not address requirements for countries through
which hazardous waste exports may transit. See generally RCRA § 3017 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2006)). EPA exercised its authority under section 3017(h) to establish
a requirement that transit countries receive notice. See Hazardous Waste Management
System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,665–67 (Aug. 8, 1986).
103 40 C.F.R. § 262.54.
104 40 C.F.R. § 262.54(a)–(c).
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Exception Reporting. A primary exporter must file an “exception
report” with EPA if the exporter has not received 1) a signed copy of the
manifest from the transporter within forty-five days of the date the wastes
were accepted for transport by the initial transporter, or 2) a written con-
firmation from the consignee that the wastes have been received within
ninety days of the date the wastes were accepted for transport by the
initial transporter, or if 3) the waste is returned to the United States.105
Duty to Reimport. The regulations require that if a shipment cannot
be delivered to the designated or alternate consignee, the primary exporter
must notify the transporter to return the waste to the primary exporter.106
Reporting and Record-keeping Requirements. The primary ex-
porter is required to submit an “annual report” with EPA that summa-
rizes “the types, quantities, frequency, and ultimate destination of all
hazardous waste exported during the previous calendar year.”107 Exporters
of greater than 1000 kilograms per year of hazardous waste must also,
in even-numbered years, report on their efforts to reduce the quantity and
toxicity of waste generated.108 Primary exporters are also required to keep
most documents, including their Notice of Intent and Acknowledgment of
Consent, for at least three years.109
Transporter Requirements. Subpart E contains no specific require-
ments applicable to the transporters of hazardous waste for export. Trans-
porters are, however, subject to limited export requirements including a
prohibition on accepting a hazardous waste for export that does not conform
to an Acknowledgment of Consent that, in most cases, must be attached to
the manifest.110 Transporters must also sign the manifest and give a copy
to the customs agent at the point of departure from the United States.111
105 40 C.F.R. § 262.55. In 2010, EPA amended this provision to require that exception
reports be submitted to Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Office of
Federal Activities, International Compliance Assurance Division (2254A), Environmental
Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20460. Revisions to
the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes Between OECD
Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1253 (Jan. 8, 2010).
106 40 C.F.R. § 262.54(g).
107 40 C.F.R. § 262.56(a).
108 Id. Domestic generators of hazardous waste are required to submit biennial reports
that describe their “waste minimization” efforts. See id. § 262.41. The export regulations
apparently exclude small quantity exporters (100–1000 kilograms per month) of hazardous
waste from this requirement. Id. § 262.56(a).
109 40 C.F.R. § 262.57(a).
110 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.50, 263.20(a)(2). There are different requirements for use of manifests
in shipments by rail or by water. Id. at § 263.20(e)–(f).
111 40 C.F.R. § 263.20(g).
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B. OECD Recycling: Subpart H
In 1996, EPA adopted a new Subpart H to 40 C.F.R. Part 262 that
governs the import and export of wastes for recycling to countries in the
OECD other than Canada and Mexico.112 The Subpart H regulations were
amended in 2010 to implement the revised 2001 OECD Decision that now
governs the transboundary movement of hazardous waste for recycling
within the OECD.113 The Subpart H regulations are more detailed and
extensive than the Subpart E regulations.
Covered Materials. Under the Subpart H regulations, covered
materials include “wastes” that are both 1) defined as hazardous wastes
under Subtitle C114 and 2) are either subject to the RCRA manifest re-
quirement or to “universal waste” management standards.115
112 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.80–.89; Implementation of OECD Council Decision C(92)39, 61 Fed.
Reg. 16,290 (Apr. 12, 1996). For purposes of Subpart H the OECD countries include:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 40
C.F.R. §§ 262.58(a)(1), 262.80(a). Since the last revision to the Subpart H regulations in
2010, four countries, Chile, Estonia, Israel, and Slovenia, have joined the OECD. See List
of OECD Countries—Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd
.org/ (follow “List of OECD Countries” hyperlink at the bottom of the page, then follow
“Dates of Accession” hyperlink under the heading “Useful Links”) (last visited Nov. 8,
2011). Apparently these countries have requested an extended period of time to comply
with the OECD Decision, and when they have complied, trade in recyclable hazardous
waste with other OECD countries will be authorized. Email from Eva Kreisler, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Office of Int’l Enforcement Compliance Div., to Jeffrey M. Gaba, Professor of
Law, Dedman Sch. of Law (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with author). At that point, EPA will
revise the list of applicable OECD countries to which Subpart H applies. Id. Canada and
Mexico, although members of the OECD, are subject to these requirements only for wastes
that transit their borders. 40 C.F.R. § 262.58(a)(2). The export and import of hazardous
wastes for recycling from or to Mexico or Canada is governed by the general Subpart E
regulations covering the import and export of hazardous wastes. See supra notes 86–87
and accompanying text.
113 OECD Decision, supra note 62, at ch.I.I.
114 40 C.F.R. § 262.80(a). The OECD Decision allows a country to determine if a waste
on the lists is hazardous based on “national procedures.” See OECD Decision, supra note
62, at II.B.4. Under the EPA implementing regulations, only wastes that qualify as
RCRA hazardous wastes are classified as hazardous for purposes of the OECD Decisions.
See Implementation of OECD Council Decision C(92)39, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,290, 16,294
(Apr. 12, 1996).
115 40 C.F.R. § 262.80(a)(2). The Universal Waste rule, discussed below, establishes a sepa-
rate program for management of certain batteries, pesticides, and mercury-containing
equipment. See infra notes 152–64 and accompanying text.
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Subpart H also only applies to the export of hazardous wastes
that are destined for “recovery operations.”116 These are defined as “activi-
ties leading to resource recovery, recycling, reclamation, direct re-use or
alternative uses”117 as listed in the OECD Decision.118 The list of “recovery
actions” in Subpart H is similar to the recycling activities covered in the
EPA definition of solid waste,119 but materials being exported to engage
in recovery actions that are not covered by the EPA regulatory definition
would not be subject to Subpart H since they would not be a RCRA haz-
ardous waste.
Amber and Green Waste Classification. Although the Subpart H
regulations only apply to Subtitle C hazardous wastes, the regulations in-
corporate the OECD classification of “green” and “amber” wastes.120 Under
the Subpart H regulations, all materials classified as Subtitle C hazardous
wastes are classified as “amber” wastes regardless of their classification
in the OECD appendices.121 Subtitle C hazardous wastes that are not spec-
ified on the OECD lists are also classified as amber wastes.122 Thus, all
Subtitle C hazardous wastes sent to the specified OECD countries for recy-
cling are subject to Subpart H requirements applicable to amber wastes.123
Somewhat confusingly, the Subpart H regulations also state that:
a waste is considered hazardous under U.S. national procedures, and
hence subject to this subpart, if the waste:
(1) Meets the Federal definition of hazardous waste in 40 CFR 261.3; and
(2) Is subject to either the Federal RCRA manifesting requirements at
40 CFR part 262, subpart B, the universal waste management standards
of 40 CFR part 273, State requirements analogous to 40 CFR part 273,
the export requirements in the spent lead-acid battery management stan-
dards of 40 CFR part 266, subpart G, or State requirements analogous
to the export requirements in 40 CFR part 266, subpart G.
40 C.F.R. § 262.89(a). This different phrasing picks up a cross-reference in the spent acid-
lead batteries (“SLAB”) regulations that apply to Subpart H regulations to the export of
SLABs to the OECD for recycling.
116 40 C.F.R. § 262.80(a).
117 40 C.F.R. § 262.81.
118 OECD Decision, supra note 62, at app. 5B.
119 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c).
120 40 C.F.R. § 262.89(d).
121 40 C.F.R. § 262.89(b).
122 40 C.F.R. § 262.83(c).
123 Wastes classified as nonhazardous “green” wastes under Subpart H may be classified
as amber wastes by importing or transit countries; in that case, “[a]ll responsibilities of
the U.S. importer/exporter shift to the importer/exporter of the OECD Member country
that considers the waste hazardous unless the parties make other arrangements through
contracts.” 40 C.F.R. § 262.82(a)(2)(iii).
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Mixtures of green wastes and amber wastes are subject to amber
control only if the mixture would be hazardous under U.S. national pro-
cedures.124 Thus, under EPA’s mixture rule, mixtures of characteristic
hazardous waste (classified as an “amber” waste) and nonhazardous
(classified as a “green” waste) would not be subject to the Subpart H
requirements if the mixture did not exhibit a hazardous characteristic.
Regulation of Green List Wastes. The Subpart H regulations pur-
port to apply only to Subtitle C hazardous wastes. Nonetheless, EPA has
included a provision in Subpart H that green list wastes are subject to
“existing controls normally applied to commercial transactions.”125 This
language, although consistent with the OECD Decision, simply cannot
create any enforceable obligation under RCRA since both the applica-
bility provisions of Subpart H and section 3017 are limited to regulation
of Subtitle C hazardous wastes.
Persons Subject to Subpart H Requirements. Under Subpart H, the
“exporter” of the hazardous wastes is required to submit the Notice of
Intent and execute a contract with the receiving facility.126 The “exporter”
is defined as
[T]he person under the jurisdiction of the exporting country
who has, or will have at the time the planned transfrontier
movement commences, possession or other forms of legal
124 40 C.F.R. § 262.82(a)(3). EPA has stated:
EPA has revised the text in § 262.82(a) to clarify that only those wastes
and waste mixtures considered hazardous under U.S. national regulations
will be subject to the Amber control procedures within the United States.
This is consistent with longstanding EPA policy, and should minimize
confusion for the regulated community. For example, under the existing
RCRA hazardous waste regulations, any mixture of an Amber waste that
exhibits one or more of the hazardous characteristics of ignitability,
corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity under RCRA with a Green waste shall
be considered an Amber waste if the mixture still exhibits one or more
of the RCRA hazardous waste characteristics and, thus, be subject to
the Amber control procedures. Conversely, if the resulting mixture no
longer exhibits one or more of the RCRA hazardous characteristics, it
will instead be considered a Green waste, and be subject to the Green
control procedures.
Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes
Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1243 (Jan. 8, 2010).
125 40 C.F.R. § 262.82(a)(1)(i).
126 The exporter is the entity required to provide the Notice of Intent to export and to satisfy
the reporting and record-keeping requirements. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.83(b).
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control of the wastes and who proposes their transfrontier
movement for the ultimate purpose of submitting them to
recovery operations. When the United States (U.S.) is the
exporting country, notifier is interpreted to mean a person
domiciled in the U.S.127
An exporter can be a “recognized trader” who has control over the waste.128
This definition of “exporter” is clearly different from the one that
applies to “primary exporters” under Subpart E. Under Subpart E, the
hazardous waste generator is the primary exporter subject to the export
requirements.129 Under Subpart H, a different class of persons who have
control over the waste and proposes to export of wastes is subject to the
requirements applicable to “exporters.”130
The record-keeping and exception reporting requirements, in
contrast, apply to the “primary exporter” as defined in the Subpart E
regulations or the person who initiates the movement document.131
Notice Requirements. The exporter must provide written notification
to EPA prior to undertaking the export of the hazardous waste.132 Notice
requirements vary depending on whether or not the wastes are being sent
to a “pre-approved” facility.133 If wastes are being sent to a facility that has
not been pre-approved, notice to EPA must be provided at least forty-five
days prior to shipment.134 If the wastes are being sent to a “pre-approved”
facility, notification must be provided ten days before shipment.135
Consent Requirements. Shipments may not occur without proper
consent from the importing and transit countries.136 Consent may be
provided in writing, but the regulations also provide for “tacit consent.”137
127 See 40 C.F.R. § 262.81(g).
128 40 C.F.R. § 262.86(b). A “recognized trader” is defined as “a person who, with appro-
priate authorization of concerned countries, acts in the role of principal to purchase and
subsequently sell wastes; this person has legal control of such wastes from time of purchase
to time of sale; such a person may act to arrange and facilitate transfrontier movements
of wastes destined for recovery operations.” Id. § 262.81(i).
129 See 40 C.F.R. § 262.51.
130 See 40 C.F.R. § 262.87.
131 Id.
132 40 C.F.R. § 262.83.
133 Id.
134 40 C.F.R. § 262.83(b)(1).
135 40 C.F.R. § 262.83(b)(2).
136 40 C.F.R. § 262.83.
137 Id.
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Tacit consent allows a waste shipment to proceed if no written objection
is received within some set period of time after the importing country
acknowledges receipt of a notice of intent to export.138
Movement Document Requirements. All shipments of amber wastes
must be accompanied by a “movement document” similar to a RCRA
manifest.139 For the portion of the shipment occurring within the United
States, a RCRA manifest must also accompany the shipment.140
Contract Requirements. All shipments are prohibited unless pur-
suant to a “valid written contract, chain of contracts or equivalent arrange-
ments (when the movement occurs between parties controlled by the same
corporate or legal entity).”141 Among other things, the contract must specify
which party will be responsible for alternate management of the waste
if its disposition cannot be carried out as described in the notification.142
Compliance with Other International Agreements. The Subpart H
regulations purport to require compliance with other international agree-
ments to which the shipment may be subject.143 The regulations identify,
as examples, a variety of international agreements relating to transit of
goods.144 It is unclear, and unlikely, that the regulations make violation
of these other international agreements a violation of RCRA itself and
therefore subject to RCRA penalties and citizen suits.
Duty to Reimport. The regulations also contain provisions requir-
ing the return of wastes if the shipment is not completed.145
Exception Reporting. Persons who are classified as “primary ex-
porters” or who initiate the movement document are required to make an
“exception” report to EPA if 1) they have not received a copy of the track-
ing document within forty-five days after it was accepted by the initial
138 For wastes being sent to a facility that has not been pre-approved, the shipment may
commence if the country has not provided a written objection or if the country has failed
to respond within thirty days of issuance of an “Acknowledgement of Receipt” of a Notice
of Intent by the country of import. 40 C.F.R. § 262.83(b)(1). If the shipment is to a pre-
approved facility, the shipment may generally commence within seven days of issuance of
an Acknowledgement of Receipt of a notice by the importing country. See id. § 262.83(b)(2).
139 40 C.F.R. § 262.84.
140 See Implementation of OECD Council Decision C(92)39, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,290, 16,295
(Apr. 12, 1996).
141 40 C.F.R. § 262.85(a).
142 40 C.F.R. § 262.85(c).
143 40 C.F.R. § 262.82(b)(2). The issue of whether section 3017 gives domestic effect to inter-
national agreements is discussed below, infra notes 275–78 and accompanying text.
144 40 C.F.R. § 262.82(b)(2).
145 40 C.F.R. § 262.85(c)(2).
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transporter, 2) they have not received written confirmation from the re-
covery facility that the waste was received within ninety days after it was
accepted by the initial transporter, or 3) if “[t]he waste is returned to the
United States.”146
Reporting and Record-keeping Requirements. Primary exporters or
persons who initiate the movement document must file an annual report
with EPA that summarizes “the types, quantities, frequency, and ultimate
destination of all such hazardous waste exported during the previous cal-
endar year.”147 These persons are also required to submit a biennial report
on their efforts to reduce the quantity and toxicity of each hazardous waste
exported “except for hazardous waste produced by exporters of greater
than one hundred kilograms but less than 1000 kilograms per calendar
month.”148 The phrasing is odd since “exporters” may not “produce” waste.
Primary exporters and persons who initiate the movement document are
also required to keep most documents, including their Notice of Intent and
Acknowledgement of Consent, for at least three years.149
Transporter Requirements. Transporters “may not” accept waste
subject to Subpart H unless it is accompanied by a “tracking document”
that satisfies the “movement document” requirements.150 Transporters are
also required to properly sign the manifest and give a copy to the customs
agent at point of export.151
C. Universal Waste Rules: 40 C.F.R. Part 273
In order to reduce the cost and complexity of the Subtitle C require-
ments, EPA, in 1995, promulgated a set of reduced requirements for a
limited class of “universal wastes.”152 “Universal wastes” include certain
batteries, pesticides, mercury-containing equipment, and most electric
lamp bulbs.153 These universal waste rules, contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 273,
146 40 C.F.R. § 262.87(b).
147 40 C.F.R. § 262.87(a).
148 40 C.F.R. § 262.87(a)(5).
149 40 C.F.R. § 262.87(c).
150 40 C.F.R. § 263.20(a)(2).
151 40 C.F.R. § 263.20(g).
152 GABA & STEVER, supra note 14, at 9:28.
153 40 C.F.R. § 273.1. EPA has recognized that the class of universal wastes may be
expanded in the future and established procedures and criteria for adding wastes. Id.
§§ 273.80–.81. In general, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that a proposed
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establish minimal requirements for persons who generate, store, and trans-
port these wastes.154 Universal wastes transported within the United States
are not, for example, subject to a domestic manifest requirement.155
The Part 273 rules also contain specific requirements relating to
the export of universal wastes.156 “Handlers” of universal wastes, including
both persons who generate and those who store the wastes without dispos-
ing or recycling the wastes themselves, are subject to notice and consent
requirements.157 Universal waste handlers that export to OECD countries
are required to comply with the Subpart H regulations.158 Handlers that
export to non-OECD countries are subject to a specified set of require-
ments that include many of the requirements of Subpart E that apply to
primary exporters, including the requirement to 1) file an “intent to export”
notice with EPA, 2) file an “annual report” of export activity, and 3) satisfy
record-keeping requirements.159 Additionally, universal waste handlers
that export to non-OECD countries may only export in compliance with an
waste, among other things, is generated by a large number of generators, can be safely
collected and transported with relatively low risk, if regulated as a universal waste will
increase the likelihood that the waste will be recycled, if regulated will improve com-
pliance with the Subtitle C hazardous waste program, and “[s]uch other factors as may
be appropriate.” Id. § 273.81.
154 See GABA & STEVER, supra note 14, at 9:28. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
EPA530-K-05-019, RCRA TRAINING MODULE: INTRODUCTION TO UNIVERSAL WASTE (Sept.
2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/osw/inforesources/pubs/training/uwast05.pdf [herein-
after RCRA TRAINING MODULE]. Although, in part, intended to facilitate the recycling of
universal wastes, the reduced requirements apply to the disposal as well as recycling of
universal wastes. GABA & STEVER, supra note 14, at 9:28.
155 See RCRA TRAINING MODULE, supra note 154. Since export regulations in most cases
only apply to hazardous wastes that are subject to a manifest, the Subpart H regulations
specifically state that they are applicable to hazardous wastes subject to a manifest or
universal waste rules. 40 C.F.R. § 262.80(a).
156 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 273.20, 273.40.
157 The term “Universal Waste Handler” is defined at 40 C.F.R. § 273.9. EPA regulations
distinguish between “large quantity” (those that accumulate 5000 kilograms of universal
waste at any one time) and “small quantity” universal waste handlers, but the export
requirements are the same for both. Id.
158 40 C.F.R. § 273.20 (export requirements for small quantity handlers); § 273.40 (export
requirements for large quantity handlers). The universal waste regulations expressly apply
the Subpart H regulations to all universal waste exports to the OECD countries listed at
section 262.58(a)(1). Id. § 273.40. This includes the OECD countries other than Canada and
Mexico. Unlike the basic scope of Subpart H, this provision appears to apply the universal
waste rules to the export of universal wastes for disposal in OECD countries. Id. § 262.58.
159 40 C.F.R. §§ 273.20, 273.40. These include the requirements found at 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.53,
262.56(a)(1)–(4), 262.57.
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Acknowledgment of Consent, and this acknowledgment must accompany
the shipment.160
“Transporter[s]” of universal waste that are being exported are sub-
ject to the requirements of Subpart H if the wastes are destined for an
OECD country.161 If the shipment is destined for a non-OECD country, the
regulations provide that the transporter may not accept a shipment that
does not “conform” to the Acknowledgment of Consent and must “ensure”
that a copy of the Acknowledgment of Consent accompanies the shipment
and the shipment is delivered to the facility designated by the person initi-
ating the shipment.162
Finally, the universal waste rules explicitly do not apply to the ex-
port of household hazardous waste or to wastes generated by Conditionally
Exempt Small Quantity Generators (“CESQGs”) unless persons “managing”
universal wastes choose, “at their option,” to comply with the universal
waste rules.163 Household and CESQG universal wastes that are “commin-
gled” with other universal wastes are, however, subject to the universal
waste rules.164
D. SLAB: 40 C.F.R. Part 266 Subpart G
Spent lead-acid batteries (“SLABs”) can be recycled by the recla-
mation of the lead content of the batteries.165 When disposed or reclaimed,
SLABs are classified as a RCRA hazardous waste since they can exhibit the
characteristics of both toxicity and corrosivity.166 Prior to 2010, reclaimed
SLABs were exempt from manifest requirements and thus not subject to
the Subpart E or Subpart H export provisions.167 In 2010, however, EPA
amended the regulations found at 40 C.F.R. Part 266, Subpart G to pro-
vide explicit notice and consent requirements for the export of SLABs.168
160 40 C.F.R. §§ 273.20(b)–(c), 273.40(b)–(c).
161 40 C.F.R. § 273.56.
162 Id.
163 40 C.F.R. § 273.8.
164 Id.
165 Revisions to: The Requirements for Transboundary Shipments of Wastes Between OECD
Countries, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,388, 58,393–94 (proposed Oct. 6, 2008).
166 Id. at 58,393.
167 Id. at 58,391.
168 See generally Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous
Wastes Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236 (Jan. 8, 2010).
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These export requirements apply although EPA still does not require the
use of a manifest for domestic transport of SLABs.169
The new rules now impose specific notice and consent requirements
for the export of SLABs. Exporters are given the option to comply with the
Universal Waste Rules (and its associated export requirements) in lieu of
the explicit Part 266 SLAB export requirements.170 For those generators
that do not elect to comply with the Universal Waste rules, the new rules
do some odd parsing and cross-referencing similar to EPA’s treatment of
export requirements for universal wastes. For exporters of SLABs to
OECD countries (other than Canada and Mexico), the rules simply require
compliance with all of the Subpart H requirements.171 For exports to non-
OECD countries (and Canada and Mexico), the SLAB rules cross-reference
select portions of Subpart E: these include the Subpart E regulations gov-
erning submission of notice of intent to export, most but not all annual
reporting requirements and record-keeping.172 Additionally, the SLAB
rules themselves expressly prohibit export without an Acknowledgment
of Consent and a requirement to provide the transporter with a copy of
the Acknowledgment of Consent.173
For non-OECD shipments, there is no requirement for a “move-
ment document” or RCRA manifest to accompany the shipment.174 Rather,
generators must provide a copy of the Acknowledgment of Consent to the
transporter.175 Transporters are not allowed to accept a shipment that
169 See id.
170 40 C.F.R. § 266.80(a).
171 40 C.F.R. § 266.80(a)(6).
172 40 C.F.R. § 266.80(a). The regulations cross-reference the requirements applicable to
“primary exporters” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.53, 262.56(a)(1)–(4),(6),(b), 262.57. For reasons
best known to EPA (since not explained in the preamble to the SLAB rules), EPA exempts
exporters of SLABs to non-OECD countries from the Subpart E requirement that gener-
ators certify in the annual report that they have undertaken efforts to reduce the volume
and toxicity of waste generated. See id.
173 40 C.F.R. §266.80.
174 In a nicely circular argument, EPA states that shipments of SLABs: “do not have any
shipment tracking documentation requirements or exception reporting requirements be-
cause they are exempt from the RCRA hazardous waste manifest requirements and are not
required to comply with the movement document requirements in § 262.84.” Revisions to
the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes Between OECD
Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1246 (Jan. 8, 2010). In other words, EPA explains
that non-OECD shipments do not have shipment tracking requirements because EPA has
exempted them from shipment tracking requirements.
175 40 C.F.R. § 266.80(a)(6).
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does not “conform” to the Acknowledgment of Consent and must “ensure”
that the Acknowledgment of Consent accompanies the shipment and that
the shipment is delivered to facility designated in the Acknowledgment
of Consent.176
E. Cathode Ray Tubes: 40 C.F.R. 261.4(a)(22)
EPA’s most direct attempt to regulate the export of electronic waste
is its 2006 regulation governing the disposal and recycling of cathode ray
tubes (“CRTs”) and processed glass from CRTs.177 CRTs include televisions
and the older television tubelike computer monitors that are now being
supplanted by flat panel liquid crystal displays.178 EPA cites data that indi-
cates that color CRTs are likely to exhibit the toxicity characteristic based
on their lead content, and, thus, when CRTs become a solid waste they
would likely be classified as a hazardous waste.179 CRTs, however, have
potential recyclable value because of the metal content, primarily lead, in
the glass on the tube, and to avoid classification and regulation of CRTs
as hazardous waste, EPA has established a general set of “conditional”
exclusions for CRTs and specific set of requirements applicable to the
export of CRTs for recycling.180
A preliminary issue involves determining the point at which used
CRTs become solid wastes. EPA’s position varies depending on whether the
used CRTs are “intact” or “broken” and whether they are sent for “reuse”
or “recycling.”181 In general, EPA claims that:
• Used, intact CRTs that are sent for reuse are not
solid wastes and therefore not regulated under
RCRA as a hazardous waste.182
176 40 C.F.R. § 266.80(a)(7).
177 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4(a)(22), 261.39–.41; Hazardous Waste Management System;
Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. 42,928
(July 28, 2006). The rule became effective on January 29, 2007. Id.
178 See Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste
Program; Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42,928.
179 See id. at 42,930–31. EPA’s selective use of the cited data is discussed below.
180 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.4(a)(22), 261.39–.41.
181 Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program;
Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42,929.
182 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(22)(i); Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification
of the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42,929.
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• Used, intact CRTs that are sent for recycling within
the United States are not solid wastes unless specu-
latively accumulated.183
• Used, intact CRTs that are exported for recycling
are solid wastes.184
• Used, “broken” CRTs that are exported for recycling
are not solid wastes.185
• Processed glass that has been removed from CRTs
for recycling, even if exported, is not a solid waste.186
Thus, all CRTs exported for recycling are classified as a solid waste (and,
if they exhibit a hazard characteristic, a hazardous waste) unless other-
wise excluded.
EPA has established a set of “conditional exclusions” that apply
to CRTs that are exported for recycling.187 In general, the regulations
183 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(22)(i); Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of
the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42,929. This position
is based on doubtful authority. EPA states that these recycled CRTs are not solid wastes
since “EPA does not regulate unused commercial chemical products that are reclaimed.”
Id. This is a reference to EPA’s definition of solid waste which does not include “commercial
chemical products listed in 40 C.F.R. § 261.33” that are reclaimed. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3).
EPA has on several occasions stated that the reference to “listed” commercial chemical
products, in fact, includes all unused commercial chemical products. See GABA & STEVER,
supra note 14, at 2:11. EPA can say whatever it wants, but the regulation is limited to
commercial chemical products that have been formally designated in 40 C.F.R. § 261.33,
and at least one court has rejected EPA’s position. See United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071
(10th Cir. 1993).
184 See Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste
Program; Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42,938. EPA claims that, unlike domestic
recycling of unbroken CRTs, unbroken CRT exported for recycling “are not handled as valu-
able commodities.” Id. at 42,938. EPA, however, claims that processed CRT glass exported
for recycling is not a solid waste “since there is no information available to us indicating
that this material is not handled as a commodity when exported.” Id. The issue of EPA’s
authority to treat exported hazardous waste differently from domestic hazardous waste is
discussed infra notes 420–433 and accompanying text.
185 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.39(a)(5), 261.4(a)(22)(iii).
186 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(c).
187 The exclusions apply both to “used, broken” CRTs and “unbroken, intact” CRTs exported
for recycling. The conditional exclusions themselves are found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(22)(ii)–
(iv) which cross-reference the substantive restrictions found at 40 C.F.R. § 261.39–.40.
Note that compliance with the requirements of the conditional exclusion simply exempts
exported CRTs from classification as a solid waste; exporters that do not comply with the
conditional exclusion requirements for CRTs would still be in compliance with RCRA if they
satisfied the general Subpart E or H requirements for the export of hazardous wastes.
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establish a notice and consent regime.188 However, rather than simply
cross-referencing the Subpart E and H regulations, EPA has curiously
established similar, but not identical, export requirements through its con-
ditional exclusion, and the regulations do not distinguish between exports
to OECD and non-OECD countries.189
Substantive Conditions. The conditional exclusion includes sub-
stantive requirements on the management of the CRTs prior to recycling.
These include conditions on proper storage, labeling, and containment dur-
ing transit.190 They also include limitations on “speculative accumulation”
prior to recycling.191
Covered Person. The requirements of the conditional exclusion gen-
erally apply to “exporters.”192 Neither the CRT regulation nor the general
RCRA regulations contain a definition of “exporter.”
Notice Requirements. The exporter is required to submit a “Notice
of Intent” to export to EPA within sixty days of the initial shipment.193
This notice may cover activity for the next twelve months.194 The informa-
tion required in the CRT notice is essentially identical to that required
under Subpart E and similar to that required under Subpart H.195
188 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5).
189 This at least raises the question of whether exports of CRTs to OECD countries satisfy
the requirements of the OECD Directive. In a remarkable statement, EPA essentially
provides an argument for circumventing all OECD requirements. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, RCRA-2004-0010, RESPONSE TO COMMENTS DOCUMENT (2004). According to EPA,
the United States is only obligated to comply with the OECD Directive only for the export
of materials classified as hazardous waste under United States law, and, thus, the United
States can establish different and less restrictive export requirements for shipments to
OECD countries as long as EPA imposes the relaxed requirements through a conditional
exclusion from classification as a solid waste. Id. at 21–24. The use of conditional exclusions
to circumvent (or curiously to ensure) notice and consent requirements for exports is dis-
cussed below, infra note 430 and accompanying text.
190 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(1)–(3).
191 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(4).
192 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5).
193 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5)(i).
194 Id.
195 In the preamble to the CRT rule, EPA stated that it:
considered simply requiring exporters of CRTs for recycling to comply
with the current notice and consent requirements in 40 CFR part 262.
These requirements, however, rely on the hazardous waste manifest
and other Subtitle C provisions that EPA is not imposing on used CRTs.
Consequently, we are promulgating separate (although very similar)
export requirements that will apply exclusively to conditionally exempt
CRTs exported for recycling.
2012] EXPORTING WASTE 437
Consent Requirements. The export of CRTs for recycling is pro-
hibited without the consent of the receiving country, but consent of the
transit country is not required.196 This would be the case even if the ex-
port were to an OECD country covered by the Subpart H regulations.197
EPA provides the exporter with an “Acknowledgment of Consent” from
the receiving country.198
Manifest Requirement. There is no manifest requirement for the
domestic shipment of CRTs destined for export, but the “Acknowledgment
of Consent” must accompany the shipment.199
Exception Reporting. There is no requirement to notify EPA if the
exporter does not receive any Acknowledgment of Receipt of the shipment
by the recycling facility. Nor is there any requirement that the recycler
provide such acknowledgment.
Duty to Reimport. There is no explicit duty to reimport or take back
if the wastes cannot be accepted at the recycling facility. Rather, the regu-
lations require “re-notification” if the shipment cannot be delivered to the
primary or alternate recycler to “allow” the exporter to send the shipment
to a “new recycler.”200
Reporting and Record-keeping. There is no annual reporting require-
ment and, since exported CRTs are conditionally excluded from classifica-
tion as a solid waste,201 the general reporting requirements applicable to
domestic generators of hazardous waste would not apply. Exporters must
keep copies of all notices and acknowledgements of consent for a period
of three years.202
F. Printed Circuit Boards
Printed circuit boards, recycled to reclaim their metal content, are
an item of international commerce.203 Although there is significant concern
Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program;
Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42,938. The small differences in the content of the
notice appear to reflect that the CRT requirements only apply to a specific type of waste.
196 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5)(v).
197 The Subpart H regulations require consent by the transit country, but CRT exports are
not subject to the Subpart H requirements. See supra notes 114–119 and accompanying text.
198 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5)(v).
199 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5)(vii).
200 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5)(viii).
201 40 C.F.R. § 261.40.
202 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5)(ix).
203 See, e.g., SEPTEMBER 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 14–15.
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about the environmental and human health effects associated with their
recycling,204 EPA has exempted printed circuit boards that are recycled
from classification as a solid waste.205 They are thus exempted from any
export requirements.
The exclusion operates in two ways. First, all “scrap metal” that
is being recycled is exempt from classification as a solid waste.206 EPA has
taken the position that whole circuit boards sent for recycling are classified
as scrap metal, and thus not regulated as a hazardous waste.207 Second,
shredded circuit boards sent for recycling are subject to a “conditional
exclusion.”208 They are exempt only if 1) “[s]tored in containers sufficient
to prevent a release to the environment prior to recovery” and 2) “[f]ree
of mercury switches, mercury relays and nickel-cadmium batteries and
lithium batteries.”209 Through these exclusions, scrap metal and printed
circuit boards that would otherwise be classified as a hazardous waste
are free from any export controls under RCRA.
G. Industrial Ethyl Alcohol
In one curious and well-hidden provision, EPA has excluded
industrial ethyl alcohol sent for reclamation from all hazardous waste
requirements, but specifically subjected the “person initiating” or the
“intermediary arranging” for a shipment to a foreign country to notice
and consent export requirements under Subpart E.210 This regulation
was adopted in 1986 as part of EPA’s original Subpart E regulatory
promulgation, and it is one of the few export requirements that apply to
204 See generally Huabo Duan et al., Examining the Technology Acceptance for Dismantling
of Waste Printed Circuit Boards in Light of Recycling and Environmental Concerns, 92
J. ENVTL. MGMT. 392 (2011).
205 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(14).
206 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(13). “Scrap metal” is defined as “bits and pieces of metal parts (e.g.,)
[sic] bars, turnings, rods, sheets, wire) or metal pieces that may be combined together with
bolts or soldering (e.g., radiators, scrap automobiles, railroad box cars), which when worn
or superfluous can be recycled.” Id. § 261.1(c)(6). It thus does not include other materials
that may have high concentrations of metals that are sent for recycling.
207 See Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste
Program; Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. 42,928, 42,930 (July 28, 2006); see also GABA &
STEVER, supra note 14, at 2:25 for a discussion of the scope of the “scrap metal” exclusion.
208 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(14).
209 Id.
210 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(3)(i).
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a hazardous waste that does not have a domestic manifest requirement.211
Although adopted prior to the Subpart H regulations, the regulation pro-
vides that its export requirements apply “unless provided otherwise in
an international agreement as specified in § 262.58.”212 Presumably this
would subject industrial ethyl alcohol to the Subpart H requirements if
exported for recycling to an OECD country.
H. Conditional Reclamation Exclusion: 40 C.F.R. 261.4(a)(25)
In 2008, EPA promulgated a lengthy (and somewhat bizarre) pro-
vision that “conditionally exempts” most materials exported for reclama-
tion from classification as a solid waste.213 This provision was included as
a part of set regulations that “conditionally exempt” reclaimed waste from
classification as a hazardous waste.214 Under the domestic provisions,
“hazardous secondary materials” that are sent for reclamation at facilities
“under the control” of the generator are excluded from classification as solid
wastes.215 Hazardous secondary materials sent for reclamation at a facility
operated by a third party, the “transfer-based” exclusion, are also exempt
from classification as a solid if a rather elaborate set of conditions is met.216
In addition to the domestic reclamation exclusions, the 2008 regu-
lation provides an express exclusion for “hazardous secondary materials”
exported for reclamation.217 Although this exclusion does not apply to the
211 The explanation has a nice “Dukes of Hazard” quality. EPA explained that it initially
declined to impose any domestic regulatory requirements on industrial ethyl alcohol since
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms already imposed notice and tracking require-
ments similar to RCRA. Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous
Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,671 (Aug. 8, 1996). EPA stated that “[s]ince notice and
tracking requirements are placed on these wastes domestically in lieu of EPA’s require-
ments, EPA believes that this is the type of waste for which notification and consent should
apply for exports. Thus, the final regulation includes an amendment to 40 CFR 261.6
regarding spent industrial ethyl alcohol when exported for recycling.” Id.
212 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(3)(i).
213 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(25); Revisions to the Definition of Solid Waste, 73 Fed.
Reg. 64,668, 64,718 (Oct. 30, 2008). As discussed below, the provision is bizarre because
of its apparent complete irrelevance and EPA’s failure to identify any cost implications
associated with its promulgation.
214 See Gaba, supra note 15 for a detailed discussion of these provisions.
215 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.2(a)(2)(ii), 261.4(a)(23).
216 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(24).
217 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(25). In addition to the specific conditional export exclusion, EPA
also promulgated a mechanism for a generator to make a “non-waste” determination. Id.
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export of SLABs or CRTs regulated under other specific controls,218 it would
potentially apply to any other hazardous waste exported for reclamation.
Under this “export reclamation exclusion,” EPA establishes a notice
and consent requirement, but, as a condition of the exclusion, the regula-
tion incorporates most, but not all, of the substantive requirements appli-
cable to the “transfer-based” domestic exclusion.219 Unlike the domestic
transfer-based exclusion, the export reclamation exclusion does not require
that generators determine if the foreign reclaimer satisfies certain finan-
cial assurance requirements.220 Nor is the foreign reclamation facility sub-
ject to environmental restrictions that would apply to domestic recyclers.221
§ 260.30. Wastes that qualify for the non-waste determination may be exported with no
restrictions. Id. § 261.4(c).
218 EPA achieves this limitation by a rather odd bit of cross-referencing. Rather than simply
stating that the export exclusion does not apply to CRTs or SLABs, the exclusion requires
compliance with certain “third-party” provisions. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(24)(iii). This section
provides that the exclusion does not apply to any material subject to specific conditional
exclusion requirements under 261.4 [such as CRTs] or SLAB management requirements.
Id. EPA drafting at its finest.
219 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(25) (The regulation requires as a condition of exclusion that “the
hazardous secondary material generator complies with the applicable requirements of
paragraphs (a)(24)(i)–(v) of this section (excepting paragraph (a)(v)(B)(2) of this section
for foreign reclaimers and foreign intermediate facilities).”). In the preamble to the 2008
rule, EPA stated:
Included by reference in 40 CFR 261.4(a)(25), the generator must comply
with the requirements of 40 CFR 261.4(a)(24)(i)–(v), which comprise
the hazardous secondary material generator requirements under the
transfer-based exclusion, such as speculative accumulation and reason-
able efforts.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA530-R-10-006, REVISIONS TO THE DEFINITION OF SOLID
WASTE FINAL RULE COMPILATIONS: THE REASONABLE EFFORTS CONDITION 1 (2010) [herein-
after REVISIONS TO THE DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE].
220 The export reclamation exclusion does not require compliance with the financial assur-
ance requirements at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(24)(vi)(F). The export reclamation exclusion
expressly excludes compliance with section 261.4(a)(24)(v)(B)(2) that requires the generator
determine if the foreign recycler has properly notified government entities that the
“financial assurance” requirement was met. Id. § 261.4(a)(24).
In an odd argument, EPA explains the decision not to impose these requirements thusly:
Since foreign reclaimers and foreign intermediate facilities are not sub-
ject to U.S. regulations, they cannot comply with the notification and
financial assurance requirements under [the] rule.
REVISIONS TO THE DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE, supra note 219, at 2 (quoting Revisions to
the Definition of Solid Waste, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,668, 64,698 (Oct. 30, 2008)). This author did
not know that the inability to legally compel a foreign entity to comply with a regulatory
requirement therefore made it impossible for the facility to comply with the requirement.
221 The export reclamation exclusion, for example, does not require compliance with the
condition, applicable to the transfer-based exclusion at § 261.4(a)(24)(vi)(D), that the third
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The notice and consent requirements of export reclamation exclu-
sion are long and complex and largely parallel the notice requirements
in Subpart E and Subpart H.222 There are, however, some odd quirks. The
export reclamation exclusion expressly provides for “tacit consent” for
exports to “OECD member countries.”223 Although EPA generally treats
exports to Mexico and Canada differently than exports to other OECD
members, this exclusion includes them among OECD countries.224 Thus,
EPA is applying tacit consent authorization for exports to Mexico in a
manner not expressly authorized by the Mexico/U.S. Agreement.225 Addi-
tionally, consent for export is only expressly required of the receiving
country,226 but it appears that objections by a transit country can pre-
clude tacit consent for shipments to OECD countries.227 Exporters (called
“hazardous secondary material generators” in the regulation) are also
required to comply with annual reporting requirements.228
The “export reclamation exclusion” may be of limited significance.
On its face, it does not apply to the export of CRTs or SLABs.229 Further,
any generator who could take advantage of the complex and detailed re-
quirements of the export reclamation exclusion could more simply meet
its RCRA obligations by complying with the relatively simple Subpart G
or H requirements. Thus, the only “advantage” to a generator of using this
exclusion is to avoid classifying its materials as a hazardous waste.230
Indeed, EPA apparently never attempted to document the consequence
of this exclusion; in the economic analysis of the entire regulation, EPA
never calculated any cost savings associated with the export reclamation
party manage the hazardous secondary material in a manner at least as environmentally
protective as that employed for analogous raw materials.
222 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(25)(i)–(iv).
223 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(25)(vii).
224 EPA helpfully notes that “Canada and Mexico, though they are OECD Member
countries, typically require written consent for exports to their countries.” Revisions to the
Definition of Solid Waste, GOVPULSE, http://govpulse.us/entries/2008/10/30/E8-24399
/revisions-to-the-definition-of-solid-waste (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
225 Although not discussed by EPA, this disregard of its international hazardous waste
obligations is consistent with EPA’s view that if the exemption from an international
requirement is phrased as a “conditional exclusion,” the requirement does not apply. See
RESPONSE TO COMMENTS DOCUMENT, supra note 189, at 29.
226 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(25)(vii).
227 Id.
228 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(25)(x)–(xi).
229 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
230 This is not a trivial consequence of the regulation and it may promote recycling, but
this was not the apparent rationale for the exclusion.
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exclusion.231 As of December 2010, no generator had taken advantage of
this exclusion.232
IV. THE OPERATION OF THE EPA REGULATORY REGIMES
Claims about the export of hazardous waste from the United States
range from the benign to the apocalyptic. For some, the United States is
exporting hazardous wastes of a type and in quantities that imperil the
health and safety of poor citizens in less-developed countries.233 For others,
there is simply no significant export of hazardous wastes from the United
States except to Canada and Mexico.234 Both sides may be correct.
A. Reported Exports: What’s Going Where?
Information about the exports of materials under EPA’s export
regimes is difficult to come by. As of December 2010, virtually no infor-
mation was available from EPA on the Internet.235 Anecdotal information
231 The Regulatory Impact Analysis prepared for the final set of reclamation exclusions
states that it “does not separately estimate industry cost savings impacts for these two
different types (i.e., offsite and export) of recycling exclusions for Exclusion 2. The generator
export tonnages and generator exporter facility counts are embedded in the generator
impacts for this exclusion, but not separately reported.” MARK EADS, ECONOMIST, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DPRA INC., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: USEPA’S 2008 FINAL
RULE AMENDMENTS TO THE INDUSTRIAL RECYCLING EXCLUSIONS OF THE RCRA DEFINITION
OF SOLID WASTE 35 (2008) [hereinafter RIA]. The RIA also states that it “does not esti-
mate the annual fraction (percentage) of affected hazardous secondary materials which
may be exported for recycling. However, this is a baseline RCRA Subtitle C requirement
(40 CFR 262.53 & 262.56) so no incremental cost impact is expected.” Id. at 181.
In other words, the RIA does not estimate the cost of notice and consent requirements
of the exclusion since they would otherwise be applicable. It also does not document any
cost savings attributable to the exclusion.
232 Email from Eva Kreisler, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Int’l Enforcement
Compliance Div., to Jeffrey M. Gaba, Professor of Law, Dedman Sch. of Law (Oct. 26,
2010) (on file with author).
233 See, e.g., Dr. Zada Lipman, Trade in Hazardous Waste: Environmental Justice Versus
Economic Growth, BASEL ACTION NETWORK, http://www.ban.org/library/lipman.html (last
visited Nov. 8, 2011).
234 See, e.g., Import/Export Requirements, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov
/osw/hazard/international/imp-exp.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2011).
235 The only online export information that EPA provides involves exports to non-OECD
countries. See Proposed Hazardous Waste Exports to Non-OECD Countries, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/epawaste/hazard/international/non-oecd.htm (last
modified Sept. 22, 2011). See infra note 448 and accompanying text for more commentary
on public access to information.
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has appeared in a variety of sources, including several reports of the
Government Accountability Office regarding the export of CRTs.236
In response to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request, EPA
provided information for this article regarding documents submitted under
EPA export regulations. The information supplied by EPA included a
summary of Notices of Intent received by EPA between 1995 and 2010
(Table 1), a summary of hazardous waste export data from annual exporter
reports, including information on CRT exports (Table 2), and a summary
of reported export notices for SLABs (Table 3).
This information confirms that, at least among persons that com-
ply with EPA regulations, approximately ninety percent of exports, by
number of Notices of Intent, numbers of shipments, and by tonnage, are
going to Canada.237 The remaining exports are roughly divided between
shipments to Mexico and all other OECD countries.238 By far the largest
share, by “tonnage,” of shipments to OECD countries (other than Canada
and Mexico) goes to the Republic of Korea.239 Information in an EPA sum-
mary of individual Notices of Intent does not indicate that any particular
type of waste predominates: the waste codes include a number of listed
wastes and wastes that exhibit all of the four hazard characteristics.240 The
documents supplied in response to the FOIA request do not provide signifi-
cant information regarding the means of disposal or recycling employed by
the reported exports. Although this information must be included in the
Notices of Intent submitted by exporters, neither the summary of Notices
of Intent nor the Acknowledgments of Consent contain this information.
236 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-626, ELECTRONIC WASTE: CONSIDERATIONS
FOR PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND REUSE AND RECYCLING 9 (July 2010). The
report states that “[a]s of March 2010, EPA reported 16 notifications, with acknowledgments
of consent from the receiving country, for a company to export CRTs for recycling. . . . All 16
consents to export came from two importing countries—Canada and the Republic of Korea.”
Id. at 9 n.6. The Report also states that EPA reported that 108 one-time notifications for
export of used, unbroken CRTs for reuse (not recycling) as of May 2010. See id. In an earlier
report, the GAO stated that “[a]s of June 2008, twenty-five countries have submitted
forty-seven notices for export of CRTs for recycling to EPA. These companies informed
EPA that they intended to responsibly recycle CRTs at facilities in Brazil, Canada, Korea,
Malaysia and Mexico.” See AUGUST 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 n.11.
237 See infra Table 1. Average exports to Canada were 1990 out of 2126,which is 93.6% of
all exports.
238 EPA also provided Acknowledgments of Consent provided from the period 1/2/2010–
7/29/2010. All of the 245 Acknowledgments of Consent involved shipments to Canada.
Information available from author.
239 See infra Table 2.
240 See infra Tables 1, 2; Email from Eva Kreisler, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Int’l
Enforcement Compliance Div., to Jeffrey M. Gaba, Professor of Law, Dedman Sch. of Law
(Dec. 7, 2010) (on file with author).
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF ANNUAL REPORTS**
Summary Hazardous Waste Export Data from OECA Annual Exporter Reports
2001 (note 1) 2002 (note 1) 2003 (note 2) 2004 (note 2)
Receiving
Country
No. of 
Exporters
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
No. of 
Exporters
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
No. of 
Export-
ers
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
No. of 
Export-
ers
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
Asia:
Korea 0 0 0 1 341 6,975 1 348 7,017 1 574 7,017
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals for
Asia:
0 0 341 6,975 348 7,017 574 7,017
Europe:
Belgium 0 0 0 1 7 122 3 9 125 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France 0 0 0 1 13 259 1 14 272 1 3 61
Germany 1 34 372 1 2 1 1 29 379 2 2 2,155
The Nether-
lands
2 30 395 3 37 621 2 25 399 0 0 0
Norway 1 1 390 0 0 0 1 30 356 1 69 1,203
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 148 0 0 0
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Totals for
Europe:
65 1,157 59 1,003 120 1,679 74 3,419
North
America:
Canada 305 28,191 330,407 239 18,048 267,703 258 16,618 263,065 228 19,680 299,889
Mexico 12 836 78,059 15 1,459 143,376 14 1,382 137,510 13 1,271 135,869
Totals for
North
America:
29,027 408,465 19,507 411,078 18,000 400,576 20,951 435,758
Total U.S.
exports:
29,092 409,623 19,907 419,057 18,468 409,271 21,599 446,194
Note 1: Two entries from one exporter did not include any destination information, and so are not included in
the summaries.
Note 2: Four entries from two exporters in this calendar year did not include any destination information, and
so are not included in the summaries.
Note 3: Some exported amounts were reported in units other than tons. For amounts reported in liquid units
(e.g., liters, gallons), a density equal to water was assumed to convert to tons. Specific conversion
factors used are listed below.
** Data as provided by EPA, see supra note 240.
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
No. of 
Exporters
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
No. of 
Exporters
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
No. of 
Export-
ers
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
No. of 
Ex-
port-
ers
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
No. of 
Ex-
port-
ers
No. of 
Ship-
ments
Tons
Shipped
1 340 12,102 0 0 0 8 1,395 31,944 7 1,150 23,824 8 717 15,555
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 120
340 12,102 0 0 1,395 31,944 1,150 23,824 723 15,675
1 2 18 2 53 698 2 27 686 2 32 558 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 7 116 0 0 0 1 2 13 1 1 7 0 0 0
1 1 31 6 19 254 4 21 135 3 42 129 2 12 75
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 13 919 2 4 59 1 55 1,103
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 165 72 952 63 1,753 79 753 67 1,179
204 15,834 230,330 208 15,084 228,558 203 18,892 279,361 188 20,918 331,203 174 14,092 240,804
8 936 89,214 16 1,723 161,026 15 1,556 150,088 16 1,543 143,547 10 1,077 48,182
16,770 319,545 16,807 389,583 20,448 429,450 22,461 474,750 15,169 288,986
17,120 331,811 16,879 390,535 21,906 463,147 23,690 499,328 15,959 305,840
Note 3 (Continued):
CU-YDS to
Liters
Liters
to Kg
Kg to
TONS
GRAMS to
TONS
GALS to
Liters
LBS to
TONS
METRIC
TON to TON
DRUMS TO
GALS
764.5549 1 .001102 1.11.E-06 3.785412 0.0005 1.102311 55
Note 4: Total number of exporters is not additive, since a facility may export waste to more than one of the
listed receiving countries.
Note 5: Table contains rounding error.
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TABLE 3: EXPORT NOTICES FOR SPENT LEAD-ACID BATTERIES
Country of Import Total Number of Notices
Canada 685
Spain 3
Mexico 16
Korea 49
Peru 1
Philippines 1
Total: 755
Limited data was also provided regarding the export of SLABs. The
export of SLABs for recycling was not regulated until 2010, and therefore
Notices of Intent have only been received for a portion of this year.241 The
information indicates that Canada received by far the largest number of
Notices of Intent involving exports, but that the second largest number
involved shipments to Korea.242 Note that exporters sent two Notices of
Intent for export to the non-OECD countries of Peru and the Philippines.243
No information was available as to whether either country gave consent.
Since both of these countries have ratified the Basel Convention,244 a deci-
sion to consent to these exports from the United States should violate their
obligations under Basel.
Information was supplied on the export of CRTs, but this informa-
tion is problematic. EPA’s conditional exclusion for CRTs became effective
in January 2007,245 but, prior to this exclusion, waste CRTs exported for
reclamation should have been subject to the Subpart E notice and con-
sent requirements. It does not appear, however, that any of the Subpart E
Notices of Intent summarized by EPA for the period 1995–2009 involved
exports of CRTs. A 2008 GAO Report states that “as of June 2008,” forty-
seven Notices of Intent to export CRTs had been submitted.246 In response
to the FOIA request for this article, EPA provided information that shows
241 See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
242 See supra Table 3.
243 See id.
244 Basel Convention’s Ratifications, supra note 3.
245 See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text.
246 SEPTEMBER 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 n.3, 10 n.9. These notices were for
exports to Brazil, Canada, Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico. Id.
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no Notices of Intent submitted for export of CRTs prior to 2009. The
information for the year 2009 indicates that thirty-five Notices of Intent
to export CRTs were submitted.247 These included exports to non-OECD
members including Costa Rica, Malaysia, and Indonesia.248 These three
countries have also ratified Basel,249 but since they do not have an appro-
priate bilateral agreement on exports of hazardous waste from the United
States, acceptance of the CRT shipments should also violate their obliga-
tions under Basel.
EPA promulgated its “reclamation exclusion” in 2008, but EPA has
stated that it has not received any Notices of Intent under this provision.250
B. Compliance with EPA Export Requirements: Are Exporters of
RCRA-Regulated Materials Complying with EPA Regulations?
There are, for obvious reasons, little data on the amounts of
hazardous waste that are being exported in violation of EPA export
requirements.251 The U.S. hazardous waste system, both domestic and
international, essentially relies on self-reporting: generators are respon-
sible for determining whether their material meets the definition of haz-
ardous waste and is subject to export controls.252
In a series of reports, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
has been critical of EPA enforcement efforts with respect to exports of
247 See supra Table 1.
248 The United States has bilateral agreements authorizing imports of hazardous waste
from Malaysia and the Philippines. See REGULATIONS GOVERNING HAZARDOUS WASTE
GENERATORS, supra note 9, at III-49. EPA has no agreements authorizing the exports
of hazardous waste to any non-OECD country.
249 Basel Convention’s Ratifications, supra note 3.
250 Email from Eva Kreisler, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Int’l Enforcement
Compliance Div., to Jeffrey M. Gaba, Professor of Law, Dedman Sch. of Law (Oct. 26,
2010) (on file with author).
251 As one knowledgeable observer stated:
It is difficult to estimate accurately the amount of such unreported
exports because some exporters may give notice of intent to export but
ultimately decide not to export; however, some estimates indicate that
waste export trade is as much as eight times more than reported, not
including smugglers who elude customs.
F. James Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of International
Legal Controls, [1989] 19 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,171, 10,174–75. “According
to one EPA official, ‘many exporters don’t bother to give notice because there isn’t any
enforcement.’ ” Id. at 10,175.
252 See 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (2010).
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CRTs.253 The GAO found EPA’s enforcement “lacking”254 and reported
that EPA had no plans to develop any enforcement strategies to assure
compliance.255 The Director of EPA’s Waste and Chemical Enforcement
Division was quoted as stating that inspections to determine compliance
with environmental laws are “labor intensive,”256 and EPA has stated that
it largely relies on “tips and complaints” to identify violations of the CRT
regulations.257 Although improved coordination with Customs and Border
Control agents has been suggested,258 improved enforcement of EPA’s exist-
ing requirements through government inspection does seem Sisyphusian.
The most significant problem is how to identify hazardous wastes
subject to RCRA export requirements that are destined for non-OECD
countries.259 The GAO identified considerable concern with the potential
illegal export of CRTs to non-OECD Asian countries, including China
and India.260 It was GAO efforts that led to EPA’s only prosecution for vio-
lation of regulations for an export to Hong Kong.261 Unless it is clear that
particular types of materials, such as SLABs, are subject to EPA export
controls, it remains difficult, if not impossible, to effectively police exports
at the border.
Additionally, enforcement can be difficult since classification as a
hazardous waste may depend on the intended use in the receiving country.
A “secondary material” that is being reused in not a solid; the same mate-
rial if recycled is a solid waste.262 This is particularly an issue with used
CRTs. If CRTs are exported for reuse they are not subject to notice and
253 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-626, ELECTRONIC WASTE: CONSIDERATIONS
FOR PROMOTING ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND REUSE AND RECYCLING 8–10 (2010); SEPTEMBER
2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 12–14; AUGUST 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at cover
page; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-47, ELECTRONIC WASTE: STRENGTHENING
THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN ENCOURAGING RECYCLING AND REUSE 23–24
(2005); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-93-24, HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTS:
DATA QUALITY AND COLLECTION PROBLEMS WEAKEN EPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 8–9,
12–13 (1993).
254 SEPTEMBER 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at cover page, 12–14.
255 Id. at 14.
256 AUGUST 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
257 Id.
258 SEPTEMBER 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at cover page.
259 The GAO engaged in “sting” operations to identify persons willing to export CRTs in
apparent violation of EPA regulations. AUGUST 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 23–24.
260 See id. at cover page.
261 See generally EarthECycle, LLC, EPA Docket No. RCRA-HQ-2009-0001 (2009) (amended
complaint, compliance order and notice of opportunity for hearing).
262 See 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a), (c) (2010).
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consent requirements; if they are exported for recycling they are.263 At the
point of export, however, there is no way of identifying whether or not a
CRT is being exported for recycling. To address the enforcement problem
raised by this situation, EPA subjects exporters of used CRTs exported
for reuse to submit a one-time notice to allow enforcers to “verify” that the
CRTs are exported for reuse.264
C. Are E-Wastes Being Properly Identified as Hazardous Wastes?
Much of the concern on exports of hazardous waste has focused on
the export of electronic “e-wastes” for recycling to non-OECD countries, in-
cluding China. EPA’s regulations directly address the issue of e-wastes
through two provisions. First, through the “conditional exclusion” of CRTs,
EPA has imposed notice and consent requirements on the export of used
CRTs for recycling.265 Second, EPA has excluded the export of printed cir-
cuit boards from export controls.266 Any other hazardous e-wastes, includ-
ing computers, keyboards, cell phones, even computer “mouses,” should
be subject to the Subpart E or H export requirements.
EPA has, however, done a remarkably poor job in clarifying the haz-
ardous waste status of most other e-wastes. This involves two questions.
When is used electronic equipment considered to be “solid waste”? What
e-waste is classified as a “hazardous” solid waste?
EPA has established policies that give some guidance on when used
electronic equipment will be classified as a “solid waste.” In general, it
appears that electronic equipment sent for “reuse” is not a waste; e-waste
263 See supra notes 182–84 and accompanying text.
264 EPA describes its rationale as follows:
The Agency notes that intact CRTs exported for reuse are identical in
appearance to those exported for recycling. Consequently, to help en-
sure that the intact CRTs are actually reused abroad, we are requiring
persons who export used, intact CRTs for reuse to submit a one-time
notification to the Regional Administrator with contact information and
a statement that the notifier plans to export used, intact CRTs for reuse.
These notifications will allow regulatory authorities to contact the notifier,
when appropriate, to ask for verification that the CRTs are exported for
reuse instead of recycling or disposal.
Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program;
Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. 42,928, 42,939 (July 28, 2006).
265 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
266 See supra notes 203–09 and accompanying text.
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sent for recycling or disposal would be a waste.267 This, of course, creates
the problem that identifying exported electronic equipment as e-wastes
requires a determination of whether they are being exported for reuse or
recycling. For used computers, there may be no obvious visual means to
determine their intended future use.
The other major problem is determining whether e-wastes consti-
tute “hazardous wastes.” No e-waste is a “listed” hazardous waste; e-wastes
would be hazardous only if they exhibit a hazard characteristic. EPA appar-
ently has taken the position that no e-waste, other than CRTs and circuit
boards, exhibits a hazard characteristic. In 2008 GAO reported that “EPA
has stated repeatedly, however, that to its knowledge, other types of elec-
tronic equipment do not fail its threshold toxicity test and are thus are not
currently regulated.”268
EPA’s statement is baffling. The basis for EPA’s conclusion that
CRTs exhibit the toxicity characteristic is data from certain studies con-
tained in the administrative record for the CRT rule.269 These studies them-
selves indicate that a wide variety of electronic components, in addition to
267 In the preamble to its CRT conditional exclusion, EPA described its position on deter-
mining the waste status of other electronic materials. It stated:
With respect to non-CRT electronic materials, the Agency uses the same
line of reasoning that is outlined above for CRTs to determine that the
materials are not solid wastes if they are reused or only require repair
and are not sent for processing or reclamation. That is, if an original
user sends electronic materials to a reseller because he lacks the special-
ized knowledge needed to determine whether the units can be reused as
products, the original user is not a RCRA generator. The materials are
not considered solid wastes until a decision is made to recycle them in
other ways or dispose of them.
Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program;
Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42,930.
268 See AUGUST 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 2 n.2. In the preamble to its CRT con-
ditional exclusion proposal, EPA wrote that it “is studying certain non-CRT electronic
materials to determine whether they consistently exhibit a characteristic of hazardous
waste. However, we are not currently aware of any non-CRT computer components or elec-
tronic products that would generally be hazardous wastes.” Hazardous Waste Management
System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray Tubes and Mercury-
Containing Equipment, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,508, 40,512 (proposed June 12, 2002).
269 See generally TIMOTHY G. TOWNSEND ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-HQ-
RCRA-2004-0010-0006, RCRA TOXICITY CHARACTERIZATION OF COMPUTER CPUS AND
OTHER DISCARDED ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2004), available at http://www.ees.ufl.edu
/homepp/townsend/Research/ElectronicLeaching/default.asp [hereinafter RCRA TOXICITY
CHARACTERIZATION]. This report discusses the complexity of applying the standard TCLP to
complex electronic equipment and presents results using several extraction methodologies.
See generally id.
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CRTs, may exhibit the toxicity characteristic for lead.270 Indeed, there is as
much information to indicate that e-wastes, including whole computers,
computer keyboards, and cell phones, can exhibit the same toxicity char-
acteristic as CRTs.271 Yet EPA appears to assume that CRTs are the only
e-wastes that would be subject to existing export controls.272
Thus, back to compliance issues. EPA regulations place the respon-
sibility on the generator to determine whether a solid waste exhibits a
hazardous characteristic.273 Exporters should not be able to violate require-
ments for hazardous waste exports because they are uncertain about the
status of their wastes. Since there is reason to believe that much of the
electronic waste, other than CRTs, being exported for recycling is subject
to EPA export requirements, this is a compliance issue that EPA must
address through regulation, guidance, and enforcement policies.274
V. EPA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE EXPORTS OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE
Whatever the merits (or demerits) of EPA’s implementation of its
existing export regulations, there are significant questions about the scope
of EPA’s legal authority to regulate exports. Perhaps the most significant
questions relate to the effect of international agreements on EPA’s author-
ity to regulate the export of hazardous waste. There are also questions as
to whether EPA has authority to regulate exports more stringently than
it now does.
A. What is the Effect of International Agreements on EPA’s
Authority to Regulate the Export of Hazardous Waste?
EPA clearly has authority to regulate the export of hazardous
wastes. Section 3017(a)(1) establishes a requirement that exporters
270 Id. at 4-1.
271 Id.; see also Yadong Li et al., TCLP Heavy Metal Leaching of Personal Computer
Components, J. ENVTL. ENGINEERING, Apr. 2006, at 497, 497; TIMOTHY G. TOWNSEND ET
AL., STATE UNIV. SYS. OF FLA., ASSESSMENT OF TRUE IMPACTS OF E-WASTE DISPOSAL IN
FLORIDA (2003), available at http://www.bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd48/wasteflorida.pdf.
272 These hazardous e-wastes would not be subject to the “scrap metal” exclusion which
applies to whole circuit boards nor to the “shredded circuit board” conditional exclusion. See
supra notes 203–209 and accompanying text. E-wastes might not be subject to export con-
trols if generated as excluded “household hazardous waste” or if generated by “conditional
exempt small quantity generators.” If commingled with other hazardous wastes, even
these e-wastes would be subject to universal waste export rules. See supra notes 203–09
and accompanying text.
273 See 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (2010).
274 See infra notes 437–47 and accompanying text.
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comply with a congressionally defined “base” notice and consent regime,
and section 3017(b) delegates authority to EPA to promulgate domestic
regulations to implement these requirements.275 EPA regulations that
apply to countries with which the United States has no export agreements
fall exclusively under the authority of this base program.276
But section 3017 does more than require compliance with a con-
gressionally defined set of notice and consent requirements; in those cases
where the United States has entered into an international agreement,
section 3017(a)(2) requires that exports “conform” to that agreement rather
than the base program.277 EPA has also been delegated authority to adopt
regulations implementing the requirements of an applicable international
agreement.278 Section 3017 thus apparently both requires compliance with
international agreements and confers authority on EPA to adopt regula-
tions implementing these agreements.
If section 3017 purported to implement international agreements
in existence at the time of its adoption, there would be little doubt that this
would be an appropriate mechanism by which Congress could ensure that
such agreements were given domestic effect.279 Section 3017 was, however,
adopted as part of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,280
275 RCRA § 3017(a)(1), (b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(1), (b) (2006)).
Section 3017(b) specifically requires EPA to promulgate regulations “necessary to imple-
ment this section.” Id. at § 3017(b) (codified as amended as 42 U.S.C. § 6938(b) (2006)).
Additionally, section 2002(a)(1) grants the Administrator the authority to adopt “such
regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions” under RCRA. Id. § 2002(a)(1)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6912(a)(1) (2006)).
276 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Notice that EPA’s regulations do not fall
under “treaty based” or “non-treaty based” authority. The Subpart H regulations apply
to exports subject to the OECD Decision. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. The
Subpart E regulations, however, apply not only to all exports of hazardous waste not sub-
ject to international agreements, but also to all exports to Canada and Mexico governed
by the bilateral treaties. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
277 RCRA § 3017(a)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(2) (2006)). The require-
ment to conform to an international agreement operates in lieu of the base program. See
supra note 37. In addition to defining the requirements of Subtitle C to require that exports
conform to an international agreement, Congress has also expressly made it a separate
crime to export in a manner that is not “in conformance” with an applicable international
agreement. RCRA § 3008(d)(6) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(6) (2006)).
278 Section 3017(b) requires EPA to adopt regulations “to implement this section,” and this
presumably extends to a requirement to promulgate regulations governing the prohi-
bition in section 3017(a)(2) on exports unless “in conformance” with appropriate inter-
national agreements. RCRA § 3017(a)(2), (b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(2),
(b) (2006)).
279 See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
280 RCRA § 3017 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2006)).
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and in 1984 there were no applicable international agreements in existence.
Thus, through section 3017(a)(2) Congress purported to “incorporate by
reference” the requirements of future international agreements.281
Congress’s apparent attempt to incorporate future international
agreements raises a series of questions:
• Do the bilateral agreements with Canada and Mexico
or the OECD Decision create domestic legal obliga-
tions in the absence of additional implementing leg-
islation or regulations?
• Do these international agreements provide author-
ity to EPA to adopt implementing regulations that
would otherwise not be authorized under RCRA in
the absence of the agreements?
• Do these agreements require EPA to exercise its
otherwise existing authority to implement their
requirements?
• If the Basel Convention were ratified, could EPA
implement its requirements without additional stat-
utory authority?
These questions involve serious, and largely unresolved, issues of con-
stitutional, administrative, and international law. The answers to these
questions have both substantive and procedural implications for EPA’s
regulatory authority to implement a program for the control of exports
of hazardous waste.
1. The Legal Effect of the Bilateral Agreements with Canada
and Mexico
The nature of the agreements between the United States and
Canada and the United States and Mexico raise a threshold issue about
their domestic effect. The Constitution provides that “all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby,”282 and, under the Constitution, treaties require ratifi-
cation by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate.283 Neither the Mexico nor
281 RCRA § 3017(a)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3968(a)(2) (2006)).
282 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
283 Id. art II, § 2.
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Canada agreements are “treaties”; neither was ratified by the Senate;
indeed, both agreements were executed, “on behalf of the Government
of the United States,” by the Administrator of the EPA.284 Both, however,
purport to create binding obligations between the countries.
The Mexico and Canada Agreements would be classified as “inter-
national executive agreements.”285 “International executive agreements” of
this sort do not have an express constitutional status, but there is wide con-
sensus that they have the status, at least within the realm of international
law, of “treaties” that have been ratified pursuant to the constitutional
mechanism of Senate ratification.286 Such is the view of the Department
of State, and there is authority that such agreements can preempt state law
requirements and govern private claims against foreign governments.287
284 Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49. The 1986 Canada/U.S. Agreement was signed
by Lee Thomas, then Administrator of EPA. Lee M. Thomas, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/history/administrators/thomas.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2011). The
original La Paz Agreement was signed by President Reagan, La Paz Agreement, supra note
55, but Annex III that governs exports was signed by Administrator Thomas. Mexico/U.S.
Agreement, supra note 55.
285 See 3 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S.
COURTS § 14:11. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law section 303 describes
the bases on which the President may execute an “International Agreement.” These include
through treaty, with congressional authorization or approval, or by the President’s own
authority that falls under the President’s independent constitutional power. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]. There is considerable debate over the
legitimacy of agreements concluded through Senate ratification (treaties) or by congres-
sional authorization or approval (congressional-executive agreements). Congressional-
executive agreements have been used to bypass the obstacle of Senate ratification. See
generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009); see also
Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945).
The operation of section 3017(a)(2) is distinguishable from a congressional-executive
agreement in that the congressional authorization is not for a specific agreement, but is
essentially a blank check to authorize and implement all future treaties, the content of
which is unknown to the Congress that adopted RCRA section 3017(a)(2).
286 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 285, § 111 cmt. d
(international agreements of the United States other than treaties, see id. § 303, and cus-
tomary international law, while not mentioned explicitly in the Supremacy Clause, are
also federal law and as such are supreme over state law). See generally Donald P. Oulton,
A Review of Executive Agreements from the Standpoint of Current Case Law, 23 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 101 (1999); David J. Kuchenbecker, Agency-Level Executive Agreements:
A New Era in U.S. Treaty Practice, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1979).
287 See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (describing executive agreements as having
the status of treaties in certain contexts); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)
(recognizing agreement settling claims with Iran); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
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Certainly international executive agreements, entered into without Senate
ratification as a treaty, have been given domestic effect when implemented
by adoption of implementing legislation.288 Notwithstanding a rather “black
letter” view that international agreements have the status of treaties, the
full scope of the domestic effects of an international executive agreement
remains uncertain.289
For our purposes, however, assuming that the Canada and Mexico
Agreements have the same domestic status as treaties, the question re-
mains as to whether they directly apply to private parties or confer addi-
tional domestic authority on EPA.
As a matter of international law, treaties create obligations between
governments, but it is an established element of U.S. constitutional law that
treaties are effective as federal law and may create domestic obligations.290
This domestic effect can arise in two ways. First, treaties may be “self-
executing” and create enforceable obligations without other implementing
authority.291 Determination of whether a treaty is to be construed as “self-
executing” and therefore immediately effective as a matter of domestic law
involves a question of interpretation based on the language of the treaty
and the intention of the parties.292 As one court put it, “[t]he self-execution
question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law.”293 Even
if construed as “self-executing,” the Supreme Court has stated that there
324 (1937) (recognizing legitimacy of an international executive agreement through which
the United States resolved claims with the Soviet Union); see also Kuchenbecker, supra
note 286, at 13 (describing the evolution of the position of the Department of State on the
status of international executive agreements).
288 The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), for example, was negotiated
and executed by the President and approved by legislation, not Senate ratification. See
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799,
802–03 (1995).
289 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 285, § 303 confines
pure executive agreements to areas that fall directly within the President’s independent
constitutional power. Courts have upheld the legitimacy of international executive agree-
ments in areas, such as negotiation of claims between governments, that seem to fall within
the President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs. See id.
290 U.S. CONST. art. VI. Article VI provides that treaties made under the authority of the
United States are “the supreme Law of the Land.” Id.; see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 285, § 111.
291 See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 504–05.
292 See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 154 (1965).
293 Postal, 589 F.2d at 876.
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is a “background presumption” that treaties do not create private enforce-
able rights.294
The second basis by which treaties may gain domestic legal effect is
through adoption of domestic legislation conferring authority to implement
the treaty.295 Although a treaty can become effective through Presidential
agreement and consent by two-thirds of the Senate,296 any domestic imple-
menting legislation would be subject to the full domestic law-making process
including bicameral agreement of both chambers of Congress and present-
ment to the President.297 In Missouri v. Holland, for example, the Court
considered the scope of constitutional authority to enter a treaty governing
protection of migratory birds, but the treaty itself was given domestic effect
through federal legislation specifically implementing its requirements.298
Thus, an immediate question arises as to whether the Canada or
Mexico Agreements are “self-executing.” If self-executing, there would be
little doubt that EPA would have the authority to implement their require-
ments through regulations. It is, however, unlikely that these agreements
could be construed as “self-executing” based on their own terms and the
understanding of the parties. Neither agreement expressly provides that
it is to be self-executing; both agreements refer to subsequent adoption of
domestic legislation or enforcement through domestic laws or regulations.299
294 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3.
295 See id. at 505 (quoting Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (2005) (en
banc)); see also John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50
VA. J. INT’L L. 655 (2010).
296 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
297 See Medellin, 552 U.S. 491.
298 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
299 The Canada/U.S. Agreement directs its obligations to the actions of the governments
and provides that
[t]o the extent any implementing regulations are necessary to comply
with this Agreement, the Parties will act expeditiously to issue such
regulations consistent with domestic law. Pending such issuance, the
Parties will make best efforts to provide notification in accordance with
this Agreement where current regulatory authority is insufficient. The
Parties will provide each other with a diplomatic note upon the issuance
and the coming into effect of any such regulations.
Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, at art. 5.3. Canada and the United States amended
the Agreement in 1992 to apply to municipal solid waste, but the United States appar-
ently has taken the position that this amendment cannot be implemented without sub-
sequent domestic legislation. See infra note 300. The Mexico/U.S. Agreement provides that
“[e]ach Party shall ensure, to the extent practicable, that its domestic laws and regulations
are enforced with respect to transboundary shipments of hazardous waste.” Mexico/U.S.
Agreement, supra note 55, at art. II.2. The Agreement also imposes liability for exports
in violation of the Agreement, but provides that this is to be enforced “when applicable
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It is the United States position, for example, that the provisions of the
Canada/U.S. Agreement addressing “municipal solid waste” cannot be im-
plemented without additional legislative action.300 If not “self-executing,”
the agreements themselves would, thus, not create enforceable obligations
on exporters. As significantly, if not self-executing, the agreements would
not themselves confer authority on EPA to adopt implementing regulations
not otherwise authorized by RCRA.
If these agreements are not self-executing, what is the effect of
the provisions of section 3017 that require exports to “conform” to future
agreements? On the one hand, the provisions of section 3017(a)(2) may
simply require EPA to exercise its existing “base” authority to establish
regulations that conform to the requirements of any future agreements.301
In this view, section 3017(a)(2) does not broaden EPA’s authority nor
establish obligations on exporters. It is simply a directive to EPA on how
it should use its existing authority.
But there are serious problems with this construction. First, sec-
tion 3017 purports affirmatively to prohibit exports that do not conform
to international agreements and section 3008(d)(6) makes such action a
crime.302 Thus, the language of RCRA does more than direct EPA to imple-
ment regulations, the violation of which would constitute a civil or criminal
violation; it directly imposes requirements and sanctions based on compli-
ance with the agreements themselves. Second, if section 3017(a)(2) merely
directed EPA to exercise its existing authority to implement international
agreements, then the language would be superfluous. Any properly exe-
cuted international agreements would, at a minimum, require the U.S. gov-
ernment to exercise its existing authority to implement their requirements.
The other possible reading is that section 3017 gives future interna-
tional agreements immediate domestic effect and confers authority on EPA
to implement their requirements. Thus, EPA could adopt regulations imple-
menting the specific requirements of the Mexico and Canada Agreements
in accordance with its national laws and regulations.” Id. art. XIV.2. The Mexico/U.S.
Agreement, however, has perhaps a stronger claim to being self-executing; it provides
that the “[t]ransboundary shipments of hazardous waste and hazardous substances
across the common border of the Parties shall be governed by the terms of this Annex and
their domestic laws and regulations.” Id. art. II.1.
300 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA530-K-06-004, WASTE SHIPMENTS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 7 (2007), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL
.cgi?Dockey=P10019VS.txt (explaining that provisions of bilateral agreement dealing
with municipal solid waste cannot be implemented until domestic legislation is passed).
301 RCRA § 3017(a)(2) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(2) (2006)).
302 RCRA §§ 3008(d)(6), 3017 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(d)(6), 6938 (2006)).
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based on section 3017(a)(2) and section 3017(b). That is the most straight-
forward reading of the language. Congress has not equivocated; compliance
with future international agreements is an obligation under RCRA and
EPA must implement those obligations through its regulations.303
But there are serious constitutional problems in construing sec-
tion 3017 to confer domestic effect on the Mexico and Canada agreements.
As noted, section 3017 was adopted as part of the Hazardous and Solid
Waste Amendments of 1984, two years before the United States entered
the Mexico and Canada Agreements.304 To construe section 3017 to confer
domestic effect on these (otherwise non-self-executing) agreements would
mean that they have been given domestic effect without having gone
through the full domestic law-making process. In other words, an earlier
Congress will have delegated authority to the Executive (or to the Executive
and the Senate in the case of formal Treaties) to make future domesti-
cally binding agreements without going through the constitutional leg-
islative process.
The Supreme Court’s formalistic treatment of the constitutional
requirements for adoption of legislation suggests that such a construction
of section 3017(a) would be unconstitutional. In decisions beginning with
Immigration and Nationalization Service v. Chadha, the Supreme Court
has rejected the authority of Congress to create mechanisms, such as legis-
lative vetoes or line-item vetoes, that produce binding legislative decisions
without satisfying the constitutional requirements of bicameral concur-
rence and presentment to the President necessary for the adoption of leg-
islation.305 Construing section 3017(a) to incorporate subsequently enacted
international agreements would thus endow these subsequent agreements
with legislative effect without satisfying these formal requirements.306
303 Memorandum from Robert A. Burton, Assoc. Adm’r, Office of Fed. Procurement Policy
& Edwin Piñero, Fed. Envtl. Exec., Office of Fed. Procurement Policy, to Fed. Agency Envtl.
Execs. and Agency Senior Procurement Exectuives [sic] (Oct. 13, 2005), available at http://
www.fedcenter.gov/_kd/Items/actions.cfm?action=Show&item_id=3144&destination=
ShowItem.
304 Compare RCRA §3017(f) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (2006)) with
Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49.
305 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (rejecting use of leg-
islative veto); see Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (rejecting legislation authorizing
use of line item veto by President); Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative
Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 212 (1984) (describing Chadha as rigidly formalist in
requiring constitutional formalities for actions with “legislative effect”).
306 This problem is not avoided by Congress having adopted the mechanism in a properly
enacted legislation. The legislative veto provision at issue in Chadha had been adopted
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Thus, there are strong reasons to question whether section 3017 of RCRA
can give domestic legislative effect to international agreements not specifi-
cally contemplated by Congress when section 3017(a) was adopted. Con-
struing section 3017 to confer authority on EPA to adopt regulations to
implement a future, non-self-executing agreement would most starkly
raise the constitutional issue of whether Congress can confer domestic
rule-making authority to implement a treaty subsequently negotiated by
the President and ratified by the Senate. The issue is perplexing and not
yet resolved by the Supreme Court.
The analogy to the Supreme Court’s treatment of legislative vetoes
and line-item vetoes is not, however, perfect. Treaties and other interna-
tional agreements stand on a different constitutional basis than legislation,
and there is no doubt that the President and Senate, through ratification
of a “self-executing” treaty, can create binding domestic obligations. There
is also little doubt that at least some class of international “executive
agreements” can have binding domestic effect without implementation
through domestic legislation.307 Thus, the constitutional requirements of
bicameralism and presentment are not required to make binding domestic
law when the law arises through international agreement. Thus, if subse-
quent agreements, such as the Mexico and Canada Agreements, stand on
the same constitutional footing as formal treaties and were construed as
self-executing, the constitutional problems would be avoided.
But this raises a new issue: are the actions of a prior Congress rele-
vant in construing a subsequent international agreement as self-executing?
In other words, can section 3017 avoid constitutional problems by con-
struing the provision, not independently to give international agreements
domestic effect, but rather to serve as a basis for construing future agree-
ments as self-executing? It seems unlikely that courts would use a provision
adopted by Congress in 1984 as a basis for interpreting a subsequent treaty
as self-executing. As “confounding” as the “self-executing” construction
question may be, the interpretations in treaties on this issue generally
focus on factors contemporaneous with ratification of the treaties and not
on the actions of Congress taken decades before. If the future agreements
are not themselves construed as self-executing (and thus enforceable
in legislation that had been enacted with bicameral adoption and presentment to the
President. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that
“initial statutory authorizations” would not shield a subsequent legislative act taken with-
out compliance with constitutional requirements. See id. at 987 (Court rejects contrary
position of Justice White in dissent).
307 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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without the need for subsequent regulations), we are back to the funda-
mental question of whether section 3017 can be read to confer authority
on EPA to adopt regulations implementing new agreements.
The uncertainty about whether the Canada and Mexico treaties are
directly enforceable under RCRA or whether, through section 3017(a)(1)
and section 3017(b), they create new authority for EPA to adopt domestic
regulations is certainly interesting, but hardly crucial.308 The terms of
these agreements largely mirror the requirements of the base congressio-
nally mandated notice and consent regime under section 3017(a)(1) that
EPA clearly has the authority to impose. In other words, EPA need not
rely on the agreements to justify adoption of the enforceable Subpart E
regulations that govern exports to Mexico and Canada. Indeed, EPA can-
not have relied on their authority; the general Subpart E requirements
that apply to the export of wastes to these countries were promulgated
before the agreements were made and the same Subpart E requirements
apply to exports to countries with which the United States has no inter-
national agreements.309
Which is not to say that there are not several interesting ques-
tions that arise if the bilateral agreements create obligations that EPA is
required to implement. The EPA regulations governing exports to Canada,
for example, do not appear to be fully consistent with the requirements of
the Canada/U.S. Agreement. This agreement, for example, expressly pro-
vides for “tacit consent”; if Canada has not responded to a Notice of Intent
within thirty days of receipt of the notice, then consent is automatically
presumed.310 The Subpart E regulations that govern exports to Canada do
308 The more significant question, discussed below, is whether section 3017 confers authority
on EPA to implement future international agreements, such as the Basel Convention,
without the need for additional implementing legislation. See infra notes 338–364 and
accompanying text.
309 The Subpart E regulations were promulgated in 1986, and nowhere in the preambles
either to the proposed or final regulations does EPA refer to those or any treaties. Hazardous
Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664 (Aug. 8,
1986). Nor does EPA expressly cite treaties as a basis for its legal authority to adopt the
Subpart E regulations. The preamble to the final 1986 Subpart E regulations, for example,
states:
These regulations are being promulgated under the authority of sec-
tions 2002(a), 3002, 3003, 3006, 3007, 3008 and 3017 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 6912(a), 6922, 6923, 6926, 6927, and 6937.
Id. As discussed below, this statement is, however, ambiguous since it is possible that
section 3017 could be construed as a source of authority to implement requirements of
international agreements.
310 Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, at art. 3(d).
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not allow for the export of waste based on such tacit consent. Any breach of
the Agreement would presumably be “enforceable” only by the government
of Canada against the government of the United States. An additional, and
problematic, question is whether section 3017 gives private parties a cause
of action under RCRA’s judicial review provisions to challenge the actions
of the administrator in adopting regulations that do not comply with the
terms of an international agreement. This issue is specifically addressed
below with respect to implementation of a decision of the OECD.
2. The Legal Effect of the OECD Decision
The issues of EPA’s obligation and authority to implement the
OECD Decision are different, and in many ways more complex, than those
arising from implementation of treaties and other international executive
agreements. The OECD was created by a 1960 Convention ratified by the
Senate in 1961.311 The terms of the OECD Convention expressly provide
that the OECD can “take decisions which, except as otherwise provided,
shall be binding on all the Members.”312 The Convention further provides,
however, that “[n]o decision shall be binding on any Member until it has
complied with the requirements of its own constitutional procedures.”313
At the time of ratification of the OECD Convention, the United
States position on the significance of OECD decisions on United States au-
thority was expressly addressed as part of the Senate ratification process.314
The Senate ratification document states it was ratified “with the inter-
pretation and explanation of the intent of the Senate that nothing in the
convention . . . confers any power on the Executive to bind the United
States in substantive matters beyond what the Executive now has, or to
bind the United States without compliance with applicable procedures im-
posed by domestic law.”315 Thus, contemporaneous material indicates that
311 Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Dec. 14,
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728 [hereinafter Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development].
312 Id. at art. 5(a).
313 Id. at art. 6.3.
314 See Richard Schwartz, Are the OECD and UNCTAD Codes Legally Binding?, 11 INT’L
L. 529, 529–30 (1977).
315 Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, supra
note 311, at 1751:
WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by their reso-
lution of March 16, 1961, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein, did advise and consent to the ratification of the said Convention
and the two protocols relating thereto “with the interpretation and
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the United States never intended, by ratification of the OECD Convention
itself, to give subsequent OECD Decisions the power to confer authority
not otherwise authorized by domestic statute.
Additionally, there are reasons to doubt that the OECD Decision ob-
ligates EPA to adopt regulations, even if otherwise within EPA’s authority,
that are necessary to implement the OECD Decision. The effect of such an
obligation would be to delegate to an international authority the power to
impose requirements of domestic agencies. Although there is growing de-
bate about the constitutionality of a delegation of authority to international
organizations to impose binding obligations on the United States, there is
limited case law.316 In Medellin v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court
rejected an argument that a judgment of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”), issued under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, created
federal obligations that were binding on state courts.317 The Supreme Court
concluded that neither the terms of the Convention itself nor a Presidential
memorandum that purported to implement the Convention provided that
decisions of the ICJ would have domestic effect on state proceedings.318
Medellin, however, dealt with the specific terms of the Vienna Convention
and with the effect of an ICJ judgment arising from an international adju-
dication; it is of limited guidance in evaluating the effect of an international
“regulatory” decision taken pursuant to a treaty.
This issue was, however, directly addressed by the D.C. Circuit in
NRDC v. EPA,319 and the case strongly suggests that the OECD Decision
does not impose binding obligations on EPA. NRDC v. EPA dealt with
the scope of domestic obligations arising under the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.320 The Senate had ratified the
Protocol in 1988 and Congress had specifically incorporated it into domestic
explanation of the intent of the Senate that nothing in the convention,
or the advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification thereof, confers
any power on the Executive to bind the United States in substantive
matters beyond what the Executive now has, or to bind the United States
without compliance with applicable procedures imposed by domestic law,
or confers any power on the Congress to take action in fields previously
beyond the authority of Congress, or limits Congress in the exercise of
any power it now has.”
316 See Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1492 (2004); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International
Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000).
317 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
318 Id. at 498–99.
319 Natural Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
320 See generally id.
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law through amendments to the Clean Air Act.321 Under the Protocol, the
United States and other parties agreed to phase out the production and
use of certain ozone depleting chemicals, and pursuant to the Protocol,
the parties subsequently adopted “decisions” that specified the require-
ments for the phaseout of methyl bromide, an ozone-depleting chemical
subject to the Protocol.322 EPA subsequently promulgated domestic reg-
ulations that purported to implement these decisions.323 NRDC sought
judicial review of the regulations, claiming that EPA had failed to imple-
ment the requirements of the decisions.324 Its legal argument was simple:
the Protocol, implemented through domestic legislation, created binding
domestic obligations; the Protocol authorized the Parties subsequently
to impose binding obligations through its “decisions”; therefore, the deci-
sions adopted pursuant to the terms of the Protocol imposed domestically
enforceable requirements on EPA.325
The court stated that the issue of the domestic effect, not of a
treaty, but of the decision of an international organization was one of first
impression, and it characterized the implications of this issue as follows:
NRDC’s interpretation raises significant constitutional
problems. If the “decisions” are “law”—enforceable in federal
court like statutes or legislative rules—then Congress either
has delegated lawmaking authority to an international body
or authorized amendments to a treaty without presidential
signature or Senate ratification, in violation of Article II
of the Constitution.326
Rather than confront the constitutionality of the position, the court
stated that it was “far more plausible to interpret the Clean Air Act and
321 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(h); 464 F.3d at 2. This section requires EPA to phase out production
of methyl chloride on a schedule “that is in accordance with, but not more stringent than,
the phaseout schedule of the Montreal Protocol Treaty as in effect on October 21, 1998.”
42 U.S.C. § 7671c(h). Note that this statutory provision does not purport to implement
future phaseout schedules negotiated by the parties.
322 464 F.3d at 2.
323 Pursuant to the Protocol, the parties adopted Decision IX/6 that established guidelines
for determining the phaseout of methyl bromide and Decision Ex. I/3 that provided specific
requirements for production of methyl bromide relating to the “critical use” provisions of the
Protocol. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for Exempting Critical Uses From the
Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982 (Dec. 23, 2004). EPA promulgated regu-
lations purporting to implement these Decisions. Id.
324 464 F.3d at 5.
325 Id. at 8.
326 Id.
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Montreal Protocol as creating an ongoing international political commit-
ment rather than a delegation of lawmaking authority to annual meet-
ings of the Parties.”327 Whatever the implications of creating a “political
commitment,” the court was clear that the decisions did not create enforce-
able domestic obligations on EPA.328 Although it did not resolve the issue,
the court strongly suggested that it would be unconstitutional for a treaty
(and its subsequent domestic implementing legislation) to confer authority
on an international organization to adopt subsequent binding obligations
with domestic effect.329
There are a number of implications that arise if the OECD Decision
neither creates a binding obligation on EPA to adopt regulations consistent
with its terms nor confers additional rule-making authority on EPA. First,
EPA relied on the “binding” effect of the OECD Decision to avoid providing
an opportunity for public comment on its original Subpart H regulations.330
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies must provide notice and
an opportunity for public comment on proposed regulations unless “good
cause” exists to forgo the comment period.331 EPA explained that “good
cause” existed in part because the Subpart H regulations merely codified
the “binding” requirements of the OECD Decision.332 It likened the promul-
gation of the Subpart H regulations to simple regulatory codification of stat-
utory provisions.333 If EPA’s action in promulgating export requirements
addressed by the OECD Decision is not simply ministerial codification of
otherwise binding requirements, then its good cause rationale for avoiding
notice and comment is, at the least, suspect.334
327 Id. at 9.
328 Id.
329 Further, the court rejected the argument that the decisions of the parties were simply
interpreting ambiguous, but otherwise applicable, treaty provisions. The court expressly
stated that the decisions, rather than interpreting ambiguous treaty terms, were filling
“treaty gaps.” 464 F.3d at 9. Thus, the court did not reach the issue of whether treaty terms
themselves, rather than subsequently adopted “regulations,” could create enforceable
obligations on the EPA.
330 Implementation of OECD Council Decision C(92)39, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,290, 16,291
(Apr. 12, 1996).
331 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
332 Implementation of OECD Council Decision C(92)39, 61 Fed. Reg. at 16,291.
333 In EPA’s view, promulgation of the Subpart H regulations implemented a binding OECD
Decision and was “analogous to a codification of statutory requirements, in which an agency
assumes the ministerial, nondiscretionary functions of translating requirements to regu-
latory form.” Id.
334 EPA did provide other reasons for invoking the good cause exception, including the need
for international consistency and the need for regulations that would allow other OECD
countries to trade with the United States in conformance with the Basel Convention. Id.
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Second, if the OECD Decision does not provide additional authority
to implement its requirements, EPA’s Subpart H regulations must be based
on authority generally available under RCRA.335 In other words, if EPA has
adopted more stringent requirements under Subpart H than those adopted
under Subpart E, those different, and more stringent, requirements must
be justified by more than a reference to the OECD Decision; they must be
requirements that are otherwise justified under RCRA.
EPA has, in fact, imposed requirements under Subpart H that are
not required under Subpart E. These include, among others:
• tacit consent,
• a requirement that transit countries consent to the
shipment,
• a requirement that any alternative disposal facilities
employ “environmentally sound management,”336
and
• a contractual obligation between the exporter and
the receiving facility.337
If these requirements can be justified under existing RCRA authority,
then EPA may have the authority to impose more stringent regulations
(at least regulations consistent with the Subpart H regulations) on the ex-
port of wastes to non-OECD countries. In other words, if EPA can justify
These other reasons may justify the substance of the regulations, but they do not suggest
a “good cause” to justify eliminating the opportunity to comment on the content of regu-
lations not legally mandated by the OECD Decision.
335 In the preamble to its original 1996 Subpart H regulation, EPA stated that authority
to promulgate the regulations arose under sections 2002(a) and 3017(a)(2) and (f) of RCRA.
Id. It also stated that “EPA has determined that no statutory change to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is needed because RCRA currently authorizes EPA
to promulgate rules governing imports and exports of hazardous waste, and contains ade-
quate authority to promulgate the requirements of the Decision.” Id. EPA’s statements,
however, suggest that it was relying on a claim of unique authority to implement an inter-
national agreement, rather than general authority to implement the set of base notice and
consent requirements, as the basis for the Subpart H regulations. In its preamble to the
2010 revisions to the Subpart H regulations, EPA somewhat more expansively, but still
ambiguously, stated that the regulations were promulgated under authority “found in
sections 1006, 2002(a), 3001–3010, 3013, and 3017” of RCRA. Revisions to the Requirements
for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes Between OECD Member Countries,
75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1238 (Jan. 8, 2010).
336 The term “environmentally sound management” comes from the Basel Convention.
Basel, supra note 3, at art. 2.8.
337 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.83–.85 (2010).
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“take-back” and “environmentally sound management” requirements for
OECD exports, it should be able to justify such a requirement for exports
to non-OECD counties. This has implications, among other things, on
EPA’s ability to a single set of export regulations and to implement the re-
quirements of the Basel Convention without additional statutory authority.
3. Could EPA Implement a Ratified Basel Convention?
The United States has signed and the Senate has consented to rati-
fication of the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes.338 The United States has not, however, submitted documentation
to the Secretariat of the Basel Convention, and therefore the United
States has not, as a matter of international law, ratified Basel.339 As a
non-ratifying party, the export of hazardous wastes to virtually all other
countries is prohibited under Basel to all countries other than the OECD
countries with whom we have an appropriate international agreement.340
The reason that the United States has not ratified Basel is the uni-
versal assumption that the requirements of Basel could not be implemented
unless Congress enacted legislation granting EPA additional authority.341
In testimony to Congress, the Administrator of EPA and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Environment stated that the United States could not
ratify the Basel Convention until Congress had adopted amendments to
RCRA that conferred authority on EPA to implement the Convention.342
In the early 1990s, a number of bills were actually introduced in Congress
that would have provided additional statutory authority to regulate the
export of hazardous wastes; however, they had little promise.343
A number of perceived inadequacies in existing RCRA authority to
implement Basel have been identified. In testimony to Congress, then EPA
Administrator William Reilly identified a number of Basel requirements
338 The United States signed the Basel Convention on March 20, 1990. See Basel
Convention’s Ratifications, supra note 3. The Senate consented to ratification on
August 11, 1992. See 138 Cong. Rec. 22,861 (1992).
339 See Basel, supra note 3, at art. 22; SEPTEMBER 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at
15 n.12.
340 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
341 See, e.g., AUGUST 2008 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 36 & n.31; Stephen Johnson, The
Basel Convention: The Shape of Things to Come for United States Waste Exports?, 21 ENVT.
L. 299 (1991); Coyle, supra note 295.
342 Hearings on Envtl. Prot., testimony of W. Reilly, supra note 5.
343 See Johnson, supra note 341, at 318–320.
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that EPA did not have authority to implement. In the Administrator’s
words:
We do not have authority to control municipal solid waste;
we do not have a notice and consent requirement with re-
spect to exports of our hazardous wastes; and we don’t have
any authority to recover the cost of any waste that we are
obligated to have returned to the United States once we
learn that it has been disposed of inappropriately in an un-
sound manner abroad. Those are all requirements of the
convention and therefore, the implementing legislation is
necessary to fulfill its terms.344
Other potential deficiencies in existing RCRA authority include the inabil-
ity to prohibit the export of hazardous waste if the waste will not be man-
aged in an “environmentally sound” manner,345 and the inability to prohibit
the export of hazardous wastes to countries that are not a party to Basel or
with which we have entered into an appropriate international agreement.346
Could EPA implement these Basel requirements under its existing
authority? As discussed above, it is at least arguable that section 3017 con-
fers authority on EPA to implement the requirements of any applicable
international agreement governing the export of hazardous waste to which
the United States is a party. If ratified, the provisions of Basel would fall
under section 3017(a)(2) and would thus arguably be either directly en-
forceable or subject to EPA regulatory authority. The ability of Congress
to prospectively confer domestic effect on subsequently ratified treaties
may be questionable, but the question has not been answered.
Further, is it so clear that EPA could not adopt the requirements
of Basel under its existing RCRA authority? Certainly, specific implement-
ing legislation would clarify and provide certainty, but it is worth consid-
ering what, if any, additional authority EPA would need to implement
Basel. EPA has asserted that adequate authority exists under RCRA to
344 Hearings on Envtl. Prot., testimony of W. Reilly, supra note 5.
345 See Johnson, supra note 341, at 315.
346 Can EPA ban the export of wastes to non-Basel members? The issue is probably moot.
At this point, 176 countries have ratified the Basel Convention. See Basel Convention’s
Ratifications, supra note 3. Not a single hazardous waste export reported to EPA in the
last ten years has been to a country that is not a party to Basel. Compare id. with infra
Table 1. The issue of whether EPA could ban exports to non-OECD countries even without
United States ratification of Basel is discussed below.
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implement the OECD Decision, and the OECD Decision was revised in
2001 specifically to “harmonize” its provisions with the Basel Convention.347
Further, EPA has stated that the OECD Decision is consistent with the
“environmentally sound management” requirements of Basel and thus,
under Article 11 of Basel, it qualifies as an agreement that will allow trade
between the United States and the members of the OECD who are Basel
parties.348 If EPA can implement the OECD Decision, why not Basel?
Consider Administrator Reilly’s objections. First, he states that
RCRA, unlike the Basel Convention, does not allow for the regulation of the
export of nonhazardous municipal waste.349 This may be true, but must
ratification of Basel wait for this authority?350 The Canada/U.S. Agreement
was amended to regulate the export of municipal solid waste between the
347 The introduction to EPA’s 2010 Subpart H regulations notes that “[t]he goal of the
2001 OECD Decision was to harmonize the procedures and requirements of the OECD
with those of the Basel Convention.” Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary
Shipments of Hazardous Wastes, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1238 (June 8, 2010); see also Request
for Information Concerning Transfrontier Movements of Wastes Destined for Recovery
Operations Within the OECD Area, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 17, 1999) (EPA information
request analyzing issues associated with harmonizing the OECD Decision and the Basel
Convention). The Preamble to the 2001 OECD Decision notes that the purpose of revisions
to the original OECD Decision was to seek “harmonization” with Basel and to continue the
applicability of the Decision under Article 11 of the Basel Convention. OECD Decision,
supra note 62, at 6.
348 In the preamble to its 1996 Subpart H regulations, EPA stated that:
The Decision, which entered into force before May 5, 1992, satisfies the
requirements of Article 11 of the Basel Convention because it is a pre-
existing multilateral agreement compatible with the environmentally
sound management of wastes as required by the Convention. Therefore,
today’s promulgation of Subpart H as part of the RCRA hazardous waste
export and import regulations, which is necessary to implement the
Decision, will make it possible for persons within the United States to
continue exporting and importing Basel-covered RCRA hazardous waste
for recovery within the OECD, even if other OECD countries are Parties
to the Basel Convention.
Implementation of OECD Council Decision C(92)39, 61 Fed. Reg. 16,290, 16,291 (Apr. 12,
1996). EPA has also stated that the Mexico and Canada treaties satisfy Article 11. See
Revisions for the Requirements to the Requirements for: Shipments of Hazardous Wastes
Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1247 (Jan. 8, 2010).
349 Hearings on Envtl. Prot., testimony of W. Reilly, supra note 5, at 642.
350 Section 3017 generally applies only to Subtitle C hazardous wastes. RCRA § 3017(a)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (2006)). See infra notes 393–409 and accom-
panying text. If section 3017(a)(2) confers authority to implement international agreements,
it is limited to those provisions dealing with hazardous waste, and it would not provide a
basis for regulating “municipal solid waste” under the Canada/U.S. Agreement or “other
wastes” under Basel.
2012] EXPORTING WASTE 471
countries,351 but that ratified international obligation has apparently not
yet been implemented.352
Second, he states that RCRA does not contain authority to require
notice and consent on the export of hazardous wastes.353 On its face this
is obviously wrong; RCRA does contain such a requirement,354 and EPA
imposes this requirement on the export to countries with which we have
no treaties.355 He may, however, have been referring to a potential concern
that the definition of “hazardous wastes” under Basel is broader than the
definition of Subtitle C hazardous wastes regulated under RCRA, and that
regulations issued under section 3017 could not fully address the scope
of Basel wastes.356 The definition of hazardous waste under the OECD
Decision is now quite similar to that contained in the Basel Convention,
and it is not clear the extent to which the U.S. national definition of haz-
ardous waste is inconsistent with the OECD Decision October 31, 2011
or Basel.357
Third, Administrator Reilly identified concerns with “recovering”
the costs of wastes that must be reimported.358 This is not expressly a con-
cern about the authority to impose a “reimport” or “take-back” requirement.
EPA apparently has concluded that RCRA provides such authority since
it has adopted a “take-back” requirement as part of the Subpart E and
Subpart H regulations.359 Rather, the Administrator’s expressed concern
was over the government’s authority to recover any costs it expends if obli-
gated to take back wastes. The government’s cost recovery authority is not,
however, relevant to its Basel obligations. While cost recovery authority
may be a good idea, the Basel Convention does not require it.
Finally, perhaps the most significant concern regarding ratification
of Basel relates to EPA’s ability to implement the Basel requirement that
351 Amendment to Canada/U.S. Bilateral Agreement, supra note 49.
352 See commentary supra note 49.
353 Hearings on Envtl. Prot., testimony of W. Reilly, supra note 5, at 642.
354 RCRA § 3017(c)–(e) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c)–(e) (2006)).
355 See supra notes 275–76 and accompanying text.
356 See Grant L. Kratz, Implementing the Basel Convention into U.S. Law: Will it Help or
Hinder Recycling Efforts?, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 323, 328–29 (1992).
357 In 1999, EPA issued an “information request” seeking comments on the implications of
the OECD efforts to harmonize the OECD Decision with the Basel Convention. Request
for Information Concerning Transfrontier Movements of Wastes Destined for Recovery
Operations Within the OECD Area, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 17, 1990). This request con-
tained an extensive discussion of the potential differences between the OECD class of
green and amber wastes and the waste covered by Basel. See id.
358 Hearings on Envtl. Prot., testimony of W. Reilly, supra note 5, at 642.
359 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.54, 262.82 (2010).
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exports be prohibited unless they will be managed in an “environmentally
sound manner” in the importing country.360 The significance of this re-
quirement is questionable given the ambiguity of the term under Basel.361
Nonetheless, this provision would presumably require that EPA have the
authority to prohibit exports based on the adequacy of their management
in the importing country. As discussed below, EPA’s position on its author-
ity to consider “extraterritorial environmental” impacts in establishing
export requirements is somewhat inconsistent.362 But the OECD Decision
and EPA’s implementing Subpart H regulations currently include require-
ments based on “environmentally sound” management in the importing
country.363 If EPA has existing authority to implement the OECD Decision,
it may have authority to implement comparable requirements of the Basel
Convention. The more general question of EPA’s authority to ban the ex-
ports of hazardous waste based on the environmental impact in the receiv-
ing country is discussed below.364
B. Could EPA Ban the Export of Hazardous Wastes to Non-OECD
Countries?
The primary concern relating to the export of hazardous wastes
has been the potential for mismanagement in less-developed countries.365
Both perceived economic incentives and inadequate institutional capacity
suggest that a notice and consent regime will not adequately address the
human health and environmental concerns arising from the export of
hazardous wastes to these countries. This has led for calls to adopt the
360 Basel, supra note 3, at art. 4.2(g). Additionally, Article 4.9(a) also requires that the export-
ing country allow exports only if it, the exporting country, does not have the capacity or
facilities to dispose of the wastes in an “environmentally sound and efficient manner.” Id. at
art. 4.9(a). The United States has stated its “understanding” that under Basel, “an export-
ing State may decide that it lacks the capacity to dispose of wastes in an ‘environmentally
sound and efficient manner’ if disposal in the importing country would be both environ-
mentally sound and economically efficient.” See Basel Convention’s Ratifications, supra
note 3.
361 A variety of technical guidelines describing “environmentally sound management” prac-
tices have been issued to implement the Basel requirement. See Technical Guidelines,
BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/meetings/sbc/workdoc/techdocs.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2011).
362 See infra notes 390–93 and accompanying text.
363 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 262.82(d), (e).
364 See infra notes 379–93 and accompanying text.
365 See, e.g., Andrew Webster-Main, Keeping Africa Out of the Global Backyard: A
Comparative Study of the Basel and Bamako Conventions, 26 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y J. 65 (2002).
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“Basel Ban” that would prohibit, under the Basel Convention, the export
of hazardous wastes to certain less-developed countries.366 Congress has
also considered, but not adopted, amendments to RCRA that would ban
the export of hazardous wastes to countries with whom the United States
does not have a specific waste export agreement.367
Could EPA, under its existing RCRA authority, ban the export of
hazardous wastes to non-OECD countries with which the United States
has no export agreements? Section 3017 generally provides EPA with the
authority to implement a base notice and consent regime and other require-
ments contained in an appropriate bilateral treaty.368 EPA has on several
occasions, however, flatly stated that it does not have the authority to ban
the exports of waste because section 3017 only provides for a “notice and
consent” regime, not an outright ban.369
But EPA’s response is clearly inadequate. Congress conferred
authority on EPA to implement more than the base “notice and consent”
366 EPA, without explanation, has stated that it does not have the authority to implement
the Basel Ban. See Johnson, supra note 341, at 315. Certainly, EPA does not have authority
under the terms of the Basel Convention; not only is the United States not a ratifying
party, but the Basel Ban is, by most accounts, not an enforceable obligation even among
ratifying parties.
367 See Johnson, supra note 341, at 318–20.
368 RCRA § 3017 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2006)).
369 In the preamble to its 2010 OECD/SLAB rule-making, EPA responded to a request by the
Basel Action Network to ban the export of hazardous wastes to non-OECD countries stating:
EPA cannot grant this request since the statute does not give EPA the
legal authority to implement an outright ban on hazardous waste exports.
Specifically, RCRA section 3017 prohibits exports of hazardous waste
unless either: (1) The shipments are covered under and conform to the
terms specified in an agreement between the U.S. and the receiving
country; or (2) the exporter has submitted written notification to EPA,
obtained written consent from the receiving country via EPA, attached
a copy of the written consent to the RCRA hazardous waste manifest for
each shipment, and ensures that the shipments comply with the terms
of the receiving country’s consent. Moreover, section 3017 directs the
State Department, on behalf of EPA, to forward a copy of the notification
to the intended country of import within 30 days of EPA receiving a
complete notification concerning a proposed waste export that would
not be covered under the terms of an existing international agreement.
Therefore, an outright ban regarding all exports of any individual hazard-
ous waste (e.g. SLABs) or all hazardous wastes to non-OECD countries
would require changes to the statutory language and is outside the scope
of this regulatory action.
Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes Between
OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1247 (Jan. 8, 2010).
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requirements of section 3017(a); section 3017(h) authorizes EPA to promul-
gate “other standards” for the export of hazardous waste under the pro-
visions of sections 3002 and 3003 of RCRA.370 Under section 3017(f), these
“other standards” can only apply to exports to countries with which the
United States does not have an international agreement.371 In other words,
Congress clearly contemplated that EPA have the authority to impose
something beyond the base notice and consent requirements for exports
to countries with which we have no applicable international agreements.
Determining whether EPA could ban the export of wastes to non-OECD
countries thus hinges on its authority under section 3017(h).
EPA appears to have used its authority to impose “other standards”
under section 3017(h) in only one instance. EPA’s Subpart E regulations
require notification, but not consent, of countries through which exported
wastes transit.372 Although the base requirements of section 3017(a)(1) re-
quire notice and consent by the receiving country, they impose no require-
ments relating to transit countries.373 Noting an OECD Decision requiring
notice to transit countries, EPA stated “[a]ccordingly, EPA has exercised
its authority pursuant to section 3017(h) to require exporters to notify EPA
of any countries through which a hazardous waste will pass en route to the
receiving country.”374 Thus, under section 3017(h), EPA imposed domestic
obligations based on extraterritorial concerns.375
The question whether section 3017(h) allows EPA to regulate
exports based on concerns about their effect on “human health and the
environment”376 outside the United States remains unaddressed. Several
arguments can be made that EPA does not have such authority. First,
Congress in section 3017 presumably established a policy of relying on
notice and consent of the receiving country even in the absence of an appro-
priate bilateral treaty between the United States and the receiving country.
This policy is consistent not only with general international principles re-
garding state sovereignty but also international environmental documents,
including the Stockholm and Rio Declarations, which generally ratify the
authority of countries to establish their own internal environmental
370 RCRA § 3017(h) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(h) (2006)).
371 Id. § 3017(f) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (2006)).
372 40 C.F.R. § 261.39(a)(5)(iv)–(v) (2010).
373 Id. § 3017(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(1) (2006)).
374 Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8744,
8755 (proposed Mar. 13, 1986).
375 RCRA § 3017(h) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(h) (2006)).
376 Id. §§ 3017(h), 3018 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6938(h), 6939 (2006)).
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policies.377 This argument, however, ultimately begs the question; Congress
imposed a base notice and consent requirement, but it also conferred
authority on EPA to impose other standards for the export of hazardous
waste.378 Thus, whatever presumptive policy of “notice and consent” en-
dorsed by Congress, Congress also specifically authorized other require-
ments in appropriate circumstances.
Second, the limited case law addressing the issue suggests that
RCRA does not have “extraterritorial” effect. At least one court has held
that United States exporters are not liable for creating an “imminent
and substantial endangerment” for wastes managed outside the United
States.379 It seems unlikely that RCRA would be construed to authorize
EPA to regulate or penalize conduct occurring outside of the United
States.380 A conclusion that RCRA does not provide EPA authority to
regulate conduct outside of the United States begs the relevant issue.
The question with which we are confronted is whether EPA can regulate
the domestic management of hazardous wastes by prohibiting their export
to certain countries.381
Third, EPA’s authority to impose “other standards” on exports is
based on its authority under sections 3002 or 3003.382 These sections allow
EPA to regulate generators and transporters “as may be necessary to pro-
tect human health and the environment.”383 It is other sections of RCRA,
including section 3004, that confer authority to regulate “treatment, storage
and disposal facilities” themselves in order to protect human health and the
377 See Tarlock, supra note 6, at 43 n.37.
378 RCRA § 3017 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (2006)).
379 Amlon Metals v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citizen suit for “imminent
and substantial endangerment” not available for endangerment arising in another country).
Cf. Basel Action Network v. Mar. Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2005) (claimed RCRA
violation for export of defunct naval vessels for disposal does not authorize RCRA citizen
suit since any prior export would be a wholly past violation and any future export would not
be a basis to allege a current imminent and substantial endangerment). The court also held
that there is a presumption against territorial effect of United States statutes and the
National Environmental Policy Act did not have extraterritorial effect. Id. at 71.
380 See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape of the Extraterritoriality of
U.S. Environmental Laws, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 997 (2010); Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New
Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an
Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 87 (2006).
381 See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (conclusion that NEPA
requires assessment of environmental impacts abroad does not imply that NEPA has
extraterritorial reach since the obligation to perform assessment is directed at domestic
federal actor).
382 RCRA §§ 3002–03 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922–23 (2006)).
383 Id. § 3002(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a) (2006)).
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environment,384 and Congress did not cross-reference these authorities as
a basis for imposing “other” export requirements.385 This at least suggests
that Congress did not intend for EPA to establish “other standards” based
on concerns about the operation of foreign recycling and disposal facilities.
On the other hand, a prohibition on generators and transporters from ex-
porting wastes to non-OECD countries is not a specific regulation of the for-
eign facilities, and a prohibition on exporters could be seen as “necessary”
to protect human health and the environment. As noted, EPA has used
its “other standards” authority to impose a requirement to notify transit
countries, and this obligation is based on extraterritorial concerns.386
Ultimately, the authority of EPA to prohibit exports to non-OECD
countries comes down to whether EPA can regulate domestic conduct under
RCRA based on concerns about extraterritorial environmental effects. As
discussed above, EPA has tailored its export regulations based on concerns
about the environmental impacts in the receiving country. In justifying
its decision to impose a notice and consent requirement on the export of
SLABs, EPA stated that it:
would like to focus on the use of preventative measures
to decrease the proportionate risks to human health and
the global environment. There are inherent human health
and environmental hazards associated with a significant
amount of SLABs being exported across borders without
the knowledge and consent of receiving countries and/or
SLABs being exported to countries with substandard smelt-
ing infrastructures. Amending the current RCRA hazardous
waste regulations to include the notification and consent
requirements would help ensure that SLABs are exported
to countries with the capacity to handle them in an environ-
mentally sound manner and to aid countries with tracking
the movements and life-cycle management of SLABs inside
their borders. . . .
EPA believes that the potential reduction in risk to human
health and the environment with this proposed modification
will outweigh the incremental increase in burden to SLAB
exporters.387
384 Id. § 3004 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2006)).
385 See id. §§ 3302–04 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922–24 (2006)).
386 See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
387 Revisions to: the Requirements for Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes
Between OECD Countries, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,388, 58,391 (proposed Oct. 6, 2008).
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Thus, concerns about mismanagement of recycled SLAB outside of the
United States formed part of its justification for regulating the export of
recycled SLABs otherwise largely exempt from domestic regulation.388
EPA also considered environmental effects outside the United
States in developing conditional exclusions. Although EPA initially de-
clined to regulate the export of conditionally excluded CRTs, in the final
rule, EPA imposed a basic notice and consent requirement. In its “Response
to Comments” document, EPA explained:
The comments, and data submitted by the commenters,
have convinced us that unfettered export of CRTs for re-
cycling could lead to environmental harm. Information in
the record shows that exported electronics may not be han-
dled as valuable commodities in foreign countries. In fact,
there is documentation that they are sometimes managed
so carelessly that they pose possible human health and envi-
ronmental risks from such practices as open burning, land
disposal, and dumping into rivers.389
Similarly, in its “reclamation exclusion,” EPA imposed a notice and con-
sent requirement “so that it can ensure that the hazardous secondary
materials are reclaimed rather than disposed of or abandoned.”390 In that
same rule, EPA established a domestic exclusion for wastes that reclaimed
“under the control of the generator.”391 EPA, however, declined to apply this
domestic exclusion to exported wastes. EPA stated that it did not apply
the “under the control” test because “EPA would not be able to ensure the
close management and monitoring by a single entity of hazardous sec-
ondary materials in a foreign country.”392 Thus, consideration of potential
mismanagement outside the United States formed the basis of EPA’s con-
ditional exclusions of exported wastes.393
388 EPA also justified imposing the notice and consent requirement because it was consistent
with section 3017 and there were advantages to consistency with OECD requirements.
See id.
389 RESPONSE TO COMMENTS DOCUMENT, supra note 189, at 22. EPA made similar comments
in the preamble to the final CRT conditional exclusion. See Hazardous Waste Management
System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program; Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed.
Reg. 42,928, 42,938 (July 28, 2006).
390 Revisions to the Definition of Solid Waste, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,668, 64,698 (Oct. 30, 2008).
391 Id. at 64,699.
392 Id. at 64,738.
393 As discussed above, EPA’s logic in both the CRT and reclamation exclusions is subtler
than “mere” concern about avoiding environmental harm in the receiving country. See
Gaba, supra note 30, at 88. Rather, EPA justified imposing conditions on the export of
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EPA has thus used concerns about extraterritorial environmental
effects to justify imposing a notice and consent requirement in a manner
consistent with section 3017(a).394 It has also relied on its authority under
section 3017(h) to impose a notice requirement for transit countries.395
And section 3017(h) clearly authorizes the regulation of generators and
transporters “as may be necessary to protect human health and the envi-
ronment.”396 At a minimum, the question of EPA’s authority to prohibit
the export of hazardous wastes under section 3017(h) based on concerns
about their impact on human health and the environment in countries
with which the United States does not have an international agreement
cannot be dismissed as lightly as EPA has in the past.
C. What are the Limits of EPA’s Authority to Exclude Hazardous
Waste from RCRA Export Controls?
Section 3017 requires EPA to regulate the export of Subtitle C
hazardous wastes.397 EPA has, however, used two distinct bases from ex-
cluding materials that might fall within the basic Subtitle C definition of
hazardous waste from export controls. First, EPA regulations generally
provide that only Subtitle C hazardous wastes are subject to mandatory
export controls, and thus the exclusion of a material from classification as
a hazardous waste exempts the material from export controls.398 Second,
EPA regulations generally provide that only materials subject to a domestic
manifest requirement are subject to notice and consent requirements.399
Amongst other things, this requirement excludes all CESQG hazardous
wastes from any export controls.400 Can EPA exclude materials that would
otherwise be regulated hazardous wastes on either of these bases?
1. Exclusion from Classification as a Subtitle C Hazardous Waste
Section 3017 does not apply generally to “hazardous wastes”;
rather the section applies to “hazardous waste identified or listed” under
materials based on the rather circular argument that potential improper management is
evidence that the material is a waste. Id. at 93. In other words, EPA imposed requirements
to avoid the classification that would justify the requirements.
394 RCRA § 3017(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (2006)).
395 Id. § 3017(h) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(h) (2006)).
396 Id. §§ 3002, 3017(h) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6293, 6938(h) (2006)).
397 Id. § 3017(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (2006)).
398 See Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed.
Reg. 28,664, 28,671, 28,679 (Aug. 8, 1986).
399 Id. at 28,669.
400 Id.
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Subtitle C of RCRA.401 In other words, the export requirements only apply
to materials regulated as hazardous waste under Subtitle C.402 In EPA’s
view, any material which is not classified as a Subtitle C hazardous waste
is thus not subject to export controls under section 3017.403 The express
statutory limitation of section 3017 to the export of Subtitle C wastes is
compelling support for this position.404 At a minimum, this means that
the export of nonhazardous solid wastes not otherwise regulated under
Subtitle C, including nonhazardous municipal wastes, cannot be regu-
lated under section 3017.405
There are, however, a significant number of wastes that meet the
definition of Subtitle C hazardous wastes, either because they have been
listed or exhibit a hazard characteristic, which EPA has expressly excluded
from classification as a Subtitle C hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 is
chock-a-block full of an increasing number of wastes that EPA has, by
regulation, excluded from classification as a Subtitle C hazardous waste,
and, in most cases, this exclusion has the effect of totally exempting the
waste from export controls.406 If EPA has properly excluded a material
from classification as a Subtitle C hazardous waste, then it does follow
that the material is not subject to export controls under section 3017. The
legitimacy of excluding a material from export controls would thus hinge on
the legitimacy of EPA’s decision to exclude the material from classification
as a Subtitle C hazardous waste and not on any separate requirements of
section 3017.
401 RCRA § 3017(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (2006)).
402 As discussed above, section 3001 of RCRA authorizes EPA to “identify or list” hazardous
wastes for purposes of regulation under Subtitle C, RCRA § 3001(b) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b) (2006)), and EPA regulations provide that “solid wastes,” defined in
40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a), will be hazardous wastes if they either exhibit a hazard characteristic
or are “listed” by EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a) (2010).
403 Hazardous Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. at 28,671.
404 With limited exceptions, regulations established under Subtitle C (which includes
section 3017) are limited to the class of Subtitle C hazardous wastes defined by EPA
regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(a), (b).
405 This also means that EPA cannot under RCRA regulate the export of materials that
are classified as hazardous wastes by the importing country but not by the United States
under RCRA. Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51
Fed. Reg. at 28,671. And, as noted above, this means that EPA does not have the authority
under section 3017 to impose requirements on the export of nonhazardous OECD “green”
wastes. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
406 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (2010). Scrap metal exported for recycling, for example, is exempt
from any export controls because EPA has exempted scrap metal from classification as
a hazardous waste. Id. § 261.4(13)(a).
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2. The Exclusion of Non-Manifested Hazardous Waste
Section 3017 generally imposes a notice and consent requirement
on the export of any Subtitle C hazardous waste; it contains no exclusion
for hazardous wastes that are not subject to a manifest requirement.407
EPA adopted the “manifest exclusion” as part of its original 1986 export
regulations,408 and at that time it stated that, in its view:
Congress could not have intended to regulate for export
those “hazardous wastes” which EPA does not regulate
domestically. It is highly unlikely that Congress would have
been more concerned about wastes exported than wastes
in its own backyard.409
Parts of EPA’s rationale for this conclusion are less than compelling.
According to EPA, Congressional intent to take an “equally firm” stand
on the export of hazardous waste as on domestic regulation means that if
hazardous wastes are exempt from manifest requirements they are ex-
empt from any export controls.410 EPA acknowledged that non-manifested
wastes may still be subject to some domestic RCRA requirements, but none-
theless concluded that exclusion from the manifest requirements justified
exclusion from any notice and consent requirement on export.411 According
to EPA, “the function served by the manifest domestically is similar to the
function served by the notification and consent internationally.”412 These
functions include providing information about the waste and a tracking
document to ensure proper delivery of the waste.413 But the notice and con-
sent requirement for the export of hazardous waste obviously serves the
additional purpose of providing governments the opportunity to object to
407 RCRA § 3017(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (2006)). The Canada/U.S.
Agreement is, however, expressly limited to hazardous wastes that are subject to the mani-
fest requirement. Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, at art. 1(b) (“Hazardous waste”
is defined “with respect to the United States, hazardous waste subject to a manifest require-
ment in the United States.”).
408 Hazardous Waste Management System, Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. at
28,671.
409 Id. at 28,670.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 28,670–71.
412 Id. at 28,670.
413 Hazardous Waste Management System, Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg.
28,664, 28,670–71 (Aug. 8, 1986).
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the import of wastes.414 Under EPA’s interpretation, if EPA has eliminated
the manifest requirement, governments are deprived of this opportunity.
One other argument made by EPA does, however, more clearly
support the exclusion of non-manifested waste from the requirements of
section 3017.415 Section 3017(a)(1)(C) requires that a copy of the importing
country’s written consent be “attached to the manifest accompanying each
waste shipment.”416 This language at least suggests that Congress contem-
plated that all wastes subject to export controls would have a manifest. It
is also, of course, possible to read this section as requiring that exports of
hazardous wastes be accompanied by a manifest even if not subject to a
domestic manifest requirement. EPA’s argument that this language sup-
ports applying export controls only to manifested wastes loses some force
from the fact that EPA does impose notice and consent requirements on
some hazardous wastes, such as SLABs, that are exempt from domestic
manifest requirements.417
Ultimately, however, EPA’s general exclusion of non-manifested
wastes is based on EPA’s judgment that such wastes pose little environ-
mental risk and therefore do not need to be regulated through a notice and
consent regime.418 EPA, in other contexts, has been rebuffed in its attempts
to narrow the scope of RCRA based on its views of the environmental need
and the administrative burden of regulation.419 Given the unequivocal scope
414 Id. at 28,671.
415 EPA also justified excluding wastes that are not subject to a manifest requirement by
arguing that, if there was no manifest requirement, EPA would be unable to police the ex-
port of hazardous waste. Id. This argument would be more compelling if, as noted, EPA did
not impose notice and consent requirements on certain wastes, such as SLABs, that are
exempt from a domestic manifest requirement. Such wastes must still be accompanied by
an Acknowledgment of Consent and the exporter must still notify EPA. See supra Part III.D.
416 RCRA § 3017(a)(1)(C) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a)(1)(C) (2006)).
417 See generally Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous
Wastes Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236 (Jan. 8, 2010).
418 Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. at
28,671.
419 In the early days of RCRA, EPA attempted to adopt a regulatory exclusion for special
“low-toxicity and high-volume” wastes, Gaba, supra note 30, at 97, and for generators of less
than 1000 kilograms per month of hazardous waste. See Richard Ottinger, Strengthening
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1984: The Original Loopholes, the
Amendments, and the Political Factors Behind Their Passage, 3 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
14 (1985). There was considerable controversy and Congress subsequently provided spe-
cial statutory treatment for “special wastes” and authorized the reduced treatment of
“conditionally exempt small quantity generators” that generated 100 kilograms per month
or less of hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (2010).
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of section 3017, EPA’s blanket exclusion of non-manifested hazardous
wastes from export controls is, at the very least, questionable.
D. Can EPA Regulate the Export of Hazardous Wastes that are
Exempt from Domestic Regulation?
Although EPA generally has taken the positions that it can only
regulate exports of Subtitle C hazardous wastes that are subject to domestic
regulation,420 EPA has paradoxically also asserted authority to regulate the
export of wastes that are not domestically regulated and that are excluded
from classification as hazardous wastes.421 In other words, EPA has taken
the position that it can exempt hazardous wastes from domestic regulation
while at the same time imposing notice and consent export requirements.422
It has accomplished this feat on one of two bases. First, EPA has
consistently claimed the authority to impose less stringent regulatory re-
quirements on Subtitle C hazardous wastes that are recycled.423 40 C.F.R.
Part 266 contains a set of regulations applicable to the recycling of speci-
fied wastes or to specific recycling techniques.424 EPA apparently claims
that it can use this authority either to exempt or substantially reduce the
domestic regulation of Subtitle C hazardous waste while still imposing a
notice and consent requirement if the wastes are exported.425 Thus, EPA
has excluded recycled SLABs, a Subtitle C hazardous waste, from domestic
regulation while imposing export requirements.426
Second, EPA has used the technique of “conditional exemption”
to exempt materials from classification as hazardous wastes while at the
same time imposing regulatory requirements as a condition of the exclu-
sion.427 Thus, EPA has excluded recycled CRTs from classification as a haz-
ardous waste but required that exporters comply with notice and consent
requirements.428 EPA’s rationale for the use of “conditional exemptions”
420 Hazardous Waste Management System; Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. at
28,670.
421 See Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes
Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236.
422 Gaba, supra note 30, at 105–07.
423 Id. at 96.
424 40 C.F.R. § 266 (2010).
425 See, e.g., Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous
Wastes Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1239.
426 See id.
427 Gaba, supra note 30, at 88.
428 Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous Waste Program;
Cathode Ray Tubes, 71 Fed. Reg. 42,928, 42,928–99 (July 28, 2006).
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is not altogether clear; it appears to vary depending on whether the waste
is excluded from classification as a “solid waste” under section 261.4(a) or
as a “hazardous waste” under section 261.4(b).
EPA’s conditional exclusions from classification as a “solid waste”
have been justified, in part, based on a conclusion that the materials, if
managed as required by the conditional exclusion, will be managed in a
“commodity-like” rather than waste-like manner, and will thus not have
the “element of discard” necessary to classify the material as a solid
waste.429 Both in its CRT exclusion and its “reclamation exclusion,” EPA
claims that the notice and consent condition is justified in order to ensure
that the exported wastes will be properly managed in a commodity-like
manner.430 In other words, EPA claims that it can exempt domestically
recycled wastes from classification as a solid waste while at the same time
imposing export controls on those same materials based on concerns that
the materials will not be properly managed outside the United States.
EPA’s conditional exclusions from classification as a “hazardous”
solid waste have been based on a distinct (but similar) rationale. Under
sections 1003 and 3001 of RCRA, EPA can classify a solid waste as haz-
ardous if there is a plausible basis for concluding the waste will be “mis-
managed.”431 Thus, EPA has conditionally excluded certain wastes based
on a conclusion that, if managed according to the conditions, there is no
plausible likelihood that it will be mismanaged.432 In these cases, EPA does
not claim that the materials are not solid wastes, but rather that under
RCRA it may exclude a waste from classification as a hazardous waste if
there is no plausible risk of mismanagement.433 Although based on a differ-
ent legal justification than that used to exclude “solid wastes,” the bottom
line is similar. EPA can impose a notice and consent requirement on ex-
ported wastes based on concerns about the way it will be managed outside
the United States.
EPA’s claim that it can impose notice and consent requirements on
wastes exported for recycling while at the same time imposing little or no
domestic regulation suggests that EPA could, for example, exempt domestic
regulation of recycled scrap metal while still imposing notice and consent
429 See id. at 42,934.
430 See id. at 42,938 (notice and consent in CRT exclusion necessary since they may not be
handled as a “commodity.”); Revisions to the Definition of Hazardous Waste, 73 Fed. Reg.
at 64,698 (notice and consent requirements in the reclamation exclusion “help determine
that the materials are not discarded.”).
431 See Gaba, supra note 30, at 111.
432 Id. at 107–09.
433 Id. at 108.
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requirements on exported scrap metal. More significantly, this also sug-
gests a way for EPA to exempt domestically recycled electronic wastes from
regulation while still implementing export controls.
VI. IMPROVING THE REGULATION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE EXPORTS
Although EPA may have authority to regulate the export of wastes
more stringently, there are steps it could take to improve its regulation of
wastes currently subject to its export requirements.
A. Clarify Determination of the Toxicity Characteristic
for E-Wastes
Much of the concern on exports of hazardous waste focuses on the
export of electronic wastes for recycling.434 E-wastes that exhibit a haz-
ardous characteristic exported for reclamation have always been subject
to the Subpart E notice and consent requirements,435 but EPA has gener-
ally taken the position that only circuit boards, CRTs, and CRT glass ex-
hibit a hazardous characteristic.436 Thus, EPA has assumed that all other
e-wastes are exempt from export controls since they are not Subtitle C
hazardous wastes.
As discussed above, however, the same data that led EPA to con-
clude that CRTs exhibit a hazard characteristic also suggest that other
e-wastes are hazardous.437 Given that the obligation to make a hazard
determination falls on the generator,438 exporters of e-wastes should be
concerned about their potential for liability. Indeed, a few citizen suits
against such exporters might focus their minds wonderfully.
It would, however, be appropriate for EPA to step up to the plate
and clarify the hazardous waste status of most e-wastes. First, EPA can
undertake additional studies to determine the possibility that various
categories of e-wastes exhibit a characteristic. If EPA finds some level of
likelihood that a type of e-waste exhibits a characteristic, it should act to
enforce. Generators have the obligation to determine if their materials con-
stitute hazardous wastes,439 and, with sufficient data generated by EPA,
434 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
435 40 C.F.R. § 262.50 (2010).
436 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
437 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
438 40 C.F.R. § 262.11.
439 Id.
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generators would be hard-pressed to rely on “knowledge of process” to
justify a determination that the waste is not hazardous.440
Second, EPA could adopt clarifications of the Toxicity Characteristic
Leachate Procedure (“TCLP”) to specify the methodology to be used in
assessing the toxicity of products like e-wastes. The current methodology
for performing a TCLP does not adequately address the problem of ob-
taining appropriate samples from products.441 Studies used by EPA have
discussed alternative methodologies and EPA should evaluate whether
alternative techniques for measuring the toxicity of electronic products
should be adopted.
Finally, one presumes that EPA is less than enthusiastic about
bringing the class of discarded and reclaimed e-wastes into the domestic
hazardous waste system. The policy and environmental implications of
classifying e-wastes as hazardous for domestic regulation is beyond the
scope of this article, but there are methods EPA could use to ensure mini-
mal notice and consent requirements for exports while exempting domestic
management. EPA could, as it has for CRTs, exclude other e-wastes from
classification as a solid waste but impose a “conditional exclusion” require-
ment for exported e-wastes. Alternatively, EPA could adopt the approach
it uses in regulating SLABs: special regulatory treatment of recycled e-
wastes which eliminates domestic manifest requirements while preserving
a notice and consent obligation.
B. Provide Greater Transparency Regarding U.S. Hazardous
Waste Exports
The entire system of export controls relies on the effectiveness of
government policing of imports and exports through notice and consent.
It is a safe assumption that the effectiveness of government supervision
is enhanced by transparency and political accountability. In other words,
the effectiveness of a notice and consent regime would be increased by
publicizing information about exports.
At the moment, exporters of regulated materials must submit a
notice of intent to EPA.442 This notice of intent is shared with the United
440 See id. (requiring generators to make a hazardous waste determination and allowing
them to make this determination, not through testing of the wastes, but based on their
knowledge of the waste “in light of the materials or the processes used”).
441 See RCRA TOXICITY CHARACTERIZATION, supra note 269, at 1-3 to 1-4.
442 Revisions to the Requirements for: Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes
Between OECD Member Countries, 75 Fed. Reg. 1236, 1247 (Jan. 8, 2010).
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States Department of State and the governments of any importing or
transit countries.443 Acknowledgements of consent to export are provided
to exporters by EPA.444 Noteworthy is the absence of any public notice of
transactions involving the export of hazardous waste.
EPA has recently taken one significant step in providing infor-
mation about hazardous waste exports. Following adoption of the OECD/
SLAB rules, EPA stated its intent “in the interests of transparency” to
provide online public posting of summaries of Notices of Intent to export
to non-OECD countries.445 This information is now available, but it is not
clear how frequently the information is updated.446
Other than this new source of information about proposed exports
to non-OECD countries, information about the export of materials subject
to EPA’s export regulations is buried in EPA files. One can find anecdotal
information from EPA about the scope of exports and it is possible to obtain
information through FOIA request. But haphazard, time-consuming, and
costly methods of disclosure surely do not further the purposes of RCRA.
It is certainly not consistent with the requirement of RCRA that “[p]ublic
participation in the development, revision, implementation, and enforce-
ment of any regulation, guideline, information, or program under this chap-
ter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator
and the States.”447
At a minimum, EPA should post summary information, such as that
provided by EPA in response to a FOIA request, that includes information
about the amounts and destinations of hazardous wastes exported from
the United States. Public access to actual information about the annual
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 See id. EPA stated that it will post:
summary information for all future notices we receive concerning a
proposed export of RCRA hazardous waste to a non-OECD country. The
online information will list the exporter name, exporter address, waste
text description, proposed receiving country, and consent status (e.g.,
notice submitted to foreign country, whether the foreign country consents
or objects). Moreover, EPA’s cover letters for notices concerning exports
to non-OECD countries will remind the countries, when appropriate, of
the relevant Basel hazardous waste listing and the Basel Convention pro-
hibition on transboundary shipments of hazardous waste between Basel
parties and a non-party like the United States.
Id.
446 Proposed Hazardous Waste Exports to Non-OECD Countries, supra note 235. This is the
current correct link to the online information; the web address specified in the OECD/SLAB
rule is not accurate.
447 RCRA § 7004(b)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(1) (2006)).
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number of exports and their destination would be consistent with EPA’s
public participation obligations and provide some greater confidence in
the export program.448
But posting of “after the fact” exports summaries does not fully
ensure appropriate public participation. Why doesn’t EPA simply post
online information regarding all Notices of Intent to export, and not simply
those regarding exports to non-OECD countries? Immediate posting of
information about Notices of Intent would allow interested members of
the public to identify pending exports and have greater ability to assure
compliance with RCRA and proper management in the receiving country.
This is not to say that there are not both legal and political problems
with publicizing Notices of Intent. The legal problem primarily arises from
prohibitions on disclosure of Confidential Business Information (“CBI”).
The Freedom of Information Act and EPA regulations provide an excep-
tion from public disclosures of CBI.449 Additionally, both the Canada/U.S.
Agreement and the Mexico/U.S. Agreement contain limitations on the
publication of CBI.450
EPA now deals with the issue of CBI in export notices in a number
of ways. First, 40 C.F.R. § 260.2(b) provides that any information submitted
pursuant to Parts 260–265 and 268, including specifically information con-
tained in Notices of Intent (“NOI”) to export, will not be classified as CBI
unless the party submits a claim of confidentiality at the time the notice
is submitted.451 Therefore, for most NOIs, the exporter will have waived
claims of confidentiality unless a specific claim has been submitted with the
notice. Although this may waive the right to assert confidentiality by the
exporter, EPA has stated that this does not waive claims of CBI by other
parties.452 To address confidentiality claims by these parties, EPA has on
several occasions published notices requesting other “affected parties” to
submit information about confidentiality claims with respect to previously
submitted NOIs.453 Under EPA’s approach, if no party submits informa-
tion in response to the notice, claims of confidentiality have been waived.
448 EPA’s current procedures for dealing with confidential business information, discussed
below, would be adequate to allow publication of periodic summary information about
waste exports.
449 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 2.203 (2010).
450 See Canada/U.S. Agreement, supra note 49, at art. 8; Mexico/U.S. Agreement, supra
note 55, at art. XIII.
451 40 C.F.R. § 260.2(b).
452 40 C.F.R. § 262.54(e).
453 See, e.g., Inquiry to Learn Whether Businesses Assert Business Confidentiality Claims,
76 Fed. Reg. 362, 363 (Jan. 4, 2011); Inquiry to Learn Whether Businesses Assert Business
Confidentiality Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 44,951 (notice July 30, 2010).
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This process is further complicated by limiting language in 40
C.F.R. § 260.2(b). The requirement in section 260.2(b) to submit a con-
temporaneous claim of confidentiality is limited to NOIs submitted under
the export requirements specified in Parts 260–265 and 268.454 This in-
cludes export requirements for most wastes, but it does not include NOIs
submitted for universal waste exports because the universal waste export
requirements are contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 273.455 Therefore, EPA has
concluded that it is necessary to provide an opportunity for parties export-
ing universal wastes to have notice and an opportunity to assert CBI claims
prior to disclosure of universal waste NOIs.456
Could EPA address CBI concerns in a way that allowed publication
of pending NOIs? Obviously EPA does not consider CBI concerns sufficient
to prohibit the publication of the type of summary information it makes
available regarding NOIs for export to non-OECD countries. It is unlikely
that the requirements of the international agreements impose a greater
barrier than FOIA.
EPA could also shorten the process of asserting CBI claims. EPA
currently requires that persons submitting a NOI under Subpart E assert
any CBI at the time of submission.457 EPA should obviously amend this rule
to require persons submitting a NOI under the universal waste rules to
also assert a claim at the time of submission. Further, under the OECD
Decision and EPA’s Subpart H regulations, information from the receiv-
ing facility must be submitted prior to export,458 and EPA could amend 40
C.F.R. section 260.2(b) to provide than any receiving facility also waives
confidentiality if not asserted at the time of submission of the NOI.
Most significantly, the limited data that would need to be published
to provide sufficient public information regarding a pending NOI, such as
the type of waste and the names of importing and transit countries, should
not qualify as confidential business information or trade secrets.
C. Don’t Ratify Basel
As discussed above, ratification of the Basel Convention by the
United States may require nothing more than filing of a notice with the
454 40 C.F.R. § 260.2(b).
455 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 273.
456 Inquiry to Learn Whether Businesses Assert Business Confidentiality Claims, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 363; Inquiry to Learn Whether Businesses Assert Business Confidentiality Claims,
75 Fed. Reg. at 44,951.
457 See 40 C.F.R. § 273 subpt. E.
458 See OECD Decision, supra note 62; 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.80–.89.
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Secretariat. There are also reasons to believe that all of the requirements
of Basel could be adopted as domestic regulations under the current pro-
visions of RCRA. The United States is thus in a position to join the inter-
national community as a party to Basel. But it shouldn’t. International
control of the exports of hazardous waste from the United States to non-
OECD countries may be better served by not ratifying Basel.
Under existing EPA regulations, all exports of hazardous waste to
non-OECD countries are currently subject to notice and consent require-
ments.459 However, as a non-ratifying party to the Basel Convention, the
export of hazardous wastes from the United States to those countries vio-
lates their obligations under Basel. In other words, as long as we do not
ratify Basel, any export of hazardous waste to a non-OECD country should
presumptively be a violation of legal obligations of the importing country.
To be sure, absent United States ratification, the export of haz-
ardous waste in violation of Basel does not violate RCRA. Thus, at the
moment, exports to non-OECD countries violates their laws, not ours,
and there is no role for enforcement by the United States.460 But it is dif-
ficult to believe that the situation would be improved by the United States
ratification of the treaty.461 Following ratification, even with adoption of
a RCRA regulatory requirement that authorized exports only if managed
in an “environmentally sound manner,”462 exports would presumptively be
allowed and proof of violations would require a case-by-case assessment
to determine if a given export complied with Basel requirements. Current
e-wastes being sent for reclamation would not be any more effectively
regulated if the United States ratifies Basel. If classified as a Subtitle C
hazardous waste, they should now be subject to notice and consent require-
ments. If not classified as Subtitle C hazardous wastes, ratification of
Basel will not ensure better regulation.
The current presumptive violation of Basel arising from the
exports from the United States to other than an OECD country provides
459 Proposed Hazardous Waste Exports to Non-OECD Countries, supra note 235.
460 Ratification of Basel by the United States might, however, have implications on the
ability of private parties to bring damage claims arising from improper disposal under the
Alien Torts Claims Act (“ATCA”). The ATCA provides United States jurisdiction for private
tort claims arising from violation of the “law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). There are arguments that the ATCA already applies if improper
disposal is a violation of customary international law. See Raechel Anglin, International
Environmental Law Gets Its Sea Legs: Hazardous Waste Dumping Claims Under the ATCA,
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 231, 262 (2007).
461 Ratification of Basel would also do little to address the significant compliance problems
associated with identifying exports that should be regulated as hazardous wastes.
462 Anglin, supra note 460, at 249.
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certainty and at least the opportunity to use public pressure on the receiv-
ing country to decline to consent to the transaction. As discussed above,
however, greater transparency in the process might help assure greater
public pressure on importing countries to decline to offer affirmative con-
sents to import.
CONCLUSION
EPA’s complex set of regulations governing the export of hazardous
waste creates a series of paradoxes. On the one hand, it appears that the
export of materials that EPA acknowledges as hazardous waste is confined
to OECD countries. Thus, many of the most contentious issues regarding
trade in hazardous waste with less developed countries may be moot. On
the other hand, EPA’s inadequate handling of the hazardous waste status
of many e-wastes makes complacency about EPA’s regulatory program
ill-advised.
EPA’s export regulations are both simple and complex. They are
simple because most, but not all, materials that constitute Subtitle C haz-
ardous wastes are subject to “notice and consent” requirements for export.
They are complex because of the dizzying set of different regulations that
EPA has promulgated to impose these requirements and the differing ratio-
nales that EPA has employed. EPA could do a better job of implementing
and simplifying its existing requirements and particularly clarifying the
hazardous waste status of e-wastes.
Further, EPA has also claimed authority to exempt materials from
classification as a hazardous waste and thus immune from export con-
trols. Curiously, through this same rationale, EPA has justified exempting
domestic wastes from regulation while imposing export requirements.
Finally, RCRA itself creates a constitutional and statutory paradox.
EPA both embraces and denies that it has authority to implement inter-
national agreements. The issue has inherent constitutional interest, but
it also has environmental consequence. If Congress can provide domestic
effect to any future international agreements, then EPA has authority
fully to implement OECD Decisions and the Basel Convention. If Congress
has not or cannot provide for the binding effect of future international
agreements, then portions of section 3017 become meaningless and there
are questions about the content of and procedures used to adopt EPA’s
export regulations.
